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It is 'a matter of particular satisfaction for "Planning Bulletin" 
to offer in this special number a select group of articles on economic 
theory and its application in economic and social development policy. 
In the light of Latin American and Caribbean experience, all these articles 
provide valuable material for helping to understand the relation between 
social programmes and their economic implications and to evaluate the 
welfare effects hoped for from all economic policies. In the discussion of 
the different topics a leading role has been assigned to the conceptual and 
technical elements involved in the process of planning and generating 
employment, which is a fundamental objective of all policies for eradicating 
poverty. 
This issue also includes valuable contributions by distinguished 
economists and sociologists on topics of fundamental importance for the 
design of the development strategy for the 1980s. Special mention may 
be made of such topics as social policy alternatives, the importance of 
social indicators in. development planning, the political viability of 
social development, and some considerations on a pioneer work byRagn_ar 
Frisch in the field of planning. 
In addition, this number contains an article that describes and 
analyzes economic policy and performance in Jamaica in the 1972-1980 period. 
We believe that this effort, constitutes a valuable contribution to the 
comprehension of this chapter in Jamaican economic history. 
Finally, as is customary, this issue includes summaries of the 
articles which appeared in edition N° 16 of CEPAL Review. 
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THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 2/ 
Vaughn A. Lewis 12/ 
This paper concerns the political-economic constraints on policy-
making relating to social development. We write with special reference to 
the Caribbean area, and in particular with that part of it which has 
acceeded to independence in the post-World War Two period - the Commonwealth 
Caribbean or Caribbean Community (CARICOM) area. As will be indicated 
below, the populations of these states forced the concession of sovereign 
independence from the British metropole through the use of the mechanism 
of universal suffrage. This implied that the indigenous political leaders 
who acceded to control in these territories, did so on the basis of mass 
support; and on the basis of promising certain specific improvements in 
economic and social welfare to the masses. 
For the populations of these states then, the expectation of 
persistently improving levels of economic and social development is embedded 
in the origins of the system. Such expectations provide an important part 
of the legitimacy of the political system. Further, because economic and 
social improvement constituted the prior claims of the majority of the 
population, the initially preferred mechanism - permitted within the 
system of colonial government of the time - was the trades union organisation, 
based on craft or occupational lines as was the case in the United Kingdom, 
or as territory-wide organisations - 'blanket unions'. 
2/) 	 Paper submitted to the "International Simposium on Social 
Development Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean during 1980's". 
Santiago, Chile, 12-15 April 1982. Not to be quoted without the 
permission of the author. The opinions expressed in this paper are the 
exclusive responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
opinion of the institution to which he is attached. 
The author is Director, of the Institute of Social and Economic 
Research University of the West Indies, Mona, Kingston, Jamaica. 
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Such trade unions, which often commenced their activity by seeking 
improvements - increased wages, better working conditions - in particular 
economic spheres, tended subsequently to generalise their demands. In the 
process of such generalisation, the conclusion tended to be drawn that a 
political instrument for representation of these wide social demands was 
required. Thus the union base was used as the fulcrum for organisation of 
the mass political party. The union leadership and the new political party 
leadership tended then to be constituted of the same individuals. The 
political party was perceived by the union membership as one of the direct 
weapons in the struggle for social improvement. 
Since the countries in question were in the main dominated by 
agricultural economies of the plantation type, the conditions of work 
of agricultural labour became a central preoccupation of the union leader-
ship. While on the other hand, the large, relatively homogenous work 
force characteristic of the plantation (sugar, banana), constituted a 
ready-made force available to the political party. 
This inter-relationship between agricultural labour and the political 
party, meant that changes in the nature of the plantation system were seen 
as among the immediately required results to be attained by the union-party 
leadership when universal suffrage was granted - and the indigenous popu-
lation given some participation in the decision-making of the system of 
colonial government in the territories. 
It should be noted however, that once, after the Second World War, 
the British Government conceded the complete legitimacy of union activity, 
and conceded that indigenous personnel would come to dominate the formal 
political and legal institutions of the territories, it sought to guide 
the development of unions and parties according to principles and practices 
developed and functioning in the United Kingdom. 
The plantation-type agricultural socio-economic systems that dominated 
the colonial territories in the Caribbean sub-region were the dominant type 
of system. But mention should be made of the existence of important mineral 
industries in some territories (petroleum in Trinidad, bauxite in Jamaica 
and Guyana) employing smaller numbers of people than the agricultural 
enterprise, though at much higher-wage rates; and providing the relevant 
Governments with higher levels of income than those dependent mainly on the 
agricultural export trade. Because of certain similarities in the dynamics 
of their functioning, Caribbean economics specialists of the post-independence 
period have labelled both the agricultural and mineral economies as 
plantation systems. 
It should in this context, then, also be noted that the Caribbean 
territories were the early location (like certain other colonial territories 
in Africa and the Pacific and South Asia) of a type of economic exploitation 
system which was the subject of extensive analysis in the 19601 s and 19701 s: 
the vertically-integrated corporation conducting activities over a widespread 
multicountry geographical space - the transnational corporation (TNC), like 
Tate and Lyle, the sugar producing enterprise. 
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In the English-speaking Caribbean area, the nationality of the TNC's 
tended at first to be British, reflecting the character of political 
dominance. In the middle 1950's, and then the 1960's, TNCs from the United 
States began to locate in this part of the Caribbean. This reflected also 
the beginning of a gradual British withdrawal from the sub-region, and the 
corresponding de facto increase in United States dominance as that country 
sought to fill any existing gaps in the Western Hemisphere strategic system. 
The implication of all this was (and remains) that any attempt by the 
new indigenous political parties to substantially change this socioeconomic 
system, meant that the parties were involving themselves not simply in 
challenging the domestic systems of the countries, but came up immediately 
against the international system of which the TNCs are an important 
component. The feasibility, then, of inducing major domestic change, was 
partly a function of the strength of the relevant international environment. 
We have elsewhere summarised this phenomenon by saying that for the 
Caribbean political leadership, any intervention in domestic political 
economy would tend to involve an intervention in international economy. 
This process is reinforced by the /open system' character of the Caribbean 
socio-economic systems. 
We should briefly describe some characteristics and domestic 
implications of the transnational corporations existing in different types 
of environments in the Caribbean: 
(i) In the case of the agricultural plantation system, the plantation 
tended to be spread widely over the physical space of the country, though 
it existed in some measure as a self-sufficient entity. 
(ii) In the mineral economy or that dominated by tourism, the system 
tended to be located in isolated areas -enclaves; these were again 
substantially self-sufficient, and not in any major way dependent on the 
local government or economy for provision of goods and services. 
(iii) In the agricultural enterprises -sugar, bananas, citrus, cocoa -
there was large-scale employment of labour at relatively low wage rates; 
basically homogeneous in functional capabilities, and concentrated. 
(iv) The mineral enterprises were characterised by employment of a 
relatively (to size of the labour force) small labour force, at high 
wage rates, and with functionally specialised skills and tasks. 
(v) Until well into the period of national independence; both the 
mineral and agricultural systems were managed at the territorial level 
by expatriate (non-indigenous) individuals. This survived longer in the 
mineral and tourism systems, than in the agricultural systems. 
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(vi) The two major types of enterprises (agricultural, mineral) gave 
rise to the formation of trade unions with different types of memberships. 
Unions dominated by agricultural labour tended to be large mass organisations; 
those dominated by mineral systems tended to be smaller though wealthier, 
with a membership subject to the Irocess of embourgeoisment, and somewhat 
apolitical. The important consequence of this distinction for the 
Caribbean socio-political system, was that it was the agriculturally based 
unions which tended to constitute the basis of the mass political movements. 
Mineral and service-based unions were secondary elements of the mass 
movements, though often providing leadership cadres, and being sometimes 
strategic for the crippling of the colonial (and even independence period) 
law and order system (we refer here to, for example, the strategic impor-
tance in 'national/ strikes of ports and telecommunications systems). 
The existence and dynamic development of, in particular, mineral 
and industrial (manufacturing import-substitution) enterprises, has given 
rise to various phenomena (problems): 
(i) Widening gaps in the income rewards going to the different 
sectors of the labour force, involving the growth in some degree of a sense 
of "relative deprivation". 
(ii) The development, therefore, of distortions in the wage 
structure as the demand for employment in mineral enterprises bid up the 
"reserve price of labour" - thus creating rigidities in the labour market 
and the phenomenon of unemployment in zones where there is an unfulfilled 
demand for labour. Distortions also arise in the demographic structure 
of the countries, as migration to /company towns/ occurs, and traditional 
patterns of settlement become disturbed. 
As a consequence of the development of such phenomena, pressures have 
developed on the post-independence, union-based government to "equalise" 
the differential rewards from TNC investment. Here arises the attempt by 
such Governments to 'redistribute' the income, employment and psychic 
rewards available in the system. Thus the appearance which these 
governments have, of being distributionist, as against productionist (new 
investment) in their policy emphases. 
Since the political directorate is one based on the universal suffrage, 
competitive party model, it feels it necessary to intervene in the pre-
viously agreed system of TNC-Government relations, and exert pressure 
on the TNCs in a number of ways; particularly where, as in the case of 
certain mineral commodities, demand for the TNCIs product is at a high 
level: 
(i) By seeking ever greater monetary income from the TNC, through 
negotiation for increased taxes or royalties. In Jamaica, for example, 
every electoral change of government has been accompanied by a renegotiation 
of the taxation-royalty agreements then in existence. 
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(ii) By seeking a wider representation in the structure of employment 
for its nationals engaged in the industry and employed by the TNC. 
(iii) By seeking to induce the TNC to provide greater spill-offs for 
the rest of the economy; in particular through the creation of backward 
linkages that would, inter alia, induce the growth of an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class. 
The purpose of seeking increased taxes or royalties from the TNCs, 
is to provide government with greater budgetary flexibility for servicing 
the demands of the mass population. This is especially important in 
circumstances where the Government has found itself incapable of generating 
major employment opportunities for relatively rapidly-growing populations. 
And if we examine this form of pressure along with the others, it 
might be noted that they service different kinds of local constituencies. 
The first is, in effect, a form of mass-based pressure, with implications 
for the formation in the national communities of a kind of populist economic  
nationalism. The second mode of pressure, that relating to widening 
representation in the employment structure, is in fact the basis for a 
narrower corporate nationalism, induced by and intended to reward a more 
highly skilled, and a higher income, grouping in the local community. 
The strategies of deriving greater rewards from the TNC system, and 
therefore, the political feasibility of achieving success in this endeavour, 
is therefore in part a function of the character of the local constituency 
that government intervention is intended to service. Different sectors of 
the work force employed by the TNC will not necessarily be in harmony with 
the negotiating strategy, since their differential location in the TNCIs 
employment structure induces differing perspectives on the possibilities 
of success by government, in conditions that will not negatively affect the 
TNC's commitment to continued investment in the particular State. 
To the extent then, that important financial resources for governmental 
use for social development derives from the local (that is, not including 
official external aid) budget; and to the extent that a major part of 
national income and foreign exchange resources derive from a single major 
economic activity (probably foreign-owned) in these mono-crop economies; to 
that extent will the political feasibility for deriving such resources be 
conditioned by the following: 
(i) The structure of the major industry (economic activity) and the 
strategic character of the demand for its product in the international 
system; 
(ii) The TNC' assessment of the development in the host country, 
and its assessment of the nature of both populist and corporate nationalism. 
This is usually what is meant by the euphemisms "political climate" or 
"political risk of investment" in the host country. 
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(iii) The Government's assessment of the vulnerability of the sources 
of both populist and corporate nationalism to internal or external pressure 
during the course of negotiation. 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POPULIST NATIONALISM 
Mass support is, of course, the base of populist nationalism. In 
the English-speaking Caribbean the unionisation of the labour force after 
the late 1930's, and the frequent transformation of the labour leadership 
into a political directorate after the grant of universal suffrage, led to 
the formation of governments espousing what today might be called a 
philosophy of labourism. At the time (especially in the 1940's and 1950's), 
this was referred to as socialism -encompassing a demand for better economic 
conditions (economic justice) for the labour force; secure and new employ-
ment for unemployed and under-employed; the transformation by gradual 
means of the essentially agricultural economies into industrialising 
economies. Such economies would be 'mixed' in two senses: they would be 
public/private sector economies, and they would be agricultural/industrial 
economies. And all this was to be accomplished within the framework of 
some form of parliamentary democracy. 
In pursuit of these objectives, the 'labour-based' political 
directorates adopted policies of 'industrialisation by invitation', 
directed to the rapid increase in employment. This foreign investment-
induced strategy turned out to be, in the larger countries, of the import-
substituting kind (as in much of South America) based not, as originally 
expected, on regionally integrated national economic systems, but on 
separate economic systems of limited market size. 
Though in fact there was an expansion of employment opportunities 
in these countries, the rapid growth of populations (therefore labour 
forces) due to better Government-provided medical and health facilities, 
in addition to the limits to import-substituted growth, led to the 
phenomenon of larger, unemployable labour forces. Relatively rapid 
economic growth (dominated by new enclave industries) accompanied by an 
expanding service class-middle sector, in the context of growing pools of 
unemployed fed by persistent rural-urban migration, led to serious 
perceptions of relative deprivation within these small communities. 
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By the end of the 1960's the political directorate, the rationale 
for whose existence was their promise to improve the conditions of labour, 
were widely perceived to have created a system in which the main bene-
ficiaries were the entrepreneurial and middle sectors. Further, the legi-
timacy of the union-party nexus as the fulcrum of national politics, was 
increasingly questioned, as it became apparent that a major part of the 
'labour force' was not only not unionised, but unemployed and not therefore 
capable of unionisation. This force - a veritable lumpen-proletariat -
however, was fully enfranchised. 
Now, the demographic structure of the Caribbean population as a whole 
had (has) also become progressively skewed towards the younger age groups. 
This additional factor means that there is now posed not simply a problem 
of the potential capability of the system for providing employment, but 
also of the more general capacity of the political system for providing 
social service and welfare arrangements for this group; and of the system's 
capacity to provide appropriate education towards employability in the 
economic system. 
The dimensions of the problem are suggested in the statement in the 
World Bank's recently published study .1/ on the CARICOM area, that "on 
average" 46 percent of the populations of the CARICOM countries are under 
the age of 15. According to this report, "in Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and 
the Windward Islands children under 15 years account for almost half of the 
total increase in population", though "in Barbados and Montserrat they are 
less than 40 percent of the total" (p.58). 
The problem has not, to this writer's knowledge, been more sharply 
posed in recent times, than in the Five Year Plan 1978-82 for Jamaica, 
published by the Government in 1979. 2/ The Plan notes in one of its 
projections - a projection of declining fertility for Jamaica (Projection 
11) - that there is a large (25 percent of the 1975 population) and 
accelerating (32 percent by 1983) population grouping in the 15-29 age 
group. Secondly, the Plan gives a present estimate of 40 percent "functional 
illiteracy" for the population as a whole. 
1/ S. Chernick, 
Experience, IBRD/John 
2/ What follows 
in Social and Economic 
The Commonwealth Caribbean: The Integration  
Hopkins University Press, 1978. 
is drawn from my extended review of the Plan, 
Studies, 1980 (ISER, University of the West Indies) • 
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Now Jamaica has in recent years devoted substantial resources to the 
effort to make a major assault on its inherited literacy problem. Yet 
by 1978, the authors of the Five Year Plan could still make the following 
observation: 
"In 1972 it was estimated that between 400 000 and 500 000 
persons over 15 years old were functionally illiterate, and 
according to JAMAL reports, 168 000 have been made literate 
through the programme. However, due to the fact that about 
40 percent of those leaving the formal education system are 
still functionally illiterate, the estimated number of illiterate 
adults is almost the same as it was in 1972". 
Dealing further with the age group 15-19, the observation is made that: 
"These ages include the critical periods of skill acquisition, 
entry into the labour force and the development of work habits 
and social attitudes... (but) the structure of the economy, 
the absolute size of the age group, and the prevalence of 
illiteracy makes absorption of youth into the socio-economic 
life of the country difficult". 
A reading of the Plan indicated a more than inferential linkage 
between employment, the development of small-scale agricultural, agro-
industrial, and industrial activities, the resolution of the problem of 
functional illiteracy, and the prospects for social peace and order. 
For most of the Caribbean countries, the inferences must be more or 
less the same. A 1979 World Bank Report on St. Lucia, noting that two-
thirds of the population of this country is under 25, goes on to observe 
that: 
"The youthfulness of the population... has led to a steady stream 
of school leavers who have caused the labour force to increase 
at a much faster rate (than the annual rate of population growth). 
The pace of economic development has not been sufficient to generate 
adequate employment for the burgeoning labour force. The trend 
has been exacerbated by declining production in agriculture and 
the inability of the tourism and manufacturing sectors to take 
up the slack as well as by declining rates of emigration in the 
1970's." 
In the face of such descriptions, it is not difficult to find, nor 
need one seek, deep explanations of political volatility in these countries. 
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This group of young, mostly functionally illiterate individuals, 
functions within the competitive political systems of the Caribbean as an 
essentially destabilising force, as politicians have fought either to 
absorb or suppress it, depending on their, and its, location in the extant 
political system. The Caribbean political directorate has for most part 
come to the conclusion that a way must be found of absorbing the group 
into the socio-economic system, if the political system and therefore the 
policy-making process are not to be subject to continual instability. 
The appropriate absorption of the youth population into employment is, in 
fact, the central contemporary problem of economic planning in the sub-
Region. And insofar as in some of the countries, it is compounded by the 
problem of functional illiteracy, then the question of the link between 
the form of education provided, and the character of the employment intended, 
is an important aspect of the problem. 
On the other hand, this youth grouping is now the basis of much of 
what is called populist politics in the sub-Region. And political parties, 
operating within the framework of the competitive party system that still 
has much legitimacy in the countries, function, and propose policies in 
such a manner as to suggest that the policy options for solution of these 
problems are in fact much wider than they really are. In the contemporary 
period, characterised by unstable international economic conditions and 
lessening financial flexibility in their domestic systems, the constraints 
which they have discovered in exercising policy options, have forced the 
politicians to seek unorthodox (within the history of these political 
systems) solutions. What then appear to the metropolitan policy-makers as 
conscious ideological choices, are in fact pragmatic courses, taken under 
pressure from disappointed populist forces. 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, SOCIAL SECTORS AND POLICY 
CONSTRAINTS 
Populist pressures, whether in Jamaica, Trinidad or Guyana, in the 
late 1960's and 70's, have induced the political directorate engaged in the 
strategy of industrialisation-by-invitation and import substitution, to 
seek additional financial resources which can be diverted to the long- and 
short-term needs of the mass populations. The industrialisation strategy 
had meant that Governments chose to forego, through the grant of various 
kinds of incentives to both local enterpreneurs and manufacturing TNCs, 
revenue that might have been obtained, among other ways, through corporate 
taxation. The justification was that such a strategy was, for a region 
of small economic size and limited material resources, the only way of 
inducing the TNCs into investment whose ultimate rationale was (from the 
point of view of the Governments) local employment. 
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Governments had two additional sources of revenue for social expendi-
tures. One was through recourse to assistance from regional and inter-
national economic institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) and the World Bank (IBRD), and the various United Nations institutions 
concerned with development aid. The construction of schools and health 
facilities is indicative of this kind of assistance for investment in 
physical and human resources. 
One impediment, however, to this assistance for the sub-Regional 
states, was the difficulty of obtaining funds from the 'soft loan windows' 
of the financial institutions, on the grounds that their per capita incomes 
(high relative to most Third World countries) placed them outside the 
category entitled to such assistance. Another impediment for one specific 
state, Guyana, was a function of geopolitics: the Venezuelan territorial 
claim against Guyana barring that country from membership of the OAS and 
therefore (until recently), from the IADB. 
The independent countries of the sub-Region at that time, were in 
fact beneficiaries of the era of relative plentifulness in official aid 
deriving from the Alliance for Progress philosophy. Though, one state, 
Trinidad and Tobago, was to complain in the late 1960/s, that precisely 
at the time when its foreign exchange reserves were minimal (as a conse-
quence of the decline of her major export staple), and when therefore, such 
external assistance was really needed, the Iconditionalities/ attaching 
to assistance inhibited the Government from availing itself of it. 
The second source of revenue for major social expenditure, has been 
foreign exchange from windfall gains deriving from periodic high prices 
or high demand for the local export staple. Very often in the 1970's, 
Governments have used such financial resources to meet short-term (immediate) 
mass demands (food subsidies, special employment programmes). Such 
allocations have served the purpose not only of raising living levels 
(albeit temporarily as some would claim), but also of stabilising the 
political system under pressure from the deprived. Such allocations have 
also been made often against the advice to bureaucrats concerned with both 
budgetary control and long-term development planning; and of private 
enterpreneurs concerned with maximising subsidies to the private sector. 
Both of these groups tend to claim that Government should make more 
'rational' allocations of such unexpected, and historically transitory 
resources. 
Experience has been that with the end of favourable international trade 
circumstances, and the decline of the windfall gains, the strain on 
national income and the budget to maintain these 'short-term' allocations, 
has led to excessive deficit financing, foreign exchange crises, and 
consequent pressure from both internal and external sectors to exercise 
financial constraint through the reduction of social expenditure. In the 
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late 1970's, non-oil producing states have been the objects of such 
pressures, as even the relative stability of the post-war international 
economic system came to an end. For such countries, there occured a 
conjuncture of both unfavourable international and domestic conditions. 
The situation of Jamaica in the late 1970's is indicative of this 
situation; though other states in the sub-Region were also subject to it. 2 
The unfavourable international conditions had two aspects: 
(i) A global situation in which the metropoles were characterized 
by inflation, increasing unemployment, adjustment to the monetary effects 
of the transfer of resources to the oil-producing states, less buoyant 
international trade and therefore less demand for developing country 
products in general; 
(ii) With particular reference to Jamaica, instability and declining 
demand for the country's major foreign exchange earner - bauxite-alumina. 
The imposition of higher taxation on the TNCs, appears simply to have 
reinforced their inclination to reduce investment and exploitation of the 
product. 
Unfavourable domestic conditions (a process) included: 
(i) Decreasing buoyancy of the local economy, increasing unemployment, 
increasing lack of flexibility in using the normal mechanisms of economic 
policy because of inadequate foreign exchange reserves; 
(ii) Increasing dependence on official external sources for meeting 
immediated government revenue demands. 
Such a conjuncture led (in the case of Jamaica) to an increasing 
paralysis of the economic policy-making machinery, as Government became 
subject to conflicting demands from its populist support base on the one 
hand, and the domestic private sector and the political factions repre-
senting them, and the international financial institutions, on the other. 
External demands focussed, inter alia on the area of reduction of short-
term social expenditure, leading to a political situation far from optimal 
for a Government operating within the competitive party system. In the 
clash between competing sectors, some of which in this open system are 
abetted from 'outside' the system, the weaker and socially-deprived sectors, 
and the political factions representing them, are invariably defeated in 
the struggle over the budgetary allocation process. 41  
3/ Discussion of some of these factors can be found in N. Girvan 
et al., "The IMF and the Third World: The Case of Jamaica 1974-80", 
Development Dialogue, 1980:2, pp. 113.155; and in Adlith Brown, "Jamaican 
Economic Policy in the 1970's", ISER, UWI (mimeo), 1979. 
4 The work of Markos Mamalakis on the theory of sectoral clashes 
is instructive and helpful in this regard. 
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SOCIAL POLICY PRIORITIES IN AN UNFAVOURABLE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The instability of the economic growth process (periodic recession) 
in the major metropoles, with its concomitant effect on international trade, 
has not only contributed to the slowing of the growth process in many 
Third World states. It has also provided a rationale for metropolitan 
Government's desires to reduce their contributions to the international 
aid programmes, both bilateral and multilateral. 
At the same time, Third World countries, including those in the 
Caribbean have, with the decline in the scope for import-substitution 
and the pressure on foreign exchange resources, decided to pursue the 
path of export (manufacturers) - led growth - preferably for the smaller 
economies, through the joint-venture process. The political directorate 
is of course aware that dependence on the major traditional staples 
(bauxita, tourism, sugar, bananas), and thus the revival of international 
trade, are still crucial short-run factors for them. 
There is, nevertheless, an awareness that with the deliberate 
official bias towards raising the level of manufactured exports, with 
its consequent bias in incentives towards the private sector industrializer 
alld the agents of direct foreign investment, some care should be taken 
to ensure the social development of the actual and potential labour force 
- if only to equip them physically and technically for the possibility 
of employment in the industrial sector. (In most of the Caribbean states, 
it is conceded that for the long-term, agriculture of the plantation type 
will not be a major employer of labour; yet, apart from a recent rhetorical 
commitment to the necessity for food production, there is little detailed 
emphasis on the methodology of agro-industry production). 
With the scarce financial resource situation in a context of growing 
youth populations, international assistance programmes to Governments 
would seem to need to be directed to ensuring the provision of (a) basic 
needs for these populations and (b) appropriate educational (technical 
and vocational) training and facilities for small-scale employment in 
both urban and rural areas. 
The rationale for this approach is as follows (and is deducible 
from what has been said above). In the sectoral struggle for scarce 
budgetary resources in a period of relative financial deprivation, 
Governments' commitments to export led growth biasses budgetary expenditure 
and governmental attention towards the private entrepreneurial sector. 
It is true that the maintenance of existing health and educational 
infrastructures consumes a major proportion of national budgets. These 
infrastructures however, still service an insufficient proportion of the 
urban and rural poor. In addition, educational structures are largely 
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of the traditional kind, and largely incapable of dealing with the existing 
functional illiteracy problem. Little too, has been done in these countries 
to attempt to determine what mix of educational skills is most appropriate 
to what form of existing or potential employment. 
A bias in international assistance towards the areas outlined above 
would, therefore, be useful for two reasons. First, it would rebalance the 
weight and influence of the rural-urban poor in the resource allocation 
system, and ensure a reasonable allocation of resources towards that sector. 
Secondly, it would ensure some modicum of continuity and stability in the 
resources allocated to these sectors, isolating them somewhat from the 
tendency to treat them as 'first victims' of budget-paring processes. 
SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION AND INFLUENCE ON POLICY MAKING 
As we have intimated above, the necessity for Government to give 
priority to the industrialization process, and to open the channels of 
influence in a substantial way, has lessened the role and influence of the 
labour movement over these labour-based Governments. Within the essentially 
Westminster parliamentary systems which exist in the CARICOM area, parlia-
mentary representatives and the Executive arrogate to themselves the major 
roles in decision-making. They use the labour movement as a support 
battalion when necessary; but essentially relegating it to the status of 
one pressure group among others. The historical primacy of labour in the 
process of attainment of independence is not necessarily acknowledged as 
relevant to the contemporary period; though labour's support is momentarily 
required at election periods. 
In the 1960's, labour as an institutional economic sector was called 
upon by Governments to give support to the attempt to establish institutions 
to control the alleged excessive growth of wage costs in the production 
system; and thus to help ensure external competitiveness. This was the 
period of incomes policies, paralleling similar innovations occuring in the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere in the metropolitan world. 
Here was an attempt, in effect, to establish a corporate system, 
parallel to the Westminster political system, for purposes of economic 
decision-making - or better said, for purposes of legitimising Governmental 
decision-making. In this system, labour and capital as the major 
institucional groups, were to have equal institutional weight in the 
system, the price of which for labour was the trading off of 'excessive' 
wage claims against the promise of long-term stability in employment and 
real income. In constitutional terms, Government's objective was the 
establishment of some form of National Economic Development Councils. 
(It should be noted however, that in the Westminster system, the process 
of budget formulation is a highly secretive one. Discussion of Govern-
mental proposals is therefore extremely limited. Though there is 
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extensive discussion in parliamentary committees after the announcement of 
the Budget, Government is by then firmly committed to the main lines of 
its budgetary policy). 
In many countries, this attempt to induce labour into the decision-
making system was not successful. In Trinidad and Tobago, for example, 
its failure was marked by the establishment of the Industrial Stabilisation 
Act, involving the legislation of wage-setting procedures and appropriate 
sanctions. This had the effect there of further alienating a major part 
of the labour movement, eventually setting Government and labour in 
conflict, with private sector supporting Government. 
In Jamaica in the late 1970's, the International Monetary Fund's 
insistence on severe budgetary restrictions, forced the Government, in 
its pursuit of national support for such policies, to entertain a wide 
measure of public discussion of economic proposals, before their formal 
enunciation. But the division of the labour movement in that country 
along party-competitive lines, inhibited the process of decisional 
commitment that was the desired outcome. 
The problem of various socio-economic sectors' influence in economic 
and social decision-making processes, and its relation to the Westminster 
parliamentary-executive system's insistence that it should retain 
institutional primacy is still an unresolved one. This general problem 
is often discussed as if the Caribbean country's politico-economic system 
is de facto an autonomous one, not subject to major external institutional 
and processual influence. 
One consequence is, that while the Executive is asserting its 
right to virtually exclusive decision-making at the expense of labour, 
external decision-makers are simultaneously exerting major influence 
on the same decision-making process. And to the extent that the local 
entrepreneurial sector has historically had, and maintains, strong 
channels of mutual influence to external decision-makers, the institu-
tional bias against the influence of labour is further exacerbated. 
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ALTERNATIVES OF SOCIAL POLICIES FOR LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE EIGHTIES 2_<-/ 
Don Mills il2L/ 
In the face of the complex issues which are the subject of our 
discussions I have no prescriptions or formula to offer. I shall express 
some thoughts which reflect my own deep concern about the future of 
development in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Almost all of the countries of the region have attained independence, 
some a considerable time ago, others, notably in the Caribbean, in relati-
vely recent years. They have concentrated their energies on the struggle 
for development, and for a just international economic order. In the 
process these countries have, in general, achieved some considerable succe-
sses. But such progress has often been won at a high cost in social terms. 
The countries of the region are now confronted with the circumstances 
of a world which is going through a process of rapid transformation. It is 
a period of grave economic difficulties, and of considerable tension within 
societies and countries, and between countries with open conflicts in some 
instances. Underlying all of this is the rising demand for political 
expression and participation and for social advancement. 
In the words of Mahbub ul Haq: 
"Our age has been described variously as the Age of Technology, the 
Age of Anarchy, the Age of Uncertainty. If we are to survive at all as the 
human race, we must graduate into an Age of Equality, since equality of 
opportunity has increasingly become the central issue of our time". 
42I Paper submitted to the "International Simposium on Social 
Development Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean durin.g 1980's". 
Santiago, Chile, 12-15 April 1982. 
Former Secretary of State (Jamaica). The opinions expressed 
in this paper are of exclusive responsibility of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of the institution to which he is attached. 
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For Latin America and the Caribbean the problems and challenges are 
no less than elsewhere. In my own view the decade of he 1980's will be 
a most difficult one for the region: no problem facing these countries 
is greater than that which relates to the issue which is the subject of 
our discussion -namely how will the create and sustain truly equitable 
societies. While the countries of the region share some of the problems 
of the other parts of the world, they also face some circumstances of a 
special nature. These include the composition of their populations and 
in particular the pre-Colombian peoples, the large inflows of population 
from Europe, from Africa and in some cases from Asia; the evolution of 
a variety of political institutions and forms of Government; and the very 
nature of the economic development in the countries, especially in the 
post-World War II years. 
The demand for a greater degree of equity is universal. It is no 
respector of political or economic systems. 
One of the major lessons of the past 30 years, a period which has 
witnessed great concern and considerable effort in respect of economic 
development at the national, regional and global levels, is the paradox, 
the contradiction between economic growth and social justice. It is no 
wonder then that there has been in more recent years a growing preoccupation 
with the issue of the gaps - in income, in opportunity, in technology, in 
education, in information - between North and South, but also within 
countries. 
The industrialized countries, as their economies have advanced, have 
used a variety of devices to limit or to narrow the gap between sectors 
of their populations, or between regions of their countries. It is 
interesting to observe also that some services concern has been expressed 
about the gaps in development and income between the more and the less 
affluent countries of the European Community 
The industrialized countries today face a serious dilemma. The 
social provisions, the welfare systems, which have been taken to such 
lenghts, in some instances, during the boom period of economic growth of 
the 1950's to the early 1970', are now threatened by the prolongued 
economic crisis. Deep differences have existed between OECD countries 
over economic policies related to the high levels of unemployment now 
being experienced. 
It has been argued, by some prominent leaders in the North, that 
the "industrialized democracies", the one-man-one-vote-countries, have 
largely based their social provisions on the expectation of continued 
significant economic growth. In the face of what might prove to be a 
period of slow growth, or no growth, these countries face the necessity 
of cutting back on the social and welfare benefits and expenditures, and with 
that their governments face the possibility of being voted out of power. 
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But this dilemma is not confined to the richer countries. The 
situation is basically the same in Jamaica and other countries of the 
Caribbean and in many Latin American countries. 
Indeed to a degree it faces all countries, whether they are described 
as democracies or not. The significant point made by the persons in the 
North expressing these concerns is that such situations can erode the 
foundations of the democratic system, since in times of hardship it is 
almost impossible for a government to carry out what it might regard as 
strong measures of economic management. 
It is in these circumstances that we are considering what Latin 
America and the Caribbean can do in the 1980's to isgnificantly advance 
its performance in the field of social development. 
The situation in Latin America has been summed up by Enrique 
Iglesias as follows: 
"one of the major contradictions in Latin America in recent years 
is that in spite of its achievements in figures and indicators, the social 
situation of the region has improved only for certain minority groups and 
very little for the rest". 
It has been projected that by the year 2000 A.D. most of Latin 
America will have reached a per capita GNP of US$2 000, that is about 
the same as Europe in 1960. There will still be many countries of the 
world with a far lower per capita GNP. Is Latin America likely to achieve 
a balance between economic growth and social development over the next 
two decades that will allow a favourable comparison with the Europe of 
1960? To do so, or do better than that, will require significant changes 
in perception in policies and in political and governmental system. In 
any event the comparison with Europe may be of little value. 
I believe that the issue of social justice is at the root of the 
tensions and upheaves in Central America today, and the problems of the 
Caribbean countries. Inevitably, there are other factors involved, but a 
mis-reading of the real root causes will diminish greatly the prospect 
of effective solutions. 
There is no lack of recognition of these issues in international fora. 
The International Development Strategy for the Decade of the 1980's was 
approved by the U.N. General Assembly in October 1980. The strategy was 
prepared against the background of the ongoing crisis in the international 
economic system, the deteriorating position of developing countries as a 
whole, the rising tension in many parts of the world, the erosion of 
economic and social gains, and the diminishing prospects of those who had 
so far only the hope of such gains. The preparation of the Strategy 
involved meetings at the regional level, and gave Latin American countries 
and others the opportunity of contributing ideas and proposals. 
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The Strategy inevitably uses moderate language and speaks in general 
terms on such issues as the urgent need to achieve real social progress 
in developing countries. 
"It is for each country to establish adequate national objectives 
for the promotion of human and social development within the framework 
of its development plans. The final aim of development must be the 
continuing increase in the well-being of the entire population on the 
basis of its full participation in the process of development and a fair 
distribution of the benefits therefrom". 
The Strategy goeS on to deal with some of the critical requirements: 
- the reduction and elimination of poverty; 
- the achievement of full employment; 
- the implementation of the recommendations of the World Population 
Plan of Action; 
- the development of human resources, by education and other means, 
to enhance the capacity of people to participate constructively 
in the development process; 
- the attainment by the year 2000 of a level of health that will 
permit all peoples of the world to lead a socially and economically 
productive life; 
- the provision of basic shelter and infrastructure for all people 
in rural as well as urban areas; 
- the securing of equal participation by women both as agents 
and as beneficiaries, in all sectors and at all levels of the 
development process. 
Although some specific targets are contained in the Strategy, these 
aims are in the main stated in general terms. Moreover it clearly 
emphasises "that each country will freely determine and implement appropriate 
policies for social development within the framework of its development plans 
and priorities and in accordance with its cultural identity, socio-economic 
structure and stage of development". 
The approach embodied in the Strategy has been described as "the 
utopian-normative approach" and a comment on the Strategy for the 1970's 
may be recalled here. 
"Its shortcomings when pursued in isolation (or its illegitimate 
uses as an evasion of reality) are cruelly exposed in a world in which 
the dimensions of injustice insecurity and violence continue to grow 
while the list of "rights" to which all human beings are entitled by the 
votes of their governments continues to lengthen". 1/ 
1 Marshall Wolfe, "Approaches to Development: Who is Approaching 
What?"in CEPAL Review. First half of 1976. 
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Attempts have been made to establish a clear connection between 
this issue of social development and the call for the New International 
Economic Order. Some interests in industrialized countries have gone 
so far as to virtually imply that evidence of movement toward the 
achieving of social justice in developing countries should be a precondition 
for movement on North/South proposilions. While such a condition is 
unacceptable the fact is that there must be a clear connection. The search 
for global equity must be a part and a vital part at that, of the concern 
for the improvement in the condition of the individual human being. These 
movements, toward equity and social and economic justice within countries, 
represent two of the major forces which will affect all countries in the 
years ahead. Together they represent a formidable combination which could 
affect Latin America and the Caribbean deeply. 
The issue of basic needs came to prominence in the context of the 
North/South discussions 	 It has been the subject of suspicion as to the 
motives of some of those in the North who pressed the idea. In fact there 
has been more than an element of oversimplification in the presentation 
of this issue by some. A proposition which clearly has its merits, seems 
to have been regarded by these persons as a total development thesis 
- rather than a very important element in a much more complex political, 
social and economic effort. 
The view of the World Bank is that the issue of growth versus basic 
needs must be carefully analysed and that good performance in meeting 
basic needs does not cause lower growth rates. The Bank has stated that 
"total attention to increasing the rate of growth of GNP without explicit 
attention to the problem of absolute poverty and basic needs would cause 
important opportunities for making immediate benefits available to the 
poor to be missed. In addition, adherence to the idea of growth now, 
alleviation of poverty later "could cause the development of an entrenched 
middle-class favoured by government services, and make reallocation of 
resources at a later date just that much more difficult"... "the more 
pressing needs of ... societies", the Bank states "can be met at low 
levels of national income". 
But the question that arises is this. Can you change the 
distribution of income and opportunity and of power in a community in a 
fundamental way through a programme which concentrates on meeting basic 
needs? Whatever good may be achieved through such an approach, may it 
not leave much of the basic social and economic structure virtually 
intact? 
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Here it should be noted that there are those in industrialized 
countries who are quite willing to assist in improving conditions in 
developing countries but who have shown no inclination to address the 
structural factors which are at the root of the imbalances and inequities 
in the relations between North and South. And as we call on the industria-
lized countries to exercise the political will to face and to deal with 
these factors, we have to ask whether developing countries will summon 
the political will to carry out the structural and other changes required 
in their communities in the interests of social justice. 
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SOCIAL INDICATORS AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING ±/ 
Christian Leipert and 
Udo Ernst Simonis 2(.2t/ 
1. Social indicators - what for? 
There is no generally recognized definition of social indicators. How-
ever, there is a large measure of agreement, in the planning literature and 
in the practical work of national and international organizations, that 
social indicators should record the results of socio-economic, social and 
political processes which fall outside the areas normally covered by eco-
nomic indicators (Leipert 1978: 91 et seq.; Peters and Zeugin 1 979; 45 et 
seq.). Moreover, these results are required to provide also information on 
aspects of social and/or individual welfare (quality of life, conditions of 
life, level of living) which are not recorded by traditional economic re-
porting (national accounts, management accounting). Demarcation from 
economic reporting - a characteristic feature of many attempts to define 
social indicators - points at the same time to the conditions of scientific 
and social origin behind the demand for the development of social indicators 
and their use in practice. Furthermore, the increasing awareness, at the 
end of the ,60s, of unfavourable concomitants of rapid economic growth in 
the industrial countries also resulted in criticism of the established method 
of measuring growth (= welfare). In the economic policy of the industrial 
countries a high rate of growth of the gross national product (i.e. all of 
the goods and services produced within an economy over a period, which are 
used for purposes of consumption, investment and export, valued at market 
2.(-/ Reprinted from Economics, Vol. 24. Institute for Scientific Co-
operation, 1981. pp. 47-67. 
-!±/ Assistant Professor at the University of Ausburg. 
Professor of Economics at the Technical University of Berlin. The 
opinions expressed in this paper are of the exclusive responsibility of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the institution to 
which he is attached. 
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prices) had become the predominant objective-variable and parameter of 
success (on its measurement, cf.BrUmmerhoff 1975). The planners and 
decision-makers of economic policy associated or identified a high growth-
rate of the gross national product (GNP) in real terms, explicitly or 
implicitly, with a high growth-rate of social and individual welfare. It 
was precisely this equation of economic growth with increased welfare that 
caused the criticism of the measurement of economic growth and the demand 
for liberation of welfare-measurement from the confines of the economic 
reference-frame, by means of social indicators. 
Criticism was expressed at two levels. Sociologists pointed, with a 
view to criticism of ideology, to the "economistic reduction of the welfare-
concept", as they called, in the current use of economic variables (GNP, in 
particular) as welfare indicators. In their view, the prerequisites for 
measuring welfare by means of economic variables no longer existed. Clear 
signs of this were the adverse effects which accompanied economic growth, 
in relation to the social and physical environment, these are not recorded 
in economic reporting or are only falsified as favourable effects. In the 
view of this line of criticism, for more comprehensive and less biased 
measurement of welfare it was necessary to construct a system of welfare 
(or social) reporting, with which the quality of life and its trends could 
be revealed, beyond the narrower economic sphere. 
The second line of criticism worked out mainly the actual inadequacies 
of the GNP as the predominant measure of welfare. This debate took place 
largely within economic science, with some of those taking part advocating 
improvement of the GNP-concept, in the sense of making it more adaptable 
as a welfare indicator. In the course of this debate, Sametz (1968), 
Nordhaus/Tobin (1972) and the Japanese NNW study group (Economic Council 
of Japan 1973) submitted calculations of a revised, welfare-oriented 
national-product-variable (net national welfare index), in which "negative" 
welfare items (such as environmental maintenance costs, environmental 
pollution, losses due to urbanization) were deducted from the conventional 
GNP, and "positive" welfare items (such as monetary equivalents of leisure 
and non-market activities) were added (Simonis 1980). The potential of 
this revised approach for development planning is not yet fully known, one 
reason being the high degree of consensus that is necessary for extension 
of the monetary approach to non-market spheres of human behaviour (cf. more 
detail on this in: Leipert 1975: 160 et. seq). Yet, even economists and 
planners who tend to be sceptical about the possibilities of an agreement 
on new conventions for more extensive monetary welfare-measurement, advocate 
adding to traditional economic reporting social indicators which can express 
the non-economic aspects of the quality of life more clearly and more 
directly than seems to be possible with non-market phenomena expressed 
in monetary terms. 
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2. Reasons for the use of social indicators in 
development planning 
The criticism of economic growth that started at the end of the '60s 
and beginning of the '70s was not confined to the industrial countries. At 
the same time as the welfare effects of economic growth were being 
questioned in the industrial countries, a debate arose in the developing 
countries, in the international institutions and in economic science, on 
the success or failure of growth policy in the developing countries and on 
the suitability of GNP as the most important indicator of development. 
In an atmosphere of euphoria over modernization, development planning 
in many countries of the Third World was based upon the development theories 
borrowed from Western countries and upon the strategies of growth-maximiza-
tion that derived from them. Development assistance, too, was based upon 
the "trickle-down" postulate of the theory of economic growth. This was the 
notion that the maximization of GNP in a developing country would set in 
motion a chain of structural changes which, in turn, would ensure that the 
'fruits of gro.th,  are passed on to the mass of the population. This 
"trickle-down" postulate is rooted in neo-classical growth theory and 
abstracted in the Harrod-Domar model which formed the theoretical basis of 
most development plans in the '50s and '60s. The Harrod-Domar model in 
simplified form is based upon the assumption tht growth depends upon the 
accumulation of capital - and, in expanded form, upon the availability of 
foreign exchange and the domestic capacity to save (saving-accumulation). 
Development assistance as financial aid and the role of industrialization 
as a motive force for growth are rooted in these assumptions. 
On average, the developing countries have achieved high rates of 
growth of GNP; yet the 'fruits of growth' have not reached the mass of the 
population - on the contrary; the gap between the "haves" and the "have-
nets", between the urban elites and the rural poor, the educated and the 
illiterate, the employed and the unemployed /ias widened. Three decades 
of statistically measured economic growth have in many cases not led to 
"development", and this may be proved by a few facts: about 1,000 million 
people in the world are undernourished in the sense of suffering from 
extensive deficiencies of calories and protein; 1,000 million people are 
inadequately housed; 1,000 million are illiterate; 1,300 million people 
earn less than the equivalent of 90 dollars a year and thus form the hard 
core of poverty; 1,500 million people have no access to medical care, 
1,700 million no access to clean drinking water, and for about 1,700 million 
people life expectancy is less than 60 years (McHale and McHale 1979). 
Thus, the expected results from policy programmed for a high rate of 
economic growth (GNP) did not materialize. Whereas in the industrial 
countries, in particular, disillusionment set is in connection with 
incresing environmental pollution resulting from high growth-rates and 
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the structure of production and consumption, in the developing countries 
the main reason was the experience of deteriorating patterns of distribution 
in the course of growth - or, in concrete terms, inadequate conversion of 
the results of economic growth in reducing absolute poverty and satisfying 
basic human needs. 
2.1. The unsatisfactory results of growth-oriented development planning 
Development planning and development policy stamped with Western 
growth-theory ideas were directed mainly towards promotion of the so-called 
modern (formal) sector of the economy (cg. Addicks/BUnning 1979: 12 et seq.). 
A process of self-sustaining growth was to be set in motion in the modern 
sector by means of a high rate of investment; it is being assumed that the 
transmission of the growth-stimuli to the traditional (informal) sector, 
largely being unintegrated in the money-based economy, would bring about 
improvement of the conditions of development there also. 
However, in most developing countries the upswing in the economy that 
was produced in the so-called modern (formal) sector resulted in accentua-
tion of the overall disparities in the conditions of life. On the one hand, 
only relatively few people profited from the expansion of the mostly 
capital-intensive market production and market income. On the other hand, 
for parts of the population in the traditional sector the conditions of life 
deteriorated owing to adverse repercussions of expansion of the modernized, 
monetary sector of the economy. The migratory movement of 'downgraded' 
parts of the rural population into the 'cancerously' expanding conurbations, 
or the increasing use of agricultural land for export-oriented production 
accompanied by neglect of domestic supplies, are examples of adverse effects 
of a growth policy which was one-sided, disregarding the social consequences. 
When it was observed that the economic and social inequalities of a 
growth policy directed primarily towards capital accumulation in the modern 
sector were becoming more pronounced, problems arose regarding both the 
development policy and planning practised hitherto and also the current 
measurement of development by means of indicators of the traditional national 
accounts; the economistic orientation of the development concept fell into 
the crossfire of criticism (on this, Tevoedjre 1980 is excellent). 
The adoption of Western production and consumption models, the 
application of capital-intensive techniques and the influence of Western 
institutions were interpreted as expropriation of autochthonous skills and 
cultural values. The debate then began as to what should be understood 
by development and by the main objectives of development in the developing 
countries; sociological, psychological theories and theories of comparative 
cultural anthropology gained in significance. A characteristic feature 
here was a recall of own cultural traditions, which had been devalued, as 
barriers to development, in the course of modernization. 
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2.2. The move towards basic needs-oriented development planning 
In the debate on development policy, this new sensitivity to the in-
adequacies of a "transplanted" growth policy and to the desirability of 
preserving cultural traditions led to a new paradigm of development. As 
an alternative to traditional growth-oriented development strategy and the 
trickle-down paradigm, since the beginning of the '70s development planning 
has been directed increasingly towards "basic needs" and "redistribution 
with growth". The new concept is focussed upon the situation with which 
traditional, growth-oriented policy was unable to deal, namely inadequate 
satisfaction of basic needs for large parts of the population. Under this 
new conception, the elimination of the inadequacies in the satisfaction 
of basic needs is to be the principal task of development planning and the 
main criterion in the selection of development projects and programmes. 
A basic-needs policy, of course, is not incompatible with growth per se; 
the two concepts are established at different levels or are directed towards 
different priorities. Traditional economic growth policy has social 
consequences which are reflected in, among other things, the (low) level of 
satisfaction of basic needs. The basic needs-oriented policy has economic 
consequences (and preconditions) which can be measured by, amongst other 
means, the absolute level, the formative structure and (above all) the 
distribution of real economic growth. Basic needs-orientation therefore 
means at least that the priorities of economic activity are set differently 
and that attention is devoted primarily to the distribution of produced 
goods and services. A growth of economic production could be aimed at, 
the pattern and distribution of which bring about the maximum effect in 
reducing poverty and satisfying basic human needs. It is, in this sense, 
an attempt to synthesize the growth-objective with the objectives of redistri-
bution and the creation of jobs through the production of goods and services 
for the satisfaction of basic needs. 
A prerequisite for the realization of this kind of new development 
pattern is institutional change (e.g. the redistribution of arable land). 
Political and/or economic power-structures often stand in the way of a more 
even distribution of goods and services and a pattern of production directed 
towards basic needs. It would therefore be naive to deal with a concept of 
basic needs-orientation to the exclusion of the dominant power structure and 
special-interest situations in a given developing country. It is precisely 
this disregard of the political and institutional factors that is charac-
teristic of the traditional growth-oriented approaches of development 
planning; although this may be more understandable there, because the 
growth-oriented concepts are usually based upon the existing power structures. 
The basic needs-strategy adopted by the World Employment Conference 
of 1976 and confirmed by the UN General Assembly, includes the notion that 
satisfaction of the basic needs of the population must be the primary 
objective of development planning and of any actual development plan 
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(Article 1). According to the definition adopted by the World Employment 
Conference, basic needs embrace: the regular minimum re(luirement of food, 
housing and clothing for the individual and his family, and also vital 
public services, especially drinking water, sanitary installations, public 
transport and health and educational facilities (Article 2). 
Development planning which is concerned with the fulfilment of these 
basic requirements cannot determine at all or can determine only inadequa-
tely, by means of the available traditional economic reporting, the situation 
within the different areas of basic needs and also the success of develop-
ment projects and programmes for selective covering of basic needs. It 
requires additional, different data, an information system which measures 
directly the social consequences of economic growth in general and of 
development planning in particular. This means that a system of social 
indicators is required, with the aid of which the actual situation, the 
desired situation, the deficiency of supply in each particular case and 
the success of special measures in the various areas of basic needs can be 
determined and evaluated (Addicks 1977: 297 et seq.; Morris 1 979; Lisk 
1979: 241 et seq.). 
In Table 1, fr a number of selected countries, some social indicators 
related to basic needs are presented, the values of which were collected 
by the World Bank. In accordance with the basic needs-concept, the 
indicators have to he able to provide information particularly on the dis-
tribution-situation in the respective areas. The policy of basic needs-
orientation therefore has a basic egalitarian feature in that it is 
essentially a question of fulfilment of the minimum welfare standard for 
all in the different areas. From the egalitarian.standpoint, there is 
improvement in the welfare situation only if representative social indicators 
indicate an increase in the proportion of the population that has this 
minimum of provision. This is the case for Nos. 4, t) and 7 of the social 
indicators shown in Table 1. Below, we shall discuss in more detail the 
distribution aspect and other aspects of an appropriate system of social 
indicators for developing countries, with several examples. 
3. A social indicator system of welfare measurement for developing  
countries - the Drewnowski model  
The Drewnowski system-model (1 974) was evolved at the United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), which provided 
important stimuli for constructing the methodological and empirical basis 
of development measurement. It aims at quantification of those social and 
economic goals striven after by development planning oriented directly 
towards improvement of the level of living of all members of society 
(Drewnowski 1974). 
The system of indicators is only one - although very important - part 
of a comprehensive methodological, statistical concept of socially-oriented 
development planning. The variables of the indicator-system work within the 
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scope of the intended new paradigm as ar ments of an extended ob etive-
function of development planning. Effects of economic growth upon the many 
different components of welfare (particularly also from distribution aspects) 
are thus revealed and become controllable by means of statistical measures. 
Drewnowski evolved, for the purpose of political evaluation of the new 
measuring tools, an interdependence table which is modelled on the Leontief-
type input-output table (p.10o et sea.). This is intended to represent, in 
model-form, the interrelationships between the economic production and 
consumption variables, which are measured by means of the economic indicators 
(such as gross and net national product, consumption, investment), and the 
components of the quality of life, measured by means of the social indicators. 
For overall valuation of success in converting output into welfare-relevant 
results, the concept "welfare effect" is evolved, while for overall valuation 
of the influences (feedback effects) of the welfare components upon the 
conditions of production, the concept "productivity effect" is evolved. The 
possibility of constructing a "welfare generation function" (effects of 
production upon welfare) and a "social production function" (effects of the 
welfare situation upon production) is mentioned. 
Using the interdependence tables as his basis, Drewnowski - for simpli- 
city reasons - evolved a linear model of social development planning. It 
differs basically in two characteristics from purely economic planning 
models. On the one hand, social variables which represent welfare objectives 
directly are integral constituents of the objective function; on the other, 
explicit account is taken of the interdependence between economic and social 
variables (p.130 et seq.). 
The aspects of the quality of life that are to be incorporated in the 
system of indicators should be observable and relevant to the whole society, 
and quantifiable and interpretable as indices of improvement or deterioration 
of the conditions of life. They are, on the one hand. flow variables and, 
on the other, stock variables. Flow variables are combined in an index of 
the level of living (= of the flow of welfare) and stock variables in an 
index of the state of welfare. (In what follows, we concentrate upon the 
proposals for quantification of the level of living). The level of living 
is accordingly synonymous with the degree of satisfaction of needs which 
results from consumption of the goods and services produced within the actual 
period and other non-produced conditions of life. The state of welfare 
reflects, at a particular point in time, specific characteristics of the 
population which has experienced the effective flow of welfare for a 
substantial time. 
The quantification of the level-of-living index conforms to an activity- 
concept. Starting-points are the production processes by means of which 
the respective needs are to be satisfied. Admittedly, only those areas are 
incorporated in which the political system obviously influences the conditions 
of life quite directly. The indicators reflect primarily the individuals' 
disposal over resources which they use and consume, not necessarily the 
direct satisfaction of individual needs. 
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The selected nine components of the indicator system can be assigned 
to three groups. In the first, those categories of basic needs are combined 
which in the general view should not be absent from any conceptualization 
and measurement of the level of living: (1) nutrition, (2) clothing, (3) 
shelter, (4) health, (5) education. The second group contains two components, 
namely (6) leisure and (7) security. Underlying them is the need for pro-
tection and safety which is expected to be guaranteed by society: protection 
against intensity and duration of work that are excessive (harmful to health) 
and against the social hazards to which the population is potentially ex-
posed. The third group relates to the environment in which the members of 
society live. It consists of two components, namely (8) social environment 
(incl. recreation) and (9) physical environment. On the basis of the con-
viction that satisfactory relations with other members of society are a 
basic human need, in component (8) the question is asked as to how far the 
population is satisfied with its life in society and with its social comu-
munication. The subject of component (9), on the other hand, is how far the 
population is satisfied with the natural environment in which it lives. 
These nine components of the indicator system are made operational by means 
of 27 indicators (cf. Drewnowski, Synopsis 1). 
For overall valuation of the trend of the level of living, aggl"egation 
of the different indicators into an overall index is thought to be necessary. 
For this, the results in the different components of the indicator system 
are valued and weighted on the basis of a framework of "critical points"; 
the latter refer to characteristic threshold values of the satisfaction of 
needs. Scientifically-founded, objective threshold values - e.g. in the 
sense of minimum requirements for a life fit for human beings - are fixed 
for few areas only (the area of nutrition is probably the best example here). 
In the other areas, they must be supplemented by socially justified norms 
based upon the views on "minimum standards", "adequate standards" and "a-
ffluent standards" of satisfaction of needs which prevail in society (or at 
least are predominant). In view of the fact that the relative weight of a 
component varies for the individual and the whole society with increasing 
satisfaction of respective needs, Drewnowski decides in favour of a sliding 
weighting-scale. 
4. A physical quality-of-life index for developing countries  
the Morris model  
Morris et. al. make an approach to development planning which is less 
ambitious than Drewnowski's, but nevertheless interesting, with the physical 
quality of life index (PQLI). They find that GNP is still the most commonly 
used measure of "development", but criticize its structural weakness and 
conclude that in so far as development planners in developing countries and 
donor countries base their work more upon the distribution effects of projects 
and on the fulfilment of basic needs, they need not only new strategies, but 
also additional measuring systems (Morris 1979: p.95). 
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A measure of development which, in particular, allows international 
comparisons must satisfy a variety of criteria: it should not only allow 
one development-path to be taken and should avoid ethnocentrism (i.e. 
standards which reflect the values of particular societies or social groups); 
it should measure results, not inputs, and be able to indicate their level 
and distribution; it should be easy to construct and understand (in the 
sense of Johan Galtung's statement: "An indicator which anyone with five 
years of schooling cannot understand within five minutes is not an indicator, 
but an instrument of control"). Morris et al. consider these criteria to 
be fulfilled for three social criteria: "life expectancy", "infant mortality", 
"reading and writing ability", which make them useful indicators for measuring 
physical well-being and for measuring success in relation to identifiable 
goals. The position with regard to the data basis for these indicators must 
be considered to be more or less satisfactory; they are not ethnocentric, 
they are objectively measurable and internationally comparable. 
The average "life expectancy" at the age of one and "infant mortality" 
can be considered good indicators of important aspects of development; they 
express, so to say, the sum of the effects of nutrition, health, income and 
environment. The reading and writing ability of poor groups of the popu-
lation ("literacy rate") indicates in a way the extent to which they 
participate or can participate in the economic and social development process. 
The PQLI-model, however, follows the fascination GNP as a unique measure 
has, by the formation of a composite index (overall index). For each of the 
three individual indicators mentioned, the respective degrees of fulfilment 
of the countries (regions, tribes, social groups) that are to be compared 
are first plotted on a sclae from 0 to 100, in which "0" is the lowest and 
"100" the highest degree of fulfilment. An overall index is then obtained 
on this basis, consisting of the simple arithmetic mean of the three 
(equally weighted) indicators. This procedure makes it possible to carry 
out international (national, regional) comparative surveys (cross-sectional 
comparison). 
In Table 2 a cross-sectional comparison of this kind is presented for a 
number of selected countries, and they are also related to or contrasted with 
the traditional GNP-indicator. (The methodological problems involved in the 
production of a time-series comparison of the three individual indicators 
and of the overall indicator are more complex and require more space than is 
available here. They will therefore not be described here; the reader should 
refer to the relevant literature). 
The PQLI, based upon three different social indicators, which in turn 
provide important information on social processes, is the sum of complex 
relationships for which no theoretical explanation provides clear-cut 
weightings; its components are therefore given the same weight in each 
particular case. Owing to the fixing of a lower and an upper limit, the 
PQLI measures only the position within a certain range, in contrast to the 
GNP-index, which is open-ended at the top. Generally speaking, this index 
can provide an important guide for development planning, as to when and 
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the extend to which achieving a high index-value conforms to a consensus-
agreed development-objective not only nationally (regionally) but also 
internationally. 
In contrast to the GNP-indicator, the PQLI-approach also makes it 
possible to close the existing "gaps" (international, national, regional) -
which means that it allows objectives to be defined which are in fact 
achievable. It does not convey the picture of a "hopeless race" - even 
though a few generations will probably pass before this development index 
is rendered unnecessary. 
The PQLI-index is interesting also in the sense of the question as to 
whether and in what way it correlates with GNP. The studies on this question 
have shown that GNP per capita does not explain the degree of fulfilment of 
the PQL-index well - an indirect pointer to the potential significance of 
this planning method for development policy. (Morris paraphrases this 
conclusion in one sentence: "Money is not everything"). This significance 
can lie also in further diversification of the model: its use with regard to 
other intranational aspects, such as income-groups, ethnic groups, other 
social groups, town/country-sectors, etc. 
5. Growth and distribution index 
As has already been shown, it is possible to use for purposes of 
development planning an index which reflects several goals at the same time. 
A development index which combines the growth objective and the distribution 
objective (or an economic indicator and a social indicator) is contained in 
a joint study by the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex, England, 
and the Development Research Center of the World Bank (Chenery et al. 1974). 
If we take as starting-point the following simple welfare function 








2 +WG +WG +WG 3 3 	 4 4 
	 5 5 
in which G is the index of the increase in total welfare, W
1  the weight of group 1 and Cl the rate of increase in income of a particular group over a 
particular period of time (year), the GNP is the case of an index in which 
(in this example) the weight for the increase in income of each group, e.g. 
one-fifth of the population, is assumed to be simply the portion of the 
total income (GNP) in each particular case that this one-fifth represents. 
If, in contrast to this assumption, we consider the actual pattern of 
distribution of GNP in the developing countries as a whole, the problems of 
the GNP-approach for development planning become obvious: 
One-fifth 
	 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Share of national income (in %) 53 22 13 7 5 100 
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According to these figures, the share of the national income in the 
developing countries that is allocated to and represented by the upper two- 
fifths of the population is approximately 75%. 
Thus, in this respect the growth rate of GNP is essentially a measure 
only of the increase in income of the upper two-fifths of the population, 
while the remaining 60 per cent of the population (the majority) is 
accordingly hardly of any significance. The problems of the, historically 
speaking, most important development indicator GNP, thus again become 
clear - in another way. 
An alternative "measure of welfare" might be to distribute the weights 
W in the above function equation proportionally, for example (in this sense 
conforming to the democratic principle of "one man - one vote"), i.e. equal 
weight for each one-fifth of the population. On the basis of economic 
reality (ratio between the upper fifth and the lower fifth on the income 
scale 53:5 or approx. 11:1), in the case of such an equal-weights-index 
(EWI) an increase in income in the lower fifth would in fact be given eleven 
times more importance than an increase in income in the upper fifth of the 
population. 
If we replace the relatively abstract one-fifths of national income 
with actual social groups - e.g. small farmers, the urban poor, etc. - then 
the great potential for development policy of this proposed methodological 
approach of combining growth objectives with distribution objectives 
becomes even more obvious. 
If, in view of the disastrous distribution situation in most developing 
countries, the planners (the government, the donor country, the international 
institution, etc.) were of the opinion that the task of planning primarily 
should be one of increasing the income of the above mentioned social groups 
(or that of the lower 40% of income-recipients, for example), then the 
measures and programmes of economic and social policy would have to be 
formulated accordingly - i.e. a low weight or no weight at all would have 
to be given on the further income-increase of the upper economic and social 
groups (regions countries), for example. The practical importance of such 
a "poverty-weights-index" (PWI) could thus be considerable. 
Weighted indices of this type (or of a similar type) offer, in our 
view, a wide range of possibilities of systematic analysis and planning of 
development processes which conform far more closely to the actual conditions 
and needs of the development countries than does the (inadequate) theoretical 
framework which has hitherto mostly formed the basis of planning in the 
developing countries and of international development assistance. (The 
reader might also just ponder the possible significance of such a diversified 
approach for development policy in the industrial countries.). 
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6. Theoretical models and reality of development policy - a look  
to the future  
For the ex post analysis of development and the ex ante planning of the 
future development of a country (a region, etc.), it is necessary to re-
define the concept of development. In the 1 50s, '60s and '70s it was, and 
today it still is, widespread practice to equate "development" with "eco-
nomic growth", expressed as the increase in the gross national product (GNP) 
or increase in income per capita. The experience of seeing no alleviation 
from the many serious problems in the developing countries despite the 
growth of GNP, in some cases resulted in gradual questioning of the validity 
of this key "development"--indicator and in increasing scepticism as to the 
favourable effects of the traditional growth policy based on it. 
A social indicator-movement arose which attained some momentum, being 
fed intellectually from individuals, university and research institutions. 
In association with this, the typology of developing countries was refined 
and development strategies were theoretically diversified; the debate 
concerning target group-oriented development assistance began, while in the 
North-South dialogue the debate on the "New International Economic Order" 
started. 
Nevertheless, it was and is most certainly too early to start talking 
already about a U-turn in practical development planning in the sense of our 
topic. Despite all the fundamental criticism, the traditional economic 
indicators - particularly the GNP-index - continue to predominate in most 
national and regional development plans, and also in international develop-
ment assistance which is based primarily upon economic indicators in regard 
to recipients, projects and programmes. The social indicator movement has 
formulated new questions and has revealed many weaknesses of traditional 
planning; but in the actual development planning of most developing countries 
and international planning institutions, social indicators have at best 
assumed a supplementary, not dominant, function. To inquire into the causes 
of this means pointing out not only deficiencies of research, but also 
serious problems of method associated with the development and use of social 
indicators. Our examples have demonstrated some of these problems; neverthe-
less, the possible practical importance of these (and similar) approaches 
to the reform of development planning seems to us to be no means played out. 
For reasons of substance as well as of method, and for reasons of 
necessary co-operation between the scientific disciplines and integration of 
technical planning, we consider the debate on our topic - social indicators 
in development planning - still to be important. The decision as to what 
development is or should be has not been made once and for all. This 
decision os still inder discussion, repeatedly. 
34 
NOTE 
Modified version of an article published in D. Nohlen, F. Nuscheler 
(Eds.): Handbuch der Dritten Welt (Handbook on the Third World), vol. 1, 
2nd ed., Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1982. 
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 

















Afghanistan 110 19 40 182 8 
Pakistan 130 37 50 124 16 
Sri Lanka 130 83 68 45 81 
India 140 41 SO 139 34 
Kerala State c 125 68 61 S8 60 
Tanzania 160 28 44 162 15-20 
Kenya 200 40 50 119 20-25 
Central African Rep. 210 18 41 190 5-10 
Bolivia 280 45 47 108 40 
Nigeria 290 25 41 180 25 
Ghana 430 31 44 156 25 
Korea, Rep. of 480 80 61 47 88 
Cuba 640 86 70 29 78 
Algeria 710 42 53 126 26 
Taiwan 810 88 69 26 85 
Mexico 1,090 75 63 61 74 
Iran 1,250 38 51 139 23 
Gabon 1,960 21 41 178 12 
Ireland 2,320 96 72 17 98 
Libya 4,640 42 53 130 27 
Netherlands 5,250 99 74 11 98 
United States 6,670 96 71 17 99 
Qatar 8,560 32 47 138 10-15 
United Arab 
Emirates 11,710 34 47 138 20 
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RAGNAR FRISCH: ECONOMETRICS AND THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANNING 
Frank Long IV 
ABSTRACT. Ragnar Frisch's main contributions are in the field of econometrics. 
This paper discusses Frisch's contribution to the political economy of 
planning. It argues that although planning was not a special feature of 
classical political economy, Frisch nonetheless shared in the broader 
social and moral aspirations of political economy; for Frisch, these were 
the ultimate objectives of planning. To this end the paper discusses 
Frisch's approach to the formalization of society's preferences. This 
approach involves an interactive mechanism in which politicians and 
technical experts participate. Against the political economy aspirations 
of Frisch, some behavioral shortcomings of his framework are biefly 
discussed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ragnar Frisch is invariably associated with his contribution to 
econometrics. He was one of the founding fathers of the Econometric 
Society, and was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for his contribution 
to quantitative work in economic science. Frisch's major works in econ-
ometrics date back to the early part of this century. Both Frisch and 
Jan Tinbergen helped to set the initial foundations for what is now called 
Econometrics (1). Without Frisch's pioneering contributions, however, it 
seems unlikely that quatitative economics would have been as firmly 
established as it is currently. 
J 	 Caribbean Science and Technology Project, Oxford; 
Visiting Fellow Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, England. The opinions 
expressed in this paper are of the exclusive responsibility of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the institution to which he 
is attached. 
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A somewhat obscure aspect of Frisch's work constitutes what may be 
called "the political economy of planning". This contribution by Frisch 
to political economy arises mainly from a conscious and systematic attempt 
on his part at formalizing societal preferences. The means to this are 
a combination of technocratic and political considerations. Both of these 
considerations constitute an essential feature of Frisch's planning 
methodology. In this brief exposition, our aim is two-fold. First, we 
make note of Frisch's approach to the formalization of societal preferences; 
and in particular the incorporation of the political system to this end. 
Second, we attempt to show the relevance of Frisch's ideas to political 
economy while at the same time drawing attention to some behavioral 
limitations which inhere his framework. 
II. WELFARE ECONOMICS: A NOTE 
The question of social preferences has, for some time now, been a 
special feature of welfare economics. It is therefore worthwhile to deal 
briefly with some points relating to this. 
It is commonly accepted in the tradition of welfare economics that 
the welfare of the community is dependent on the welfare of the individuals 
comprising it. Under certain assumptions, such as a given distribution of 
income, rationality, non-satiation, transivity, continuity of indifference 
curves, non-inter-dependence of individual utilities, etc., it is possible 
to arrive at a welfare preference function of society at large. Such a 
function can be written as follows: 
1) 	 U = U(X
1 	  x 
where symbols 
	 U nationalwelfare and U(X
1 	  Nn) = measurable 
welfare of the entire population. 
This type of social welfare function was first expounded by Bergson 
in 1938 (2). It was later explored more formally by Arrow, Samuelson and 
others. Essentially, Bergson's welfare function was not designed to rank 
all combinations of individual welfares, but the combinations of particular 
goods consumed and services rendered by each of the individuals in the 
society (3). 
Arrow, in taking up a mathematical treatment of the above, concluded 
that, in general, a rule for passing from individual orderings to social 
orderings cannot be found in a free market type economy (4). Hence his 
Impossibility Theorem. Consequently these two orderings can only take 
place if there is an imposed social welfare function. The question Arrow 
asked was the following: suppose there are x distinct social states 
attainable, and suppose that there are n different ways of ordering these 
social states, the real question to be answered is, regardless of these 
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different ways chosen by each of the individuals, will it be possible as a 
result of rules ethically acceptable to a free society to construct a 
corresponding social ordering of x social states? 
Apart from the Bergson tradition, most of the post-1939 attention in 
welfare economics represents different formulations of the Pareto optimal 
condition. This condition is defined as one from which it is not possible 
by any reallocation of factors to make anyone better off without making at 
least one person worse off (5). Meanwhile, A. C. Pigou's "The Economics 
of Welfare", is invariably associated with the controversies of the 1930s 
over interpersonal comparison of utilities. But as Mishan argues, Pigou's 
main contribution is to be found in the emphasis of the vital distinction 
between social and private valuations of economic activities (e). This 
still features in contemporary analysis of welfare economics with reference 
to "external effects", or "external economies or diseconomies of production 
and consumption", for instance. 
III. RAGNAR FRISCH AND THE FORMALIZATION 
OF SOCIETAL PREFERENCES 
Frisch, in a sense, represents a slightly different tradition to the 
Bergson-type social welfare function. Viewed from Arrow's position, his 
approach to the formalization problem represents an imposition. Arrow felt 
such an imposition was a contravention to free market type principles of 
decision making. However, Frisch was not concerned with the Bergson type 
welfare function. His formalized preference function is something quite 
different. Essentially, such a function can be described with reference 
to a given time period as follows: 
2) 
	
Sp  = f(P 
v 
 , To) 
Where S represents a vector whose constituent elements are political 
preferences (P ) and technocratic choices subject to political 
parameters  (Ti. 
making machinery which is 
from "social claims" of a 
normative type, since, ostensibly, politicians come to power by winning 
votes from the political market place. In other words, by appealing to 
popular support. In principle, this process could be likened 
type auctioneering-Tatonement, where producers the competing 
parties) and consumers the electorate) decide, via some form 
price bidding, what bundles of social goods and services will 
in a given time period. If social demands are 
principle, by the offer curve of party y, then 
mandate to formalize the social preferences of 
reason being, that it will not come to power. 
equilibrium, when viewed in strictly Walrasian 
P , essentially, is determined by a decision 
po
v 
 litical party in power. It is not removed 
the 




unable to be satisfied, in 
that party will not have the 
society at large. The 
This is, however, a pseudo-
terms: aggregate demand 
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and supply do not really match, since in a democracy, political parties 
are never able to capture the entire market when offering "political 
prices" in exchange for political support. Also, political tend not to be 
"tentative prices" of the Walrasian auctioneer, but once for all in the 
form of set programs. 
Be that as it may, in its ideal form, the political preferences of the 
party will tend to serve as a reasonably approximate common denominator of 
what society wants in broad terms. The more overwhelming is the support 
the less inapproximate, is the denominator. To, on the other hand, is 
representative of the technocratic machinery made up of planning experts. 
In the main, these are involved in the planning process, and in particular, 
the formulation of the plan. Efficient allocation of resources, least cost 
ways of attaining special objectives, and efficiency in terms of 
utilization of time, namely meeting targets, are important considerations 
here. 
Frisch posits that the political system is indeed responsible for 
settling different systems of preferences. As he argues, "the political 
system whatever it may be is intended just in order to settle such 
differences. What we have to do in Econometrics is to apply this very 
system for the formalization of the preferences to go with our models. 
Thus, the preference function as it appears in our model is an expression 
for the preferences of the decision making authority..." (7). 
For Frisch, the task of formalizing the political preferences for 
purposes of planning could be broken down into the following phases: First, 
there is a systematic attempt by the technocracy to appraise the overall 
political climate in the country; especially that of the political party 
in power. This will then enable the expert to obtain some idea of the 
preference range of the political system. Such a range will in turn enable 
the expert to have a tentative idea of what his model should look like. 
Following a tentative formalization of these preferences, a semi 
Socratic approach (interview/questions) is adopted by the expert vis-a-vis  
the political decision makers. This is intended to bring about a more 
definitive formalization of the preferences in question. Essentially, the 
idea here is to arrive at a type of policy indifference curve. Thus, 
Frisch contends, 
As a simple example for an interview/question, we may take the following: 
What would you politicians choose if you had a choice between two 
packages of economic results, for instance one package with say 3 percent 
unemployment and an annual inflation rate of 5 percent, and another 
package with say 10 percent unemployment and an inflation rate of 1 percent. 
By repeating this question but with different figures involved, it will 
be relatively easy to reach a situation where the interviewed person would 
say: It is all the same which one of the two packages I decide. The 
point of indifference is precisely what the expert is aiming at. Similarly, 
for other kinds of comparisons, there will be a whole series of such 
partial Package 	 the expert will be able to build a preference function (8). 
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Or more accurately, to give formal content to such a function. The 
third phase represents itself as a more definite quantitative preference 
formalization. This is based on the above considerations, and its main 
operational use is to be an input for the planning model. From this, a 
solution will eventually emerge in the form of some optimal development 
path for the economy, with optimality defined in terms of (a) the 
preferences of the political party; (b) the preference formalization which 
the expert has eventually reached; (c) and the best ways of implementing 
these in the socio-economic system. All in all, the expert tries to 
formalize this function in free form and wherever convenient in reduced 
form. For a schematic elucidation see Table 1. 
In terms of what has been said so far, it must be noted that the 
process of interview/questions continues at different levels until a 
satisfactory and workable preference function, in formalized form, is 
reached, both from the standpoint of the political machinery and the 
technocracy. The process of preference formalization does not really stop 
until a unified or macro system of preferences emerges. Such a unified 
formalized preference function would then represent a "compromise formaliza-
tion" involving various subsets of the political machinery (for example, 
different political officeS) and the relevant experts. The optimal solu-
tion, mentioned previously, is then an optimum based on technical and 
political compromises. 
In a sense, therefore, the Walrasian type Tatonement does not stop in 
the political market place where contending parties try to sell their 
respective programs to the electorate. The bidding process continues 
throughout and is particularly marked on an exploratory phase such as the 
second outlined in this section; this time between experts and politicians. 
Seen in the foregoing light, Frisch's framework has greater operational 
content as it is part of a planning process, it is more politically and 
institutionally oriented, and it has greater technical complexities than 
the preference function of the Bergson type which is common to welfare 
economics. 
Where the welfare function in welfare economics is measurable in 
monetary terms, generally speaking, the formalized social preference of 
the Frisch type is essentially a function of non-market forces of the 
effective demand type, in the inmediate instance. Social preferences in 
Frisch's framework are often extendable to non-economic magnitudes. 
However, the obverse is generally true of revelaed preferences in welfare 
economics. Such preferences are in the main registered through the price 
system. In fact, Frisch's formalization attempts to amend some of the 
inadequacies of the price mechanism, in satisfying social well-being in 
society. 
So far for some comparisons between aspects of the Bergson type 
welfare preference function in welfare economics and Frisch's attempt 
at formalizing social preferences. An attempt is now made to situate 










































C' o ; TIE 1"6. 
'24°4 5 tc= td C 
spot o.v.1291moilo; 
 atp jo aq Aum alos ata  
48 
IV. FRISCH AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Classical political economy was generally concerned with issues 
relating to value, distribution and capital. It did not encompass plan-
ning in any systematic way. Indeed, planning became only a legitimate 
concern of present day economics during the latter half of this century. 
Several factors could be held accountable for the non-incorporation of 
planning in classical political economy. Of these the following seem 
worthy of note. 
In the first place, there was the prevailing that the market mechanism 
or Adam Smith's invisible hand was sufficient, in itself, to resolve 
important questions like production, distribution, consumption and resource 
allocation. This view was taken to the extreme by laissez faire exponents; 
but was also firmly held by mercantilists in spite of the deep seated 
advocacy that the State should intervene to protect the interests of the 
society. This intervention was, however, never conceptualised as planning 
in the way the term is currently used. In the case of Karl Marx, who did 
not adhere to the principles of the free market system, the primary concern 
was not planning as a way of improving the social and economic efficiency 
of capitalism, but something else. He was mainly preoccupied in explaining 
the capitalist mode of production (its origins and modus operandi), and an 
explanation for the inevitable downfall of the capitalist society. It is 
clear that, within a non-market system of the type advocated by Marx, there 
would be no room for Adam Smith and his invisible hand. However planning 
within the context of socialism or communism which Marx advocated was not 
of operational interest to him. It was, for example, left to a later 
generation of socialist economists to fill this conceptual gap. 
Secondly, classical political economy was not theoretically constructed 
with a statistical or quantitative framework in mind. While it is true 
that this does not affect conceptualising about planning as such, as it does 
to the operational aspects of a plan (for instance, one may conceive of a 
plan without statistics; that is, however, a different matter from putting 
a plan into operation), it is probably true that the awareness of quantita-
tive techniques can enable one to realize the practical usefulness of such. 
As Frisch himself reminds us, "the architectural plan for theory had so to 
speak not made room for this verification" (9). 
Lastly, a matter related to the above, is that quantitative facilities 
such as national income statistics, computer networks, and econometrics 
for example meant that statistical infrastructure was poor to start with. 
How can you plan without data if planning has to deal with targets and 
measuring results against these? 
If then classical political economy was not preoccupied with planning, 
how does one fit Frisch and planning into the mold of political economy? 
What is more, the growth of quantitative methods in economics is often 
cited as a contravention of the basic outlines of political economy. The 
point being that the former is deprived of the broad social and human 
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framework which characterised the writings of Mill, Smith, Malthus, Ricardo 
and others who helped in the development of political economy. 
The answer to the above lies mainly in conceptualization and in scope. 
The central issues of political economy, for example, are basically 
incorporated in Frisch's framework. Let us illustrate briefly. Frisch 
saw the role of planning in economic activity as an organic link with an 
overall societal process. Consider, for instance, the question of decision 
making in society and the formalization of societal preferences, dealt with 
above. Here Frisch argues "... political discussions today come dangerously 
close to resembling a dog fight where the global battles of and inter-
connections between the basic questions have a tendency to get lost and 
only shouting about striking partial aspects of inefficiencies and 
injustices count. All this calls for a radical and unconventional approach 
about the decision making in society at large. The preference function 
is a tool for defining the goal..." (10). 
Thus, in human welfare terms, Frisch sees co-operation between ex-
perts and politicians in the formalization of society's preferences as 
being necessary to obtain an improved quality of socio economic and 
political life in society at large. In other words, achieving appropriate 
decisions, which in the ultimate analysis, reflect the wishes of the human 
population. More than that, such co-operation tends to politicise experts 
bycreating political awareness of the technical and policy implications 
of political preferences. 
V. FRISCH AND DEMOCRATIC PLANNIIAG 
It is often claimed by modern day critics of bureaucracy that a major 
problem is that bureaucrats often lack a full appreciation of the wider 
consequences of the day-to-day decisions taken. As a result, such de-
cisions are not necessarily in the best interests of the community at 
large. In principle, this criticism would seem to apply less to Frisch's 
experts, given the type of political environment and interactions taking 
place in the determination of technical choices. 
Aside from the formalization of society's preference function as such, 
it is worth quoting Frisch in terms of what he considers to be the ultimate 
objective of planning. This is necessary since the preference function is 
situated within a planning context. Both should therefore subscribe to one 
common philosophy or idealized end state. Frisch affirms: 
My purpose is to make economic planning at a high aspiration level, the 
pillars of a living democracy. I want a society which is a living 
democracy ... a democracy that is living in the sense of actively engag-
ing as many as possible of the citizens to take an active part in the 
affairs of the small community where they are living, and also to take 
an active part in the affairs of the nation as a whole. (11). 
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This certainly attests to a philosophy of planning which is by no means 
limited to manipulation of data. It certainly bears echo of present-day 
critics of neo-classical and Keynesian type economics, who clamor for the 
return of the "human element" in tha study of "ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses", namely economics. 
On other count, it is clear that, in terms of consistency with Frisch's 
planning philosophy outlined above, elements such as redistribution of income, 
satisfaction of basic needs and the like, could be built into the formali- 
zation of societal preferences. 
Seen in the foregoing light, therefore, planning within Frisch's frame-
work is consistent with the broad dimensions of classical political econ-
omy. A quotation from John Stuart Mill suffices to bring this out: "In so 
far as the economic conditions of nations turn upon the state of physical 
knowledge, it is a subject of the physical sciences and arts founded on 
them. But in so far as the causes are moral or psychological, dependent 
on institutions and social relations, on the principle of human nature, 
their investigation belongs not to the physical but to moral and social 
sciences, and it is the object of what is called political economy". The 
questions of morality and social and political justice are central questions 
to Frisch. It is why he is at home with Mill. 
Frisch is therefore an example of a highly specialized and quantitative 
economist who was able to bring such techniques to the service of political 
economy. It is, however, true that his efforts were largely in the realm 
of developing a planning methodology per se, rather than locating that 
methodology within economic philosophy of the classical variant. This 
latter neglect explains why, as an economic thinker, Frisch has been seldom 
known. Given, however, Frisch's initial contribution to both empirical and 
theoretical aspects of planning, and the fact that he was among the first 
Western econometricians to regard planning in a broad societal and moral 
context, it is probably no exaggeration to regard him as a founding father 
not only of the Econometric Society, but of the Political Economy of 
Planning. 
VI. FRISCH-SOME BEHAVIORAL LIMITATIONS 
An elementary feature of any plan is the conscious mobilization of 
social productive agents for the attainment of certain goals. As Frisch 
would argue, planning is ultimately aimed at improving the quality of 
life of the human population. In terms of the latter, it is important 
that the planning process functionally recognizes, and indeed provides a 
meaningful framework for, such a realization. With this in mind, this 
section aims at pointing out some behavioral limitations of Frisch's 
framework. 
Behavioral considerations, for some time now, have formed a core of 
what can be called management science (12). Their relevance stems from the 
recognition that a full understanding of human agents, engaged in productive 
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and other pursuits, must take one into the realm of social psychology. It 
is only when one is equipped with this understanding, it is argued, that 
the human contribution to a particular task can be made fully optimal. This 
is so because action depends on motivation, and motivation in turn depends 
on need fulfilment. Simon and others have used behavioral considerations 
in an attempt to enrich economic analysis. In other words, going behind 
the customary assumptions of "rationality". Little work, on the other 
hand, has been attempted in the area of planning and human behavior, 
although it has for some time now been recognized that human considerations 
often play an important role in explaining the failure of plans. 
In the above 'light, Frisch's framework does not guarantee that polit-
ical choices accurately reflect societal preferences. In real terms, the 
political machinery is supposed to serve as a proxy for such preferences. 
But as we observed earlier a Walrasian Tatonement does not really exist in 
a Frisch type political market place. Also, there is no guarantee that 
pre-election political preferences will obtain when party y assumes power. 
Of more practical interest, in conditions of uneven socio-economic 
relationships in a given society ;a ruling party that draws its support 
mainly from a particular class is likely to inject a preference bias in 
terms of particular societal aspirations and interests. 
Consider, for example, an agricultural development project in a de-
veloping country which reflects the preferences of a landed aristocracy 
from which the ruling party draws its support. Social groups in the 
agricultural sector such as landless laborers, small peasants and rural 
unemployed labor will tend to be of peripheral concern. From a social 
welfare point of view, there are strong reasons why such a situation 
should not obtain. Put differently, the aggregate welfare needs of the 
socially peripheral groups will tend :o be greater simple because the 
level of poverty (absolute and rels:Live) will be greatest among these 
groups. This type of asymmetry is indeed a real problem in terms of 
policy formulation in most Third World countries, given grossly uneven 
social relationships, which obtain there. The situation has resulted in 
the advocacy of a basic needs development strategy for the Third World, 
by a number of international organizations. We cite the Third World, 
simply because of wider social discrepancies prevailing there; in 
principle the problem obtains in all societal environments where groups 
of people have uneven access to the political machinery. 
Secondly, is a point not removed from the foregoing. Frisch 
advocates citizen participation in the planning process, at least in 
broad outline. Note his concern for citizen involvement in human affairs 
which was quoted earlier. However, in his formalization process, which 
operationally sets the broad parameters of government policy, no 
systematic attempt is made to deal with this question. Indeed, there 
are strong reasons to expect that, in the type of machinery where 
politicians and technocrats interact to determine the societal preference 
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function, this could at best lead 	 a pseudo-social preference function. 
The reason being that the mechanisr does not make room for participative 
planning. The only real link, in 'fie formalization process, between the 
wider society and the planning mach finery is the political system. The 
inadequacy of this tenuous link. ha already been mentioned, namely as a 
registration device it is not 'FIAlly reflective of the broad interests of 
society at large; also political ferences are subject to change during 
a period of political rule. The en result is likely to be discontinuity 
in the planning process in so far s: the interests of community are con- 
cerned. 
In a slightly different vein, 'risch's approach does not deal sub- 
stantially with the role of the hot 	 agent in the operationalization of 
the plan. How does one optimize the human contribution to planning, in a 
similar way as behavioral theorist were asking, how does one optimize the 
human contribution to organization.+L performance? At what levels of the 
formalization process for example? This is necessary since it cannot be 
asked of people to participate fully in something, which in a sense has 
been imposed upon them, unless the imposed preference is coincidental with 
theirs. This is unlikely when divergent group interests prevail. These 
points seem critical since plannin in the final analysis is a human 
activity and should therefore embrace socio-psychological, cultural and 
political, in addition to economic and technical interests. It seems 
necessary for econometricians to pay more serious attention to what are 
normally regarded as "exogenous variables" as they go a considerable way 
in explaining the failure of plans ohich operate within a western type 
political economic environment. 
The limitations raised here nc, doubt stem from the fact that Frisch 
was in the first instance an econometrician. He was primarily concerned 
with technical details even though he tried to keep these in a human and 
societal perspective. 
(1) Tinbergen shared the Nobel P ze jointly with Frisch. 
(2) See A. Bergson, "A ReformLla,_:on of Certain Aspects of Welfare 
Economics", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LII, pp. 310-34, 1938. 
(3) See E.J. Mishan, "A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-59", in 
Surveys of Economic Theory, Vol. 1, The Royal Economic Society and The 
American Economic Association (London: Macmillan, 1965) for a discussion 
of some of the finer points. 
(4) K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: 1951). 
(5) For instance Kahn, Hicks, Little, Kaldor, Graaff. 
(6) Mishan, op. cit. 
(7) F. Long, ed. (Preface by Jan Tinbergen), Ragnar Frisch Economic  
Planning Studies (Dordrecht: Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976), 
p. 25. 
(8) Ibid, p. 29. 
53 
(9) Ibid, p. 11. 
(10) Ibid, p. 41. 
(11) Ibid, p. 27. 
(12) See for example: A. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: 
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A GUIDE TO COMMUNIST ECONOMIES 
Soviet-type Economic Systems: A Guide to Information Sources, an annotated 
bibliography 1/, is designed to help the researcher avoid the laborious 
process of searching through many books and journals for material relevant 
to a specific topic or sub-area of interest. Covering what are commonly 
referred to as socialist or communist economies, the book cites books and 
articles dealing with the functioning economies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union. Also covered 
in the guide are works referring to theoretical concepts or models of 
centrally planned, command, or Soviet-type economies. It is edited by Z. 
Edward O'Relly. 
All of the words cited in the bibliography are available in English 
and include some translations from works originally published in other 
languages. Citations emphasize the economic, as opposed to the accounting 
or business, aspects of the economies. Since many of the Soviet-type 
economies follow a similar economic process, material in the guide is 
organized primarily according to functional categories instead of particular 
countries. 
Fourteen chapters cover sub-topics of major interest to researchers 
in Soviet-type economic systems: Overview... Economic Organizations and 
Structure... Western Theories of Socialism... Growth and Development... 
Planning Theory, Practices, and Methods... Prices and Inflation... Capital 
and Investment... Population and Labor Force... Wages and Consumer Welfare 
. Efficiency and Productivity... Sectoral Problems and Accomplishments 
(includes Agriculture, Industry, Transport and Communication, Energy and 
other Natural Resources, and Services)... Monetary and Fiscal Theory, 
Practices, and Institutions... Foreign Trade... Economic Reforms. 
Author, Title, and Subject Indexes complete the guide, which is 
Volume 12 in Economics Information Guide Series, part of the Gale 
Information Guide Library. 
(From Tom Romig for the company). 
I/ Soviet-type Economic System: A Guide to Information Sources. 
Edited by Z. Edward O'Relley, associate professor of economics, North 
Dakota State University, Fargo. (Detroit, Mich. 48226: Gale Research 
Co., 1978, xii + 228 pp., $22.). 
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ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND THE SOCIAL 
DIMENSION OF ECONOMIC POLICY 21/ 
Jorge Mendez Munevar and 
Alvaro Garcia Hurtado ±-1/ 
INTRODUCTION 
During recent decades many Latin American countries appear to have 
encountered a formidable dilemma in the field of economic and social 
development policy. On the one side there is neo-classicism, which, applied 
as a doctrine in which purely economic considerations should prevail, does 
not satisfy the aspirations of the popular classes for change and 
participation. On the other side there is social change accelerated at 
times in the form of populism, which can lead to a decline in the economic 
process and the rate of growth. Experience shows that both the one and 
the other can bring about an impairment of democracy and hence restrictions 
on individual liberty. 
The fact that this dilemma tends to persist and that consequently each 
of the two extremes frequently causes an increase in social discontent may 
be largely explained by the lack of appreciation of the relations between 
social aims and their economic aspects. The solution of social problems, 
as for example the relief of extreme poverty, has an undoubted economic 
value in terms of the greater productive capacity of those benefited. On 
the other hand, social benefits involve expense and generally imply a 
transference of resources from some sectors of society to others. It is 
important, when taking decisions on social expenditure, to bear in mind both 
the potential economic value of the results of that expenditure, and the 
(../ Paper submitted to the International Symposium on Social Development 
Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1980s. Santiago, 
Chile, 12-15 April 1982. 
:121/ Director of ILPES and Expert of PREALC. 
The opinions expressed in this paper are of exclussive responsibility 
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Institution 
to which they are attached. 
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effects of the cost incurred in terms of the growth rate of the economy as 
a whole. At the present stage of economic science and of development 
policies in practice, neither the one nor the other is usually taken 
sufficiently into account. 
The ideal for Latin America and for all developing countries would be 
to achieve the introduction of policies which would at the same time allow 
for an increased growth of investment and preferential attention to the needs 
of the great majorities of the poor, all this within a framework of 
individual freedom. Throughout Latin America this ideal has been earnestly 
sought, but generally without the desired success. As already said, the high 
growth rates achieVed for a time in some countries have not succeeded in 
alleviating the social problems, and on the other side, the attempts at 
mass solution of the social problems have been accompanied by economic 
difficulties. 
Those who have followed with interest the efforts of the countries of 
the region in the field of development policy concur in view that all this 
denotes a serious gap in conceptual, technical and operational awareness 
which should be most urgently filled. This paper, which might serve as a 
basis for a detailed research project on the subject, aims to set out the 
main areas in which the relationship between social programmes and their 
economic implications is most evident. 
I. TOWARDS AN OPERATIVE DEFINITION OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM 1 
We are called upon to deal with the subject of social programmes in 
their relation to the economic question. It seems appropriate therefore, 
to begin by asking what is meant by the term "social problem". In reply 
there immediately comes to mind a vision of our familiar human dramas: 
poverty, marginality, uncertainty and other such manifestations of 
injustice in a continent which has the resources and conditions to free its 
population from these miseries. These images of the social problem, 
however are not sufficient to define the characteristics that social 
programmes should possess, understanding by these the programmes designed 
to overcome these problems. 
The actual and objective reality that causes our concern is the 
existence in Latin America of more than 100 million people who have no 
access to a range of goods and services indispensable for subsistence in 
conditions compatible with human dignity. Our concern is reinforced by 
the fact that, after a successful period of economic growth -as in the 
1/ In this paper there are no quotations, although direct references are 
made to various authors. This, however, by no means implies that the 
writers claim the authorship of all the ideas contained here. On the 
contrary, the absence of literal quotations arises from the impossibility 
of citing in a work of this type the rich and vast literature that exists 
on most of these topics without leaving serious gaps. 
56 
decade of the 60s, when a growth rate of the product for the region of 
almost 6 per cent per annum was attained- the absolute number of persons 
in a state of poverty remained unchanged. This is all the more serious 
when it is realized, as various studies attest, that the region actually 
possesses the resources needed to overcome the problem of poverty. Indeed, 
in most of the countries for which information is available, the existing 
conditions are propitious for the total ellimination of poverty by means 
of a transfer of resources from the sectors which enjoy high standards of 
living. Such transfers would not need to be, on average, more than 12 per 
cent of the available income of the richest 10 per cent of the population. 
The first characteristic of social problems becomes patently obvious: it is, 
fundamentally, a matter of distribution of wealth and well-being, and not  
necessarily one of an increase in the availability of resources. 
This inequality in the distribution of income and wealth is based on 
the action of an economic system which excludes large sectors of the 
population from the benefits of growth. In fact, an examination of the 
characteristics of the social groups affected by the social problem reveals 
that those who cannot adequately meet their basic needs tend to be those 
who have employment problems. The most direct linkage is seen to be 
between poverty and underemployment, especially in the rural sector. In 
its turn, the employment problem is linked with two determinative concepts 
in Latin America today, one being structural heterogeneity and the other 
differentiated labour and employment markets. 
For many years now CEPAL has maintained that a central characteristic 
of the economic system prevailing in the countries of the region is its 
structural heterogeneity. In this situation the modern sector of the 
economy concentrates technical progress within itself, excluding from it 
large social and productive sectors. In these conditions the process is 
reinforced and intensified, and thus the dynamic of the economies of the 
region tends to be concentrative and exclusive. 
In its turn, PREALC has pointed out that the heterogeneity of the 
economic structure results in a heterogeneous situation in employment. In 
other words, there is a small sector, comprising those who work in the most 
modern strata, which records a high productivity and high levels of 
remuneration; and another and larger sector, consisting of those employed 
in the intermediate strata, with lower levels of income and productivity. 
This feature of the economic system, existing in practically all the 
countries of the region, results in the employment of small proportion of 
the work force in the modern sector, whereas the majority are obliged to 
work in the traditional sector in conditions of low productivity and, in 
general, with low and fluctuating levels of income. 
We see, then, that a second root of the social problem is the  
existence of an economic system that concentrates technical progress and, 
in consequence, generates a heterogeneous employment structure. This 
circumstance, added to the high concentration of income and wealth, 
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explains why the region, despite its high economic growth, irradiates this 
growth over an unduly restricted social field. The employment problem 
becomes especially important from this standpoint, particularly the 
underemployment that affects a high porportion of the labour force in 
Latin America. In view of the circular causation between the different 
levels of structural heterogeneity (technology, productivity, labour 
segmentation, poverty) it becomes essential for any social policy to combat 
the problems arising from the existing employment structure and, above all, 
to encourage a partial reassignment of the economic surplus towards those 
productive sectors with least capacity for accumulation and therefore with 
the highest indexes of underemployment of labour. 
A large part of the social problem, therefore, lies in the form in 
which the economic process functions and evolves. This implies that social 
problems cannot be fully solved merely by programmes aimed at the relief of 
the symptoms of poverty; rather must the prevailing economic model correct 
its tendency to concentrate wealth and to exclude great masses of the 
population from participation in the fruits of growth. In this respect, 
the relation between the social and the economic elements is crucial, and 
should be stressed whenever social programmes are proposed. But there is a 
second aspect in this relationship which is equally pertinent and important 
social programmes, and changes in the economic model aiming at greater 
social justice, have costs in economic terms, and these also must be taken 
into account. We shall return to this important question later on. 
At the same time, when the imbalances in the distribution of wealth 
reach the magnitude they have attained in Latin America, with the result 
that approximately 40 por cent of the population lives in a state of poverty, 
we cannot regard the problem as a purely economic one. Obviously society, 
must have political mechanisms to cope with this situation and, in the face 
of such imbalances, to seek a genuine social integration. Consequently, 
a basis must be sought in this political machinery for the understanding 
and, subsequently, the alleviation of these imbalances. 
Political power is founded on a juridico-legal structure which enables 
the different social groups to formulate and exert pressure for the 
satisfaction of their needs and aspirations. This possibility of 
participating, and the advantage taken of it, determines the amount of 
representation that the different social groups posses in the definition 
of the modus operandi of society, and hence in the degree of efficacy with 
which society satisfies their needs. From this standpoint we can speak 
of political poverty, referring to the situation of those sectors of civil 
society which have none of the elements of power (organization, representa-
tion, self-awareness) nor the basic conditions (education, information, 
health, income) for taking part in the decision-making which determines 
the future of the country and its human and material environment, thus 
maintaining the possibilities of being active subjects of their own 
development. 
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Moreover, the State is the fundamental instrument for the expression 
of political power. Through its actions -economic and political- it 
implements and gives cohesion to a political project, which obviously does 
not respond lineally to a single group of interests but which tends to 
represent the interests of the relatively more powerful groups. Thus the 
State becomes an instrument of integration and maintenance of political 
order which is used to promote a national project; in practice through 
planning -understood as the technical instrumentation of a political 
project- it has a decisive effect on the economic order and hence on the 
relative well-being of the different social groups. We see, as a third  
characteristic of the social problem, that its solution are related to the  
differentiated access of the different social sectors to the institutions  
which constitute and express political power and, in very practical terms, 
to the State. 
The magnitude of the social problem in the region and its economic-
structural and political roots lead to the conclusion that a development 
strategy aiming to overcome it will need to have global or structural 
characteristics in which the three great components specifically the 
economic, the political and the social, must be simultaneously taken into 
account. 
As a logical conclusion of the foregoing it becomes apparent, on the 
one hand, that social policies should be invested with the power to make 
the productive and distributive structure compatible with the objectives 
of well-being for the majorities. And on the other hand it becomes 
necessary for the political power of the State to be based on a broad 
social coalition in which the interests of the majorities are duly 
represented and effective channels of communication exist between these 
groups of society and the various institutions of the State. Consequently, 
social policy should certainly not be a compensatory and subsidiary 
element of economic growth. Rather should it be understood as a set of 
procedures which modify the structural factors behind the market, and 
which transform the modalities of the assignment of resources -apart from 
redirecting public expenditure- and of the social product with a view on 
the one hand, to the more inmediate benefit of those who are poorest 
politically and economically and, on the other, to the creation of 
structural conditions that will ensure the permanent and increasing well-
being of the community as a whole. 
In other words, the success of social policy depends on the technical 
coherence with which the structural conditioners of the social problem, 
such as the direct palliative action of the State, are dealt with, and 
secondly, on the political will to carry out this task. The "social" 
aspect , therefore, cannot be isolated from the economic and political; 
otherwise the policy will be diluted and fragmented and result merely 
in a prolongation of the uncertainty, marginality and poverty in which 
more than 100 million Latin Americans live. In theoretical terms, 
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however, two areas of concern for the solution of the social problem can 
be distinguished: one, the coherence and technical efficiency of the 
procedures designed to overcome it; and, two, the construction and 
expression of a political will to accompany and support these procedures. 
Since the main object of this seminar is to consider the first of these 
topics, the present paper will be devoted entirely to this. Nonetheless, 
this fact should certainly not be construe-6 as evidence that the authors 
think that political considerations should take second place. On the 
contrary, we are convinced that social change is only possible if the 
great majorities have effective access to the organs of political power, 
thus becoming active subjects of the necessary process of reform. 
II. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE OVERCOMING OF 
THE SOCIAL PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA 
Our contention, then is, that in an economic and social situation 
which is complex, multidimensional and above all inter-dependent, such as 
the one in which we find ourselves, the "social problem" cannot be thought 
of in isolation. When we attempt an analysis of the ways of overcoming 
the social problem in our region we must therefore include both the theory 
and practice of economic development and the distribution of its benefits. 
Indeed, the conceptions held about economic growth have a powerful 
influence on the measures designed to surmount the problems and, viceversa, 
the social procedures can have a profound effect on the intensity and the 
characteristics of growth. 
1. Conceptions on the relation between economic 
	 owth and the 
overcoming of the social problems  
In Latin America there is certainly no single theory and practice of 
economic and social development. Very much to the contrary, throughout its 
history, in one country Lr another, there have been many and varied national 
development projects, depending naturally on different bases of social 
support and different modalities for obtaining their objectives. In a 
recent document produced by ILPES, "The State of Planning in Latin America 
and the Caribbean", a lengthy account is given of the various forms adopted 
by the theory and practice of development policies, or, as it was expressed 
in the said document, the different styles of planning prevalent in Latin 
America. In this study ILPES referred to the existence of four styles of 
planning which, in their turn, defined the various theories and modalities 
for overcoming the social problem which are practiced in the region today. 
It is unnecessary to repeat here the analysis of planning styles made 
by ILPES in the above-mentioned document. On the basis of this, however, 
we can distinguish two important forms of approach to the relation between 
growth and the mastery of the social problem. Each of these approaches 
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incorporates two of the four planning styles recognized by ILPES. Moreover, 
in describing these approaches we shall refer only to the relationship 
postulated between growth and well-being and, in consequence, to the 
mechanisms deriving from this for the attainment of social well-being 
and income distribution. 
The first of these approaches, based on traditional economic theory 
and, fundamentally, on its neo-classic version, postulates a mechanical 
equivalence between growth and the well-being of the population as a whole, 
and therefore gives priority to growth. In other words, this approach 
assumes that growth, through its "spill-over effects", automatically benefits 
the whole population and that therefore the most efficient method of 
overcoming the social problem is to speed up the growth rate. Even so, 
this approach recognizes that the State -without interfering in the market 
decisions concerning the assignment of resources- must supply certain 
social services that the market does not provide. Thus it accepts the 
existence of a "social policy" confined to certain spheres and subsidiary 
to the growth objective. The importance and magnitude given to these 
policies generate differences between the various countries which are 
implementing, or have implemented, this approach; but in essence they 
all believe that growth -in the medium or long-term- constitutes the best 
solution to the problem of poverty. 
The second approach does not accept the direct and automatic link 
between growth and social well-being and therefore postulates the need 
for direct State intervention in order to guarantee certain substantial 
increases in the standard of living of the population and, in particular, 
of the sectors with least resources. Within this concept there are 
differences in respect of the quantity and depth of the transformation in 
the economic, political and social structure needed to attain the social 
goals. At all events, it is recognized that social aims have a central 
place in development strategy, since they wil not derive automatically 
from growth, and moreover, that the State h,  an essential role to play in 
the creation of conditions which will mak:- viable the attainment of these 
aims. 
2. Some criticisms of the neo-classic conception  
As already said, the first of these conceptions claims that the 
market -except in certain special circumstances- freely and spontaneously 
attains an ideal level and composition of the product. This is a situation, 
as defined by Pigou,in which there is no alternative form of production 
obtainable through a reassignment of resources among the different 
productive units which could provide the community with better conditions 
than those established by the market. This definition gives rise to the 
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"neutral" character required of State action, 1  that it should not 
interfere in the process of assignment of resources that arised from market 
relations. Any intervention, it is claimed, would so affect the members 
of society that those who "gain" from the changes produced would be unable 
to compensate those who "lose", and hence there would be no net gain for 
society. 
We believe that this conception can be criticized from two viewpoints: 
first, its ethical basis, which we consider incompatible with the aims of 
equality and social justice; and, second, the fact it does not take into 
account the characteristics of the economic and social structures of Latin 
America. 
Our disagreement on the ethical plane with the traditional economic 
theory is simply our refusal to accept Bentham's concept that the algebraic 
sum of the interests of individuals is equal to the interest of society, 
which leads to the postulate that the individual who looks after his own 
interests also serves the interests of society. This claim, moreover, is 
seem to be linked with a hedonistic vision of the human being, which would 
keep him completely absorbed in the task of obtaining for himself an ever-
increasing material well-being. To this he subordinates his life, 
rejecting a social-community dimension which, in our view, is an essential 
part of humanity. All this, incidentally, is the basis on which the 
traditional economic theory feels able to absolve itself from the 
distributive problem. Indeed, if it is held that a man derives no 
pleasure from the fact that a fellow-being more needy than himself should 
satisfy his whole or partial needs, there can be no justification for the 
transference of resources from those who have their needs satisfied to 
those who have not. In its own terms, the marginal profit on income 
is no greater for the poorest groups, and, consequently, the "social 
utility" does not increase with such transferences. 
We see, then, that the ethical concept underlying the traditional 
economic theory -and especially its neo-classical version- is incompatible 
with a model or style of socioeconomic development- of which the central 
motivation is the search for an equality of opportunity to realize in the 
fullest possible way the true and multiple dimensions of humanity. These 
views of ours on the "ethical" in economy, and on the ideas of Jeremy 
Bentham, might seem to some a trifle anachronist. They have, however, 
an amazing actuality. During recent years, and especially in Latin America, 
there has been a great resurgence of utilitarian ideas that seemed to 
1/ We are not overlooking the fact that this theory accepts the need 
for State intervention in certain exceptional cases. These will be 
described and discussed in the third chapter of this paper. 
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have been buried under the enormous accretion of economic events in the 
19th., and the first half of the 20th century, and crushed by the advances 
in philosophy and social sciences generally. 
Our second disagreement with traditional economic theory derives from 
the reality of the structural roots of the social problem in Latin America. 
As already said one of the central characteristics of the countries of the 
region is their enormous economic and social heterogeneity. We believe that 
this is largely the cause of the existing social inequality and the chief 
barrier to surmounting it. The extremely deficient economic productivity 
of the lower strata condems them to a state of poverty and unfulfilment 
of their basic needs. Likewise, it is common knowledge that the 
heterogeneous and unequal distribution of productive capital, technical 
skill and education normally introduces "segmentations" into the labour 
markets which give a permanent character to the original unequal 
distribution of incomes and wealth. Lastly, the composition of the supply 
of goods to the end-consumer conform to patterns of demand which derive 
from a highly concentrated distributive structure, thus strengthening the 
existing criteria for the assignment of material and human resources, and, 
in dynamic terms, a concentrative and exclusive model of economic growth. 
This brief outline of the consequential relationship between the 
structural heterogeneity of the Latin American countries, the form acquired 
by profit distribution, the structure of demand, the composition of supply 
and the assignment of resources, is designed to show the incapacity of the 
market to correct these inequalities. In fact, as already said, the market, 
functioning spontaneously, tends to reaffirm and reproduce or intensify 
the existing structure with its consequent injustice and social inefficiency. 
Apart from this, the situation is clear from the results of economic growth 
in the countries of the region. Even in the period of greatest growth, 
and when the State was also playing a part in correcting social imbalances, 
as in the 60s, the number of people who could not meet their basic needs 
remains unaltered. The reason for this was the fact that no changes were 
made in the structural conditioners of unemployment and underemployment, 
of the distorted prices of capital, of the concentration of wealth and 
various other causes of the social problem. 
For these two reasons, among others which it would take too long to 
mention, we are convinced that the development strategies based on the free 
play of market forces and on the expectation of a "spill-over effect" of 
economic growth will not be capable of eliminating the social inequalities 
which are manifest today in the poverty, marginality and uncertainty in 
which somewhat more than 100 million Latin Americans are still submerged. 
The solution of social problems requires a dynamic and deliberate process 
of structural change -and therefore of the basic economic and political 
processes- which will alter the relations of the different socioeconomic 
strata among themselves and with the productive structure. It is a question 
of producing certain fundamental changes in the socioeconomic structure, 
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thereby achieving a socioeconomic model which would allow for the dynamic 
incorporation of all members of society. 
3. The requirements of social change 
The realization of this process of change requires, on the one hand, 
a certain normative relationship in the direction of the transformation and, 
on the other, a planned action designed to implement the "socioeconomic 
model selected". It is important to be clear and, we repeat, rational in the 
task of defining the aims and criteria which will govern the procedures 
destined to transform the socioeconomic structure so that it will meet the 
needs of the whole population. Hence the proposal'is to carry into effect 
what most of the Latin American nations have determined to do, but in vague 
terms and without all the necessary instruments; namely, to make an 
integrated and continuing effort to combat the state of social inequality, 
with its resulting poverty, marginality and uncertainty. 
The forms and tempo of structural change will depend on the social, 
economic and political situation in each country. Hence it is impossible 
and certainly not desirable to define common criteria -except those of a 
theoretico-methodological nature- for the programming and realization of 
this endeavour. 
In the theoretico-methodological field, however, we are convinced that 
there is still much work to be done, particularly with reference to a 
multidisciplinary definition of the theory of economic and social 
development. This compels us to think of an integrated or (as the 
United Nations proposed .at the beginning of the 60s.) a unified version 
of development where economic growth and social progress are not only 
understood to be mutually interdependent, but also to be organically related 
in an integrated development process. 
In what follows we shall concentrate on a discussion of the conditions 
required for an integration of economic and social problems. We shall try 
to analyse the social implications of economic policies and the economic 
dimension of social policies. This analysis, we trust will help to delimit 
the large areas included in the field of the interrelation existing between 
the economic and social aspects of planning and in the adoption of 
development policies. 
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III. THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
1. General background 
Economic and social policies, whether directly or indirectly, attempt 
to achieve the same end which is the development of the well-being and 
potentialities of the human being. It should be evident, therefore, that 
economic policy has social implications and that social policies, in their 
turn, have an economic dimension and implications of a depth which cannot 
be ignored or minimized. These relationships, which are so patently 
obvious, have often been markedly absent from Latin America Planning and 
in general from the formulation and adoption of economic and social policies. 
We shall attempt to highlight the importance of the links, between the 
economic and social elements to point out the most important aspects to be 
taken into account, and to indicate the areas of research and decision-
making which seem to have priority in the advance towards a definition of 
an integrated approach to economic and social development. Naturally we 
shall not attempt to mention here all the possible relationships, much less 
to deal with each of them in depth. 
The economic problem is in effect a social problem, both in its nature 
and its conditionings and consequences. Hence it is impossible to think of 
the two subjects separately. Nonetheless, economic policy in practice -
powerfully influenced by traditional economic theory - has minimized the 
importance of this relationship. 
In respect of their social effects, three types of economic policy can 
be distinguished: those which tend to affect the primary distribution of 
income; those which tend to correct the differences between private and 
social costs of prices and, lastly, those which are traditionally called 
economic policies, namely those related to the achievement of objectives 
such as growth, price, stability, etc., and which have social implications 
through the natural participation of the members of society, including the 
poorest, in the prosperity or deterioration of the economy. 
All these policies, as we have seen, can alleviate the social problem 
through increasing the level of income and hence the capacity of consumption 
of the basic needs of the lower income groups. With regard to the specific 
aim of income-redistribution, there are many procec.hres for achieving it: 
for example, those which directly redistribute primary resources; those 
which transform the supply structure by stimulating the production of goods 
consumed by the lower income groups; and those involving technologies which 
promote a greater use of unskilled labour, etc. All these have as common 
denominator the fact that they increase the consumption capacity of the 
poorer groups in the short term. All of them, too, have profound and 
reciprocal relations with the investment decisions of the community with 
the way in which these investments are carried out, and with the types of 
production achieved in the process of investment saving. 
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For example, to achieve the aim of dynamically increasing the capacity 
of the lower income groups for consumption of their basic needs, the 
redistribution must not hamper the rate of growth or at least it must ensure 
that in the long term the income level of the most disadvantaged group is 
not lower in real terms than it would have been without the intervention of 
redistribution. Similarly, the productive structure, both in the type of 
technology it uses and in the type of goods it produces, must progressively 
adapt itself to the capacities (human resources) and needs (structure of 
demand) of the lower income groups, while at the same time avoiding an 
unfavourable effect on the average, productivity of the economy. 
We must emphasize that among the elements which satisfy basic needs we 
include employment, not only because of its capacity to generate income but 
also because it is creative by nature and incorporates the individual into 
the community. Work has the power to develop man's potential and thus, to 
complete and fulfil him. Likewise, when an individual performs a socially 
useful task, it satisfies his need for social appreciation or to belong to 
and form part of a society or group on which he depends and to which he 
contributes. Hence it is not a question of just any type of employment but 
of one which enables a person to develop his potentialities and which 
produces socially useful results. 
Having touched on these general considerations, we shall proceed to 
outline by way of example the social implications of different types of 
economic policy. 
2. Economic policies which transform the primary 
distribution of income 
Policies of this type are those which modify the conditions determining 
the original sharing out of income. Thus they centre around the phases of 
generation and appropriation of incomes and their effect is permanent; that 
is, once the transformation has been made -provided there are no new 
changes- it continues indefinitely. This is undoubtedly the most direct, 
effective and permanent method of improving the situation of the lower 
income groups. The doubt which persists in connection with the use of these 
mechanism -apart from the basic conditions of a political nature- concerns 
their effect on the growth rate. 
We will analyse briefly the situation -in this respect- of the four 
areas of intervention through which the government can achieve a 
redistribution of income. 
(a) Ownership and control of assets  
This is the fundamental area, since it largely determines the form 
in which the renevues of society are distributed among individual. In Latin 
America a consideration of the distribution of assets is particularly 
important since all the studies on the subject point out that their 
concentration is greater than that of incomes and at the same time is the 
chief cause of the concentration of the latter. 
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Changes in ownership and control of assets can be achieved.by means of 
a redistribution of existing assets or -what is politically less conflictive 
in dynamic form by way of changes in the pattern of accumulation which is 
that which determines the growth of the different assets of course of time. 
The redistribution of existing assets can be made through collectivation 
or through their redistribution towards the lower income groups. Both 
modalities have been tried in Latin America, with very varied results. As 
regards their relation to economic growth, perhaps the only general lesson 
that can be learnt from these experiments is that, as far as public enter-
prises are concerned, their efficiency largely depends on the clarity with 
which their functions are defined, whether these are financial accumulation, 
consolidation and/or promotion of development or income distribution. There 
are many examples of success in the fulfilment of each of these functions. 
But there are also many records of failure which impose burdens sometimes 
very heavy, on the exchequer. At all events, to the extent that the 
function of the public enterprise is clear and, of course, advantageous 
for the lower income groups, it would seem that this can efficient fulfil 
its social role. 
With reference to the transference of assets towards the poorest 
groups, the chief lesson seems to be that this process is inadequate and 
undesirable -from the growth point of view- unless it is accompanied by 
programmes of technical and financial assistance and of provision of 
resources complementary to production. It is axiomatic that the lower 
income groups not only have fewer means of production but also less capital 
-in the broad sense of the term- for the necessary investment and the 
maintenance of production. Hence, unless these are provided for them, 
production will fall and the income level of the supposedly favoured groups 
may be reduced. 
The dynamic redistribution of assets, moreover (that is, the reorien-
tation of the pattern of investment of the economy), can be promoted or 
induced by the government through a gradual socialization of the assets, or 
through policies of support for direct investments destined to raise the 
lowest incomes. 
The option of gradual socialization is what has been operating, 
probably unconsciously, in Latin America. This means the growing 
participation of the public sector in the investment rate and, in some 
cases, the imposition of restrictions on the activity of the private sector 
in certain areas. From the point of view of distribution and growth this 
option is subject to the same conditions as already described in the case 
of public enterprises; that is, it depends on productive efficiency and on 
the identity of the direct and indirect beneficiaries of the activities. 
In any event, is should be noted that in Latin America public investment 
-although almost always financed by taxes- has been a complement, not a 
substitute, for private investment. As was demonstrated in the case of 
some of the Southern Cone countries, a reduction in taxations, and hence 
in public investment, implies a fall in the overall rate of investment. 
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This occurs, as every economic primer will tell us, because the tendency ti 
save the additional income is undoubtedly less than the unit. From this 
viewpoint, therefore, the increase in the public investment rate has given 
an impetus to economic growth. 
In some degree the policies of support for the direct investments of 
the lower income groups tend to surmount another of the basic causes of 
poverty in Latin America. This is the lack of access of the poor to fiscal 
and financing capital; to the acquisition of human capital, to infrastructure 
and a wide range of complementary inputs. It is a question, therefore of 
correcting the factors which prolong this structural fault, thereby directly 
benefiting the target group, and at the same time creating the conditions 
for the gradual raising of their income level. This type of action, at a 
low political cost, can obtain excellent results from the redistribution 
viewpoint. In terms of its effect on growth, this will depend on the 
relative productivity of the capital in the redistribution options compared 
with the other possibilities of investment in the economy. 
Within the investment options mentioned in the previous paragraph that 
of human capital should also be considered. There are some who argue that 
the patterns of concentration of human skills are as important a cause of 
inequality of income as the concentration of physical assets. Although 
recognising the inmense importance of education -above all if this acquires 
a functional character strictly linked with the requirements arising from 
the assignment of resources- we consider that this policy like all so-called 
"social" policies implemented in isolation, is clearly insufficient, since 
in not changing the productive strs 7,re it wcylid not affect the demand for 
human capital, thus maintaining the tieteiceneous ].::hoar mail
-et with its 
"pockets" of low productivity and underemployment, with low incomes as the 
inevitable result. 
These options of direct 
	 in the_ target group incorporate in 
part the traditionally accepted social policies, to which we will return 
later on. They should also incorporate -a fact which has not been often 
enough observed in the region—policies tending to support the informal 
urban sector and the traditional rural se0
-or, The immense importance of 
these policies, from the standpoint of redistribution and growth, has been 
duly pointed out by PREALC and we do not think it necessary to repeat it. 
However, we wish to emphasize that this is probably one of the most effective 
ways of advancing towards the dynamic satisfaction of basic needs, above all 
in the political climate of Latin America today. 
Finally, it is our view that from the standpoint of economic theory 
-including the traditional- the alteration of the patterns of concentration: 
of assets constitutes an important inStrument in promoting redistribution 
objectives. Moreover, empirical studies such as those carried out, among 
others, by Irma Adelman, have demostrated that it is the only way to 
achieve a model of equitable growth. 
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Nevertheless, traditional economic theory has neglected this area, 
concentrating almost exclusively on questions concerning the fixing of prices 
in relation to factors and empi;ymert. This is particularly surprising when 
one considers that the policies f7 redistribution of assets, as opposed to 
others, fulfil the basic premise 	 the traditional theory concerning 
assignment of resources. That is t say, the,r have no direct effect on the 
price system nor on the free fu:ecti 'eine of the market. Consequently, in 
terms of the Wairasian analysis, ti's type of policy reconciles technical 
and economic efficiency with social efficiency. 
(b) Direct action on the facto;;  of production market is normally aimed 
at varying the prices and/or the reels of utilization of the factors, 
thereby transforming the level of icome these obtain. From a social 
viewpoint the object of this policy would be to increase the level of 
employment and/or wage of the tower income groups. As we have seen in 
Latin America a majority of those who cannot satisfy the basic needs are 
in employment, but they spend less 'ime and effort (human and technical) 
than is required to produce an income adequate for SBN (satisfaction of 
basic needs). We are thinking therefore, of the underemployed rather than 
unemployed -although the latter alsc affect in greater proportion the lower 
income groups- who need to increase their income. This can be achieved 
through the creation of more productive jobs or through an increase in real 
wages. The latter, however, if not based on the former, usually has a 
negative effect on the employment level, resulting therefore in an uncertain 
surplus over the aggregate income level of the poorest. 
The policies of intervention in the factor market traditionally 
applied in Latin America have frequently had a negative effect on the 
employment level. These policies have basically been of two types: those 
which affect the level of wages (minimum salaries and taxes on the payroll) 
and those which have an impact on the cost of capital (exchange rate, 
tariffs or import quotas and interest rate). It can be shown that both 
the policies of minimum wages and "pay as you earn" and those of capital 
subsidy -in the form of credit, tariffs or undervaluation of the exchange 
rate- tend to create a distortion in the factor market which results in a 
style of growth more capital-intensive than the available resources in 
Latin America justify. 
The aforesaid policies, therefore, have had a negative effect on the 
employment level. Nonetheless, their substitution or elimination might also 
have possible social repercusions. 
In effect, in respect of policies affecting the level of wages or the 
cost of labour, it should be noted that, although they have probably had a 
negative impact on employment, they have undoubtedly brought considerable 
benefit to the population employed in the formal sector of society. A 
reduction in real wages will only have a redistributive effect if the 
elasticity of technical substitution among factors is higher than one. 
On this point, the technological conditions prevailing in Latin America, 
particularly in the formal sector, would suggest that this elasticity 
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is inferior to the unit and therefore the elimination of the policy of 
minimum wages would only produce a redistribution within the working 
class; 1/ that is if the formal sector actually contracts at the levels of 
the minimum wage. In many cases it would seem that this is not so, since 
in order to reduce the cost of staff turnover the entrepreneur prefers to 
pay a higher wage. Evidently this considerably reduces the impact of a 
wages liberalization policy. In any case, this is an area where there has 
been practically no research that would enable definitive conclusions to be 
drawn on such an important matter. At the same time, the policies which 
tend to reduce the cost of labour -through a reduction in social lows- have 
a negative effect on the financing of the public sector. This could result 
in inflation, a reduction in the social services in the public sector or in 
another type of solution, -increase in income-tax or reduction of expenditure 
on items not affecting the poorest groups- which would not have a negative 
social impact. 
Lastly, still referring to wages, the literature has on various 
occasions suggested the possibility of creating posts in public employment 
-which also might produce social goods or services- at a minimum wage level 
adequate for SBN; or, to that end the subsidizing of the free private wage to 
bring it up to the same level. This solution, while not introducing 
distortions in the factor market, has the double advantage of increasing 
the employment level and probably the income level of at least, some of 
those employed. Despite its great attraction in theory, however, the 
subject has not been treated in empirical studies which might determine 
its viability. At all events, the few studies available suggest that from 
a fiscal point of view at least, this option seems feasible. In the case of 
Chile for example, a recent study indicates that 4 per cent of the public 
revenue would be enough to finance, at an income level adequate for the 
SBN, the whole of the unemployed labour force. 
Similarly, the policies of capital subsidy are regarded as a method 
of boosting growth and hence employment. Nevertheless, there are models 
for promoting growth more in keeping with the available resources and 
therefore more efficient and more effective in terms of employment. A case 
1/ It should be remembered that the really important factor in defining 
the effect on employment of a wages policy is the price elasticity of the 
demand for labour. On this point Vine, among others have indicated that 
the elimination or disminution of the minimum wage can increase the total 
payment for wages and the employment in the modern sector and improve the 
equality of distribution between the workers in the modern and the 
traditional sectors even if the elasticity of substitution is less than the 
unit -always provided that the elasticity of substitution is higher than 
the participation of capital in the modern sector. In its turn, this 
argument has received a series of criticism which it would take too long 
to enumerate here. 
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in point might be the support of small and medium industries. For instance 
in Colombia and Ecuador there have been studies of case showing the 
viability of generating productive employment with an investment of 1 000 
to 1 500 dollars per job, which is considerably lower than the average 
for the most modern and sophisticated sectors. Another study by PREALC 
for Bolivia reveals that the mere deconcentration of subsidized credit 
would have a merked effect on employment. 
Finally, the highly heterogeneous character of the capital market in 
the countries of the region should not be overlooked. This generally 
results in the simultaneous existence of an undervaluation of the price 
of capital in the modern sector and an overvaluation in the informal and 
traditional sector. This situation discriminates against the use of labour 
in two ways: it induces a greater ase of capital in the modern sector and 
inhibits the expansion of the sectors of small and medium industry, which 
make a more intensive use of labour. Consequently a policy socially 
and economically) sound in respect of the cost of capital should place 
this on a level adjusted to the available resources at national level and 
furthermore, endeavour to make the market homogeneous or even introduce 
preferential conditions for the small and medium producer. 
Closely related to the aspect described above is the third form of 
redistributive policy, which is concerned with technology. The state of 
technology determines - among other things - the level of total production 
and the degree of substitution between factors. This directly affects the 
generation of income in the factor market and the relative prices in the 
goods market, producing an inmediate impact on income distribution and 
the availability of goods and services. 
Nevertheless, as has already been said - and several studies have 
demostrated it - technological change can have a negative effect on the 
lower income groups. This might occur because it promotes the production 
of goods which are not related to the needs of the poorest and/or because 
the productive process is not adjusted to the existing availability of 
resources. In general, the lack of technological policy in the region -
although a growing in interest in the subject can be observed - has meant 
that the technology has been taken up in countries with resources and 
demand structures very different from those of Latin America, and 
therefore its use has had a negative impact on the social question. 
This circumstance has induced various States to play a more effective 
part in research, dissemination and information on the available 
technologies and in the production of capital goods. It must be 
remembered, however, that the countries of the region only invest between 
0.15 and 0.30 per cent of the product in research, dissemination and 
production of technology. This figure is extraordinarily low when compared 
with the 1 or 2 per cent spent on the same activities in the developed 
countries. 
This is not the moment to repeat the important suggestions made by 
ILPES concerning the form in which policies on science and technology 
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should be linked with the planning process. We wish to mention, however, 
that this link appears to us to be indispensable in promoting technological 
development in accordance with the social needs of the countries of the 
region. 
(c) Modification of the structure of supply of goods and services  
In this case the government -basically through its expenditure 
and investment policy- attempts to redirect production in favour of goods 
produced by enterprises using labour-intensive technologies and which, 
moreover, do not show high degrees of concentration. Likewise, an 
endeavour is made to induce the generation of a supply structure adjusted 
to the satisfaction Of basic needs. 
In general, the governments of the region have used this criterion to 
define their expenditure policy only in the case of public investment. But 
it could also be applied to give an impulse to those private sectors which 
fulfil the prescribed conditions as for example construction, agriculture, 
agroindustry and the basic services, which figure among the most suitable 
for this purpose. 
An interesting experiment in this respect is that of the policy of 
prices of support and purchase of basic foods by the National Production 
Council of Costa Rica. In this case it was evident that those agricultural 
products which benefited from this policy were precisely those that 
increased their production at a greater rate. However, in some cases 
-sorgum, for example- the products were not directly or indirectly 
consumed by the lower income groups; and in others -rice for instance-
though they were a basic food for those groups, they were not exactly 
those which were produced in.small or medium farms, nor the most intensive 
in the use of labour. The incorporation of these considerations in the 
selection of the production items benefited by the public expenditure 
policy might have appreciably increased the social irradiation of the 
production growth. 
In addition to the policies mentioned, the government can achieve 
similar effects on the supply structure by means of indirect taxes and/or 
controls on the production of luxury goods. Although the literature has 
demonstrated the difficulty in defining luxury goods, this course of 
action might prove to be an interesting way of promoting a convenient 
reassignment of resources. However, considerable further research is still 
needed as to which goods to boost and which to restrict, and on the effects 
this intervention has on the efficient assignment of resources and on 
economic growth. 
All the foregoing indicates the great potential for redistribution in 
the policies of the public sector, and at the same time the insufficiencies 
in terms of existing empirical research and the need to correct these in 
order that the achievement of the social aims of the redistributive policy 
may be compatible with economic growth and the dynamic satisfaction of 
basic needs. 
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3. The correction of market imperfections 
Even traditional economic theory recognizes the incapacity of the 
market to ensure, in certain circumstances, an efficient assignment of 
resources. Among the imperfections. of the market there is, for example, 
the existence of employment and cotiital markets which are non-homogeneous 
and segmented. On this point, hover, we shall limit ourselves to 
commenting on those situations which are schools of economics openly 
condemn and which should therefore motivate some kind of intervention. 
The remaining situations have already been discussed or will be in the 
following sections. In view of the wide knowledge and agreement on these 
obvious "areas of interventior , by the State, we shall. not examine any of 
them in depth, but merely mention them as a matter of record, since we 
think that in general there is an awareness of the need to act in these 
areas, though very little is being done in the matter. 
(a) The markets which present some degree of concentration or central-
ization can lead to a poor assightfient of resources and an inequitable 
distribution of income. Traditional economic theory suggests direct action 
to restructure the market in question or the application of taxes. To 
equalize the private marginal. cost with the social cost. Despite the 
clarity of theory in connection with the detrimental effects of concent-
ration, this continues to exist with harmful effects, particularly in 
modern industry and in the financial systems of the countries of the region. 
It is also clear that the concentration and/or centralization of 
production or demand not only generates economic and distributive problems, 
but also supplies instruments of political power to those groups which. 
possess the economic power that enables them to perpetuate their 
privileges. 
(b) The second case for intervention accepted by traditional micro-
economic theory and which, in our region, is closely linked with the 
former, is that of the existence of economies of scale, To the extent 
that there are increasing returns to scale, that is, that the marginal 
cost is Thwer than the average cost it would benefit the country to 
increase production (if there is a market for its products) in this way 
to the point at which the marginal cost is equal to the marginal product. 
To achieve this, however, production will probably have to be subsidized 
to the extent of covering the difference between the marginal cost and 
the average. 
The presence of economies of scale is frequent in modern industry. 
This however, because of restrictions in the size of the market, normally 
leads to the existence of monopolistic or oligopolistic situations. Only 
with this supply structure are the firm or firms in a position to expand 
their production at least to the point where the marginal cost exceed the 
average. In this way a positive advantage is reaped from the economy 
of scale, but its fruit are not normally enjoyed by the population. Hence 
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the presence of economies of scale in small markets constitutes one of the 
fundamental barriers to the existence of competitive markets. 
A third case is that of public goods, for which a zero price is 
suggested and which therefore are naturally provided directly by the State 
or through State subsidies to the private enterprise charged with their 
production and production and supply. Pure air, parks, and the defence 
and security of the population are clear examples of this type of goods. 
The States of Latin America have always directly provided certain 
public goods, thus benefiting the entire population. It is clear, 
however, that not all the population, has equality of access or of interest 
to "consume" particular types of public goods. The construction of roads, 
public beaches, a certain type of basic infrastructure, etc., benefits 
only the population that lives in or frequents the place in which they 
were constructed. When there is a great territorial inequality in the 
provision of these public goods -as is clearly evidenced in Latin American 
cities- this expenditure on the part of the State can become an additional 
source of concentration of income and well-being. This fact should 
motivate the development of techniques of assessment of the social impact 
of public goods, so as to give priority to those activities oF more 
direct benefit to the lower income groups. 
Another area of intervention accepted by traditional economic theory 
is that which has to do with the existence of externalities in the  
production or consumption of goods and services.  A typical case of 
externalities in production occurs in the explotation of certain natural 
resources, where the participation of a large number of producers tends to 
increase the cost of each one in particular (fishing, for example). 
Another of these cases is education where economic theory postulated that 
the social cost of education is less than the private cost because of the 
greater contribution to society that a person with a higher level of 
education can make. 
Additionally there is the whole environmental problem which, in large 
measure, is created by externalities to the production and consumption of 
certain goods. 
In all these cases economic theory proposes the intervention of the 
State to equalizes -through taxes and/or subsidies and/or through direct 
action- the private and social cost. Even so, as in the case of the 
provision of public goods, the benefits derived -though subsidies- from 
positive externalities or the compensation obtained -financed by taxes-
for negative externalities can sometimes aggravate the existing social 
imbalances. 
A clear example of this is the immense concern of the States of the 
region to provide mass higher education either free or highly subsidiezed 
which is mainly to the advantage of the higher income groups in society. 
It is clear that the list of situations in which economic theory 
proposes State intervention has certain potential for improving the 
general well-being of the population. These forms of intervention, 
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however are not always guided by criteria of equity and therefore do not 
always lead to a more equitable distribution of income. In Latin America 
some types of intervention have probably tended to reinforce rather than 
diminish social inequalities. 
4. Traditional economic policies  
Within this context it is possible to identify the measure of economic 
policy designed and applied to influence different quantitative variables 
in terms of the "growth with stability" objective. The achievement of 
this objective brings with it social repercussions. An exposition of what 
these are makes a useful contribution to the search for an economic growth 
model which will at the same time promote the achievement of equity and the 
overcoming of social problems. 
(a) Policies for the promotion of production and employment  
The basic principle which has hitherto defined the orientation of 
these policies in the region is the attainment of an adeaute level and 
structure of investment, both public and private. This should lead to the 
greater possible growth of the product, given the availability of resources. 
According to the form adopted by these policies a specific distribution will 
result between the various factors of production. 
For these effects the State has recourse to mechanisms which can be 
divided into two large groups: those of direct investment, whether in 
production, infrastructure or human capital; and those affecting the 
performance of private agents, such as taxes and subsidies, restrictions on 
foreign trade, credit policy, etc. Through these two main channels the 
State in Latin America has had a great influence on the definition of the 
characteristics of investment. This, in its turn, has a decisive effect 
both on the level and composition of the product and on the level and 
structure of employment and wages. Thus it has a direct effect on income 
distribution. Furthermore, as was pointed out in the previous section, 
investment defines the style of development and consequently the 
characteristics of dynamism and equity that the system can acquire. 
The decision as to what to produce -whether to incentivate the 
production of mass-consumption goods or luxury goods, of goods for 
export or domestic consumption and in what proportion, whether industrial 
production with a high added value or raw-material production with little 
added value for example- increases or restricts the consumption capacity 
of the lower income sectors in accordance with the levels of employment 
and income generated and the range of goods placed at their disposal. 
Similarly, the technology selected for use in production determines 
the proportion in which the basic productive factors are used. That is, 
the level of employment and the distribution of income which each level 
of activity creates. 
Finally, the ownership of the means of production benefited by the 
new public investments or by the public incentives to increase private 
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investment, reinforces or alters the patterns of income distribution 
defined in the productive process, inasmuch as it defines the destination 
of the surpluses or utilities generated by the activity in question. 
This set of relationships largely determines the levels and structure 
of employment and income and these, in their turn, have a definitive 
influence on the structure of demand. 
Hence, the economic policy which directly or indirectly seeks to guide 
private investment and also to complement it with public investment has a 
great impact on the social structure. In this connection there can be no 
doubt -and numerous cases in Latin America corroborate it- that the 
economic and social structure which has emerged after decades of intensive 
public intervention leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of social 
equity. One cannot conclude from this, however, that the State should not 
intervene. Very much to the contrary, in a situation of unequal income 
distribution, such as that which is prevalent in the region, the 
disappearance of the State as a factor influencing investment would lead 
to even greater degrees of inequality, since the only guide to the assign-
ment of resources would be the prevailing demand structure which in its 
turn, would clearly mirror the existing inequalities and basically represent 
the preferences of the higher income groups. 
Public intervention, therefore, is necessary for the guidance of 
investment and growth. This action, however, should keep in view the 
objectives of redistribution and the conditions needed to obtain them as 
presented at the beginning of this chapter. 
(b) Income policies and fiscal expenditure  
As we have said, these are used in part to correct a series of 
nature which the market by itself is not able 
are activities which directly affect the social 
and health, and others which have an indirect 
policy affects the social problem in two ways. The first, as 
we have shown, depends on the destination of expenditure, the second, on 
the origin of fiscal revenues that is, on the taxation structure. 
(i) With regard to the sources of public revenue or taxation policies, 
there have been several studies on the effects of taxation which attempt 
to establish the way in which taxes affect the different social groups 
by their effect either on their income or on their expenditure. These 
studies have enabled us to define with relative clarity the conditions 
which could lead to an equitable tax structure. Among these the 
following may be mentioned: 
- There should be an increase in the proportion of total fiscal 
revenue derived from personal income tax. This is undoubtedly the most 
progressive tax but it generally represents only a small fraction of the 
total revenue. 
- The same might be said of taxes on property. In general these 
are insignificant in the countries of the region. Particularly important 








in this respect is the designing of adequate systems of land taxation which 
would improve the use of the land and reduce the economic profit derived 
from the mere ownership of this asset. 
- 
In general, taxes on consumption which today finance a significant 
portion of expenditure, are regressive in character; that is they have a 
greater impact on the lower income .Troups. 
- 
Taxes on sales appear to be neutral. Even so, neutrality when 
it is a matter of correcting the existing income distribution is regressive 
in character. 
- 
There should be an increase in the contribution of taxes on 
inheritance and on donations which at present represent a negligible 
percentage of the tax structure. This is particularly important since 
inheritances and donation constitute a privileged institutional mechanism 
for the transference of inequality. 
The above-mentioned studies agree in also pointing out the regressive 
character of the tax burden in most of the countries of the region. These 
statements of a general nature should certainly be validated and individual-
ized in the case of each country. The researches already carried out are 
of a macro and subregional nature and should therefore be complemented by 
more specific studies on taxation effects. 
(ii) In respect of the incidence of fiscal expenditure there are 
relatively few studies, and generally those which exist do not examine the 
situation in Latin America. The only studies on Latin America deal with 
Colombia, Chile and Ecuador. These studies indicate that the expenditure 
-and specially the social expenditure- in on the whole progressive or 
rather messocratic in that the average benefit per family is less For the 
poorest groups. In other words, 60 per cent of the lower-income 
population receives less than 60 per cent of the benefits of public 
expenditure. It is also noteworthy that in the countries analysed both 
the taxation system and the fiscal expenditure are more regressive in 
character than in the developed countries. For these reasons it appears 
urgent to introduce clear criteria as regards the equitable character 
that public expenditure should assume in the region. Various studies 
have referred to the regressive character of the large sums assigned to 
general expenditure (administration, defence, etc.) and to certain public 
programmes (promotion of the production of certain goods, provision of 
infrastructure for transport and of air and road transport in itself, etc.). 
On the other hand mention has been made of the progressive character of 
the greater part of "social expenditure" (health, food, housing, etc.). 
At all events, we shall return to this aspect in discussing the economic 
dimension in social policies. 
There are basically two types of price policy. The first aims at a 
greater stability, which ought to have -depending on the instruments 
utilized- a positive effect on income distribution, since inflation tends 
to be regressive. Nonetheless, the importance of the stabilization 
programme has to be offset by the social impact of the reduction of 
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inflation. It is clear that, as in the case of Chile, the counterpart of 
stabilization is a drop in production levels, in employment and in real 
wages, which negatives any redistributive effect of the programme. The 
second attempt to solve certain social problems by fixing the prices of 
the goods or services which have an important place in the shopping-basket 
of the lower income groups. 
In connection with this second form of intervention in the price 
system, there has been a lengthy discussion. On the one side it is argued 
that prices, in competitive markets, reflect relative scarcity, since to 
ignore and distort this "signal" is prejudicial to the social objective of 
the efficient assignment of resources. On the other side it is contended, 
and rightly, that in general the markets are not competitive. Evidence 
of this is the segmentation in the labour and capital markets and the 
existence of concentration and centralization in various markets of 
goods and services, both in respect of supply and demand. In addition to 
these distortions incorporated into the price system there are the cases, 
already referred to, of externalities, public goods and economies of 
scale. It seems, therefore, that there should be some form of inter-
vention to achieve a degree of social efficiency in the assignment of 
resources. This intervention, however should not necessarily affect the 
goods which form part of the basic shopping-basket. To extend the 
consumption of this type of goods it seems preferable to apply subsidies 
which do not generate distortions in the price system and therefore do 
not impede the efficient assignment of resources. 
In respect of the stabilization policy, it is generally argued that 
this benefits the lower income sectors. At the same time, however, it is 
pointed out -and experience corroborates it- that there is a certain 
"trade-off" between stability and employment. All those anti-inflation 
policies which generate high levels of unemployment will have a regressive 
impact on income distribution. A clear example of this as had been said 
before, is what happened in some Latin American countries during the last 
years of the 1970s. On the other hand, the high inflation rates which 
affected most of the Latin American countries in the middle of the past 
decade clearly indicated the regressive character of the inflationary 
periods. 
It would seem, then, that there is a difficult field of manoeuvre 
between the problems of inflation and unemployment. To ignore the impor-
tance of either would have unfavourable consequences for the lower income 
groups. This last fact indicates the urgent need -which has not been 
generally observed- to analyse in detail the social impact of the policies 
both of stabilization and expansion so that they can be compared and 
suitable action taken. 
(c) Foreign trade policy covers such a large number of aspects -some 
of which have already been mentioned- that we can only refer in broad 
outline to the relations of one or another of these with the social 
problem. 
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The different types of exchange policy (fixed exchange, free or 
floating rates), for example, have different effects on inflation and 
thereby influence income distributi.)n. An exchange policy which has, in 
the medium and long term, a lesser inflationary impact, and which obviously 
does not signify the existence of external incontrollable imbalances, will 
be more progressive than one which generates more inflation. Furthermore, 
the over or undervaluation of the real exchange rate, the former being 
expansive and the latter depressive, will afect the sectors dealing in 
exports and import substitutes, and hence the level of employment and 
remuneration. 
In its turn, the tariff policy affects the consumer goods available 
to the population. In a free marke,. the access to imported goods will be 
in terms of income distribution, since this will determine the structure of 
demand for imports. 	 For this reason, given the inequitable character of 
income distribution in the countries of the region, it is at least probable 
that the free market leads to high levels of luxury consumption. This not 
only fails to benefit the lower income groups, but it can also be to their 
detriment in that a proportion of scarce foreign assets is used for this 
type of consumption instead of for obtaining capital goods to increase 
production and employment. Similarly, the fixing of high tariffs may have 
kept many national enterprises functioning at low levels of efficiency with 
a resulting loss to the consumer in the sense that he might have obtained 
the same goods at a much lower cost. 
Additionally, in many cases, these high tariffs have created a bias in 
favour of the import of capital goods which are unsuitable for the 
resources available in our countries. This has affected the relative use 
of productive factors and, hence, the level of employment and the 
distribution of income. Thus, although we are convinced that some level 
of protection is necessary, both from the argument of the "infant industry" 
and from considerations of political autonomy, it must be borne in mind that 
excesses in this field can have a high social cost. 
Considerations of this kind are als-. relevant in respect of the volume 
and areas of foreign investment. In this case, moreover, consideration 
must be given to the problems of alternative availability of capital as a 
substitute for credit or foreign aid the problem of national appropriation 
of surpluses and the contribution of "know-how", which these investments 
imply. These considerations can have the effect of maximizing the social 
benefit of foreign investment or of restricting it in certain areas. 
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5. Construction of indicators expressing economic  
and social progress  
When economic and social development is thought of in integrated form 
the need at once arises for indicators to express social progress. 
It was more than ten years ago that Dudley Seers, in discussing the 
meaning of the concept of development asked himself: "What are we trying 
to measure?" His reply was: "The capacity of a man to develop himself 
to the full". Development, therefore, according to this author, should 
be assessed according to the following criteria: whether there has been 
a reduction in (i) poverty; (ii) unemployment, and (iii) inequality. From 
this standpoint he criticized the gross national product as the only develop-
ment indicator, since this can grow without any improvement in the areas 
mentioned above. 
As already said, the situation in Latin America has shown that good 
economic performances are not necessarily accompanied by an improvement in 
the lot of the great majorities; in fact, there are cases where this has 
worsened. Hence, it is particularly important to have indicators which 
will effectively express economic and social progress. 
To this end there have been proposals from many sources. Among others 
we might mention the indicators of basic needs used -among many- by 
Drewnouski: the "rates of reduction of social disparity" designed by 
Grant; and the "index of the physical quality of life" proposed by Morris 
of the Overseas Development Council. It is clear, therefore, that methodo-
logies exist which might replace or at least complement the present inap-
propriate development indicators. 
With this in view it will be necessary, apart from enlisting the good 
will of the governments of the region, to answer many questions -especially 
those of a microeconomic nature- which we present in the following section 
in discussing the economic dimension of social policies. 
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IV. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIOS I1 THE DESIGNI-uG OF SOCIAL POLICY 
1. General exposition 
Before suggesting the type of economic considerations which should be 
taken into account in the designin of efficient social policies we must lay 
emphasis on the systemic characte:- of every social problem, and this, 
in a double sense, in its interrelation with the rest of the economic 
system and likewise in its interrelation with the rest of human needs. 
(a) The systemic character of social problems  
All the social problems that are rooted in the fact that a social 
group has no access to a range of "satisfiers" of a basic need (food in 
the case of nutrition, dwelling and basic infrastructure in the case of 
housing, for example) can be understood to be inserted into a chain or 
system of production, distribution and consumption of the said satisfiers. 
The systemic character of the loci :L problem, in terms of the economic 
process as a whole, is therefore related to the range of macroeconomic 
interrelations implicit in the origin and search for solutions of the 
social problem. The housing problem, for example, must not only be thought 
of in terms of the number of square meters per person -or rather 
traditional indicators for measuring the satisfaction of housing needs-
which have to be built up, but in terms of all the inputs required, their 
internal or external availability, the construction technology suitable 
for the raw materials and labour available, the financing system, etc. 
In other words, it is a case of inserting the solution of the social 
problem into the chain of production-distribution-consumption of 
"satisfiers" of the basic need in question. 
(b) The complementary character of the process of satisfying basic  
needs  
The second form of overall interrelation to be taken into account 
in designing a specific social policy is concerned with the so-called 
"social areas". The need to think of the relations and interdependence 
of the different basic needs arises from two factors which have been 
stressed in numerous studies on the subject. The first of these relates 
to the complementary character of the process of satisfying basic needs. 
In other words, the joint provision, of "satisfiers" of different needs 
multiplies the efficiency of each individual satisfier. For example, if 
the nutrition programmes include the provision of certain basic sanitation 
services, it has been estimated that the amount of food needed to achieve 
a satisfactory level of calories and nutrients drops by approximately 
15 per cent, since adequate sanitary conditions increase the capacity 
of absorption of the calories and nutrients contained in the food. 
The second factor referred to above is connected with the overall 
deficit of "satisfiers" in the lower income groups. This global 
deficiency makes it necessary to elaborate "packets" of social policies 
81 
having a complementary character, since the target group itself tends to 
redistribute the benefits of a direct social policy towards other expenses. 
For example, if an official policy concentrates on the distribution of food 
packets it is probable that the target group will reduce the amount of food 
it bought before and use the surplus income for the purchase of other 
basic goods or services. Obviously in this case the effect of the 
complementary food policy on the state of nutrition would be nil or 
negligible. On this point it should be noted that only the poorest groups 
are deficient in their overall basic needs. The rest of the population 
which in some degree has unsatisfied needs will only show deficiencies in 
some of them, and therefore the packet of policies will be inefficient in 
economic terms since it will provide goods and services that are not 
strictly necessary. This situation indicates the need to define as 
precisely as possible the characteristics of the target-group for social 
policies. 
In general, social policy in Latin America has not been systematically 
thought out in either of the two senses just discussed. This is probably 
one of the basic causes of at least two of the problems invariably involved 
in the implementation of these policies. The first is the very high cost 
of reaching a member of the target-group with the adequate amount of goods 
and services. This occurs basically because of the poor definition of the 
normal target-group and, as a result, the considerable filtrations to which 
these programmes are liable; and further, because of the displacement of 
the benefits towards other unsatisfied needs of the target-group. The 
second problem usually encountered by social programmes is the scarcity 
of resources or the appearance of "bottlenecks" which hamper the execution 
of the programme. In many cases this occurs because insufficient 
consideration has been given to the need for resources and the chain 
effects (especially backwards) that the provision of these resources will 
require. Thus unexpected "bottlenecks" arise which halt the execution of 
the programme or increase the cost of its implementation, making still more 
scarse the resources which in most cases are already in short supply. 
(c) The macroeconomic impact of social programmes  
The third and perhaps the most important reason for undertaking 
social planning in a systemic form is connected with the macroeconomic 
impact of social programmes. The problem of unsatisfied basic needs is so 
great in Latin America that its solution requires -and in fact implies-
the mobilization or transference of resources in sufficiently large 
quantities to generate profound macroeconomic effects. Indeed, public 
expenditure in the social field represents an average around 10 per cent 
of the gross domestic product of the region. Its financing, therefore, 
can have an important effect both on the income of the poorest and on the 
savings and investments of the richest, that is, of those who run the 
so-called "modern sector" of the economy (depending on the social impact 
of the taxation policy). This social expenditure can also have significant 
effects on the price system (depending on the size of the public deficit 
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and the relation between the structure of demand and supply of the goods 
and services required by the public sector). 
In addition to these questions, there is traditional concern about the 
alternative cost of present consurTaion, namely investment and consequently 
growth. In recent years there has :,een a large number of studies -mainly 
theoretical and not necessarily rea:=ing to Latin America- on these topics. 
Most of them concur in pointing ant that a substantial increase in public 
expenditure -enough to satisfy basic - needs- would result in a slight decrease, 
in the short term, in the growth rote of the product (1 or 2 per cent) which 
could be offset by an increase in )reign indebtedness or by emission with 
its resulting although slight inflationary effect. All these studies -among 
which mention might be made of thou, by Lance Taylor both for their 
representativeness and for their Quality- also coincide in indicating the 
importance of producing an initial redistribution in financial, physical 
and human capital to enable the economic system to acquire a dynamism that 
would strengthen the equitable character of growth. This is because 
income distribution by stages seems to be more difficult to alter by means 
of direct social policies. Hence, unless action is taken on the mechanisms 
determining the primary distribution of income, the system -in effect the 
market- will reproduce and reinforce the structure which existed before 
the public intervention in the final distribution of income. 
Lastly, the studies carried out on the subject also point out that a 
partial analysis (whether it be on the effect of isolated policies or 
involving only some of the productive sectors) tends to lead to incorrect 
conclusions on the impact of public intervention in the social field. 
If the analysis is made on the economic-social system as a whole, 
important differences can be detected in the impact produced by specific 
programmes, not only in respect of size but also in the direction, of 
the effects. This occurs because the effect of the interaction of policies 
-not only social- is important; that is to say, the result of the application 
of public policies taken together is different from the sum of the 
components of each one. These conclusions, therefore, tend to reinforce 
the need to use a systemic approach to planning for the satisfaction of 
basic needs. 
Although the theoretical literature on social planning has in recent 
times repeatedly stressed the urgent need to use this systemic approach, 
little or nothing has been done in Latin America in this respect. This 
has had the twofold effect of conserving a sectoralized style of social 
policy which is known to be inadequate and inefficient and, at the same 
time, of inhibiting progress in the formulation and subsequent application 
of empirical models which take account of the range of interrelations 
existing between the social and economic variables. A noteworthy and 
significant exception to this is the recent announcement and implementation 
of the "Mexican Nutrition System". This is probably the only experiment 
in social policy in Latin America that has taken into account the need 
in a mixed economy, to relate systematically the different variables 
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mentioned. The excellence of this experiment and of the concept of a 
nutrition system may become an example of what the Latin American countries 
could do in this field. 
The effective integration of the solution to the social problem or 
what we shall henceforth regard as synonymous with the satisfaction of 
basic needs within a systemic framework, requires the elucidation of various 
uncertainties. The great majority of these refer to the interrelations 
between the satisfaction of a single need or of basic needs in general and 
the economic problem. We shall now attempt to indicate the basic questions 
which arise -given the experience in the implementation of social policies 
or the theoretical studies of research-workers- in attempting to establish 
and define this interrelation. To facilitate this exposition we shall 
discuss independently the considerations and interrelations of a macro-
economic and microeconomic type. Lastly, a basic aim which we shall keep 
in mind in making this exposition will be to point our what are in our view 
the chief gaps in terms of the designing of efficient social policies. 
2. Macroeconomic considerations in the designing of social policies  
(a) Calculation of the magnitude of resources required to solve the social  
problem  
This is probable the field in which, thanks to the CEPAL project on 
"Critical Poverty", there has been most progress in Latin America, but there 
is no doubt that much remains to be done. It seems unnecessary to 
demonstrate the importance of having a clear idea of the size of the 
problem to be overcome; this is necessarily the first step in defining the 
form which the actions destined to solve the social problems should take; 
the periods in which they will be solved; their viability; the proportion 
of available resources required and, conJ'equently, the impact these 
programmes can be expected to have on different macroeconomic variables 
(basically investment, prices, foreign trade and growth). Without this 
type of information it is impossible to envisage genuine social planning. 
The few indicators available today, however, are based on a type of 
information which makes them highly suspect. This is fundamentally because 
of the quality of the basic information, but also because most of the 
indicators constructed have used an indirect method of calculating gaps, 
which is by means of income, or rather, of family expenditure on "satisfiers" 
of basic needs. It does not seem necessary to repeat here the possible 
defects of this type of indicator and the consequent need to make efforts 
to construct indicators of gaps based on the actual consumption of 
"satisfiers". 
(b) The foregoing takes us directly to the second topic, which is the 
improvement and systematization of statistical information. The direction 
of this improvement should derive, moreover, from the already mentioned 
problem of the quality of information in terms of the systemic approach 
explained above. This means an integration of the currently uncoordinated 
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information on the production and consumption of satisfiers and the addition 
of a system of classification by sb..ial groups. An excellent general 
framework for the definition of the type of information required is the 
so-called "Matrices of Social Accuirnting" which unfortunately has received 
little attention in Latin America. 
The importance of producinc:, a inkage in the compilation of information 
on the production and consumption L.: "satisfiers" is clearly illustrated 
by the following example on the nutg'itional situation in Costa Rica. By 
the middle of the 70s the information on domestic supply and availability 
of foodstuffs (balance sheet) indicated that this had increased considerably; 
but the information on consumption surveys on family income and expenditure) 
showed that this had appreciably decreased. In view of the models for 
compiling and producing statistical data in Costa Rica -as in all the 
Latin American countries- it is als)lutely impossible to compare these 
two figures and hence to reach a conclusion as to what is really happening 
with regard to the nutritional pro Lem in that country. 
(c) Once the statistical informatipn system has been integrated amatrix of 
social accounting could be constructed which would explain the inter-
connections found between the productive system and demand structure on 
the one hand and the situation of different social groups on the other. 
This would enable a great advance to be made in planning for the 
satisfaction of basic needs. 
This type of information, organized in a matrix of social accounting, 
could determine, for example the impact of an increase in the supply of 
popular dwellings on production, the consumption of other goods or 
investment in the sector and on the economy as a whole. Or from the other 
standpoint, it would be possible to determine the impact of changes in 
different economic variables,such as production, modalities of marketing 
or patterns of consumption of one particular need, such as the nutritional 
state of individuals or at least of households disaggregated by social 
groups and geographic regions. 
Traditionally when these relations have been established, it has been 
done in a partial manner. For example: what is the effect of a housing 
subsidy on the demand for dwellings? Or: How does the supply of foodstuffs 
increase when the State fixes a "support price"? This type of partial 
analysis obviously provides only partial replies and thus conceals 
important aspects such as-returning to our examples -the effects of the 
policies on the nutritional state gf the target-group or in the 
characteristics of the housing of the same group. Furthermore, it conceals 
all the indirect and basic effects of these policies on, say, employment, 
investment, the availability of foreign currency, etc. Most of these 
effects could have an impact on the target-group equal to or even 
exceeding that of the social policy itself, and, what is more, not 
necessarily in the same direction. 
(d) This last point leads us directly to the need for planning models. 
The traditional models of general balance or imbalance would have to be 
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complex ented, of course, by considerations proper to the analysis of basic 
needs. Among the most important of these are the linkages between the 
satisfaction of needs and the achievement of economic results. There are 
various studies which show, for example, hoe labour productivity increases 
when the nutritional state of the workers is improved; and others which 
indicate the relation between the development of human capacities and the 
stimulation received (through education, basically) in the early years of 
life 
Moreover, among other things, the dynamic character of needs must be 
incorporated, that is, the fact that they change in the course of time. 
Only thus can these models offer great advantages for the analysis of the 
effect of the different social policies on the economy as a whole, and 
reveal the great impact of a social policy on the target-group, and hence 
assess its usefulness. We have already mentioned that a social policy 
does not only bring direct benefits to a fraction of the population but also 
indirectly affects the population as a whole. The direction of this 
indirect effect will depend, among other things, on the form of financing 
of the policy (if it is taxation it could affect the level of income 
and/or of savings of the poorest groups and, on the other side, the 
capacity or will to invest of the richest groups; if it is through emission, 
it would affect the stability of prices and, through this, the income level 
of the groups with less negotiating power, etc.); on the effect on 
employment -direct and indirect- that this could have; on the quantity 
of imported resources required; etc. On many occasions these indirect 
effects can have an impact as great as, or greater than, that of the direct 
action on the target-group and sometimes in the opposite direction, than 
halting the effects of the social policy on the aims for which it was 
designed. Moreover, the dynamization of these models discloses the total 
effect of these policies in the long term. 
Finally, the construction and use of these models makes it possible to 
assess the relative efficiency of different policies; to foresee the effect 
of the absence of social policies and to calculate the volume of resources 
that should be assigned to achieving as rapidly as possible the satisfaction 
of basic needs. The failure to use this type of instrument has probably 
been one of the basic causes of the collapse of great projects of social 
reform undertaken hy progressive governments in Latin America. On many 
occasions these social goals have resulted in inflation or stagnation of 
investment, or an intensification of the problems of scarcity of foreign 
currency or growth of external undebtedness. We are convinced that a 
general and systematic analysis of the requirements and impacts of a 
programme of social change could be of great help in avoiding these 
problems. 
In Latin America various models of this type have been designed which 
would help us to visualize the overall impact and relative efficacy of 
different social policies. In Colombia, Brazil and Ecuador, among others, 
dynamic simulation and long-term models have been or are in process of 
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being completed which include subroutines on demography, economy, employment, 
distribution of income and of consumption and satisfaction of basic needs, 
and which would permit the assessment of the relative efficiency of different 
economic and social policies and c) global development policies in terms 
of the achievement of the social goals of growth. 
These models, however, have usually been developed by research 
institutes or international organizations -especially the Institute of 
Social Studies of The Hague and the ILO- and have not yet been formally 
adopted in official planning circles. The search for a greater integration 
between national and international circles and a closer link between the 
researches made by international bodies (inside and outside the region) 
and the planning offices and agencies responsible for implementing social 
policies can be very useful for the designing and adoption of this type 
of model. 
3. l'iicroeconomic consideration in the designing  
of social policies  
From the microeconomic standpoint there are two large areas of 
attention that help towards the efficient definition and implementation 
of social policies in the systemic context which we have in mind. The 
first relates to the technical and productive characteristics of the units 
responsible for the process of production and/or distribution of satisfiers 
of basic needs. The second concerns the determinants of the patterns of 
consumption of satisfiers by the target-population and the relation between 
the consumption of these and the degree of satisfaction of basic needs. 
As in the case of the macroeconomic considerations for the designing of 
social policies the criteria and suggestions we wish to present by way of 
example are valid both for the design and for the assessment of social 
policies. This is because the criteria and objectives used in the 
designing of policies -especially when emphasis is laid on the efficiency 
criterion- should be the same as those used later for the evaluation of the 
efficiency of these policies. 
(a) Microeconomic aspects of the production and distribution of satisfiers  
This is probably one of the areas where there are the greatest gaps in 
the knowledge of the Latin American situation in relation to the designing 
and implementation of social policies. In general economic and social 
development theory has made little attempt to ascertain the elements which 
determine the performance of the economic agents responsible for the 
production and distribution of goods and services, and in particular the 
incentives or disincentives which really motivate changes in the 
performance of these units. Nonetheless, Latin America is rich in 
experience of policies destined to produce changes in the performance 
of the private producer or distributor (subsidies, price and/or standard 
fixing, rationing or fixing of quotas, tariffs, etc.) and also in 
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experience of public action aiming to substitute or complement private 
action directly (marketing claims, free distribution of goods, financing 
or production programmes or direct provision of satisfiers, etc.). 
These experiences undoubtedly offer a rich field for investigating the 
relative efficiency of the different forms of intervention and the 
importance of taking action in these areas. These inquiries however, can 
only be dealt with in a really thoough manner by means of empirical 
research, since there are no instruments or information which could permit 
a prior assessment of the efficiency of these policies or forms of 
intervention. 
In addition to the intervention policies aimed at inducing or subs-
tituting private sector action there can be actions destined to complement 
it. An example of this is the activity -still by no means sufficient- that 
in most of the countries of the region has been initiated by the "National 
Science and Technology Councils", or the international agreements 
concerning price stability and supply of certain basic consumer goods 
(particularly food). Once again, however, there has been very little 
research on the incidence of this type of policy on the agents responsible 
for the production or distribution of satisfiers. At all events, there are 
some studies on these topics which constitute a good guide for their future 
development and, moreover, demonstrate the usefulness of contuining the 
effort of research. As an example of these there are the studies on the 
subject of the so-called "green revolution". This topic is particularly 
suggestive because it dea:_s not only with the procedure for considerably 
increasing the supply of basic foods by means of new technologies, but also 
with the effect of these technologies (improved seeds and use of synthetic 
fertilizers and herbicides) on aspects of production which had profound 
social significance. The reason for this, among other things, was that 
they were neutral in terms of scale of production and therefore it was 
assumed that they could be utilized by small farmers, which would permit a 
more rapid increase in the income level of the marginated groups of the 
population. 
A detailed study on the subject however, disclosed that the idea of a 
"neutrality of scale" was mistaken. In fact, the new technologies were 
capital-intensive and therefore required a working capital and additionally 
a series of complementary investments (fundamentally to regulate the supply 
of water). The productive and institutional conditions of the small 
producer made it difficult for him to utilize the new technologies since 
he had not the capacity for saving or indebtedness. Moreover, certain 
scruples of a "cultural" nature were detected when it came to introducing 
radical and drastic changes in the productive technologies used. In short, 
m,,st of the studies conclude that the green revolution tended to polarize 
•still more the social difference in the rural areas, thus largely 
dissapointing the original expectations. 
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There is still a need, however, to ascertain the nutritional impact 
of these policies and how this compares with the results achieved by direct 
policies of complementary .reeding or others of the same type. 
(b) Microeconomic aspects which define the pattern of consumption of  
satisfiers  
This is a problem which has traditionally occupied an important place 
in economic theory. Notwithstanding, the concept of "rational economic 
man" -he who takes decisions which maximize his gains- which informs 
traditional economic theory on the one hand and the insufficiency of 
statistical information on the other, have hindered the development of a 
conceptual frame which would explain more globally and organically the 
performance of the consumer. 
The situation in our_region, moreover has demonstrated the invalidity 
of this concept of "rational economic man", at least in respect of the 
consumption of satisfiers of basic needs. There are innumerable cases in 
which goods, which are indispensable for human development are neglected, 
whereas others which apparently at least, are superfluores are consumed. 
Furthermore, many cases are observed of poor distribution of satisfiers 
within the home; the classic example of this is the case of those families 
in which there is an overfed adult (usually the wage-earner) longside an 
undernourished child. Indeed, there are countless problems of this type 
which demonstrate the need for more detailed study of the motives which 
determine the preferences of the consumer. 
With reference to the consumption of satisfiers of basic needs there 
are at least three areas which it would be advisable to study in more 
detail. 
(i) The relation between modernization with its demonstration effects  
and the consumption of satisfiers of basic needs  
Traditional theory contends that it is relative prices and the 
level of consumption that determine the performance of the consumer. 
Practically all the other social sciences have concurred in pointing out 
the importance of other elements such as education, propaganda and in 
general, all those connected with the socio-cultural conditioning that 
society exercises on individuals. There are several studies, including 
some by economists, which tend to support the latter proposition. By way 
of example, mention can be made of a recent study on the patterns of 
food consumption of the indigenous population of Mexico and Guatemala. 
The conclusion is reached that to the extend that these communities 
were "penetrated by civilization" there was a rapid substitution of the 
traditional foods by others whose cost per unit of calories and nutrients 
was generally considerably higher. Even so, these foods (white bread, for 
example) represented a symbol of progress. This substitution process 
in every case would result in the generation or intensification of the 
nutritional problem. 
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A clear identification of this question seems important for the under- 
standing of the overall impact of modernization and for defining the relative 
efficiency of policies of redistribution by way of money-income, goods or 
education and training. There are countless policy experiments which offer 
a fertile field for these investigations. For instance, as already mentioned, 
the effect on employment and income of the green revolution or the programmes 
of integrated rural development seem to be relatively well defined. It 
would cost little, therefore, to analyse how these resulted in an increased 
consumption of satisfiers and, through these in a greater degree of 
satisfaction of basic needs. 
(ii) Distribution within the home of the consumption of satisfiers  
In general the measurings of the degree of satisfaction of basic 
needs disclose important differences between the age groups, and, further, 
that it is the passive portion of the population that is most often 
affected by the lack of satisfaction of their needs. Though it is true 
that all this appears to be corroborated by the studies on the subject, 
there are on the whole no researches which explain the reasons for this 
phenomenon and thus point out the courses of action required to overcome it. 
This shortage of studies on the subject has meant that nutritional 
policies, for instance, are increasingly aimed at a specific age group. 
This in its turn implies that the costs per beneficiary increase as much 
as the coverage of the programmes tends to diminish, probably, to a lower 
level than when subject to all kinds of filtration. Thus we see that in 
most of the countries of the region non-selective programmes subsiding 
food and distribution of milk (subject to filtrations and displacements) 
have given way to programmes of distribution of fortified foods (which 
by not being mass-consumption foods are less liable to filtrations, but 
are also less consumed by the target-group and continue to be affected by 
the problem of displacement) and, lastly, to canteen programmes, which 
are more than five times as expensive per caloric unit per beneficiary) 
as the initial programmes. 
Investment in researches which "ould result in progress in this field, 
although these are costly and complex, would probably yield high returns 
through the volume of public resources that would be saved and because 
they would ensure an effective penetration to the target-group with the 
satisfiers they need and are prepared to consume. 
(c) Microeconomic aspects of the relation between consumption of satisfiers  
and satisfaction of basic needs  
The literature on the satisfaction of basic needs has traditionally 
distinguished between two types of indicators: those of input and those 
of result. The former relate to the amount of goods and/or services that 
should be "consumed" so that a person satisfies his needs for example, 
daily calories per capita, square meters built per capita, etc.); the 
latter relate to the actual situation in the satisfaction of needs 
for example, anthropometric measurements of the population, degree of 
crowding, etc.). In most cases, and basically determined by the type of 
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statistical information available, use has been made of the input 
indicators as representative of the result indicators, which are those 
which it is of real interest to know. The relation between these two 
situations (input and result) is however, very complex, and indeed on this 
depends the efficacy of a policy which by providing inputs expects to 
achieve certain results. Consequently an adequate knowledge of this 
relationship is essential for the designing and evaluation of social 
policies. Among the most important aspects that should be investigated in 
order to define this relationship are the following three: 
(i) Definition of standards of satisfaction of basic needs  
Standards or norms constitute the basic information for the all-
round planning of basic needs. For this reason there have appeared several 
studies in recent times proposing such standards for the various basic 
needs. These studies however, are still incomplete in the sense that they 
only refer to certain needs (food and in some form health and housing) 
leaving to "value judgements" the definition of the rest. This is 
especially complicated when definitions are made for populations on average 
when in fact, they are enormously heterogeneous. 
There can be no doubt that standards of basic needs vary according 
to the type of work, the region in which the people live, certain 
characteristics of a cultural nature, etc., and hence it seems impossible 
to think of homogeneous standards for countries and indeed for Latin America 
as a whole, as some studies propose. Only when the specific characteristics 
of each group are taken into account is it possible to construct better 
indicators of result. 
In addition to the lack of representativeness in many of the standards 
used today there are also certain problem in the form in which they are 
elaborated. The first and most important is that they are founded on value 
judgements which, in many cases, may not represent the real interests of the 
community and the target-group. The adoption of these value judgements 
should be based on participation, so as to effectively represent the needs 
felt by the population. Moreover, although there has been a certain degree 
of technical sectoralization in the definition of standards (nutritionists 
define food standards, physicians health standards, etc.) the truth is that 
the relation between input and result depends on many factors which are 
outside the scope of any single discipline. 
An effort, therefore, must be deployed which is multidisciplinary, 
participatory and based on a profound knowledge of reality, in order to 
define the standards which will enable the gaps in the satisfaction of 
needs to be assessed and a range of actions devised which will close each 
gap. 
(ii) Constant evaluation of the satisfaction of basic needs  
This evaluation should be made in such a way as to ascertain the 
progress of the target-group on receiving the benefits of the social 
policies and at the same time discover how and through what factors 
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-apart from direct action- the satisfaction of the basic needs is 
significantly affected in the short term. 
These tasks have been soldom performed in Latin America. The reasons 
for this might be, first, because in most cases there are no adequate 
methodologies for doing the work and secondly, because most of the social 
programmes have not been formulated on the basis of an evaluation of the 
degree of satisfaction of basic needs. Thus although indicators of result 
exist, there is nothing with which to compare them. 
Fortunately, in recent years there has been appreciably progress in 
the definition of indicators and instruments which are serviceable for 
tracing the course of the situation of the population. As an example there 
are the periodoc studies on health and nutrition produced by many of the 
Ministers of Health in the region. As yet, however, there has been 
practically no study in depth on, say, the macroeconomic linkages between 
the different social problems or the microeconomic details of the state 
of satisfaction of basic needs of the different social groups. This 
hampers the designing of really efficient policies and limits the 
knowledge of the effect of the policies implemented. 
An interesting step in this direction, though limited in scope was the 
elaboration for Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile and Panama among others, of Maps 
of Extreme Poverty. These studies however, have been made only once and it 
seems that there was not sufficient interest to keep them up to date. 
Keeping them up to date would enable the efficacy of the policies to be 
assessed and new areas defined where direct action is necessary. 
(iii) The economic consequences of social problems  
One of the criteria which can best serve to guide decisions on 
social policy is that of the economic consequences in terms of lost 
production or a decresse in the growth rate attainable, lack of 
satisfaction of basic needs or failure to solve social problems in general. 
The advances made in the region in the field of measurement or 
forecasting of the economic consequences of social backwardness have been 
very limited, attention to these being confined to very partial aspects. 
Indeed, the studies on this subject usually refer to a restricted and 
therefore unrepresentative) social group or to a particular problem or need. 
Even so some significant progress has been made, especially in the 
areas of health, education and nutrition. In education, for example, 
many countries of the region have adapted international measurement 
scales such as the Gessel 07' the Terman Merril) to measure the motor 
development of social language and of intersensory organization. The 
application of these measurement scales has revealed a marked correlation 
between the degrees of development in the different areas and the levels 
of income. 
It would therefore be feasible to have quantitative approximations 
on the effect on production of a certain degree of satisfaction of basic 
needs, measured by income level. In the case of nutrition, various studies 
have shown that caloric-protein undernutrition and deficiencies in the 
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consumption of iron and codine can have a marked effect on a person's mental 
and physical development and hence i)ri his capacity for economic production. 
The same studies have shown that un dernourished children have a response 
level lower than the stimuli of thy .r environment, a factor which undoubtedly 
affects their learning capacity an,: hence their psychomotor and social 
development. These interrelations, however, have not been utilized as 
fully as they might have been, so 	 at defliniLe conclusions cannot be drawn 
as to the effects for example, of 7 he nutritional or educational problem 
on different economic variables. 
At all events, the researches oincide in pointing out that the 
failure to satisfy a basic need (enecially in the first years of life) 
definitely marks an individual in 	 rms of preventing him from fully 
developing his potentialities. There can be no doubt that this is a 
negative externality of the social )i-oblem whose cost is not only paid by 
the person affected but also to society as a whole. The magnitude of these 
costs -although in view of our very low level of knowledge on the subject 
it cannot be regarded as the only yniterion- ought to bring about an advance 
in the definition of standards of satisfaction of basic needs, in the 
definition of the volume of resources destined for the solution of the 
various social problems and in the priority given to these actions. 
Finally, it seems important t, mention the studies on these topics 
initiated by Julian Steward. An attempt is made in these to integrate all 
the determinative aspects and the consequences of the nutritional state in a 
model of society as a whole. lhi3 activity, though difficult and costly, 
has the great advantage of avoiding the errors of omission of the focalized 
and sectoralized studies which have been made in the region. 
These topics have received the attention of social and biological 
scientistcs in recent years. There has been a marked absense of economists, 
however, in these researches. This may be partly explained by the fact 
that the said researches deal with subjects which normally lie outside the 
scope of economics. Nonetheless, considering that the results of these 
researches are, or rather should be, used by economistas in planning 
actions aiming to solve social problems, it seems essential that they 
should play a more direct part in the interdisciplinary enterprise needed 
for the definition of standards, the monitoring and the study of the economic 
consequences of social problems. 
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4. Criteria for the economic evaluation of social  
policies and programmes  
The basic criteria for evaluating social policies from an economic 
standpoint have now been presented. It remains to define the methodology 
of evaluation most suitable for utilizing these criteria. We can think of 
three ways of tackling the problem: cost-benefit analysis; the "planning 
balance" developed by Lichfield; and cost-efficiency analysis. 
These methodologies are still deficient in some respects, the basic 
reason being the difficulty of quantifying in monetary terms the impact of 
social policies. They seem, however, to offer a good starting point for the 
development of a task -such as evaluation- which is fundamental for 
achieving a substantial improvement in the efficiency of social programmes. 
This economic assessment of social programmes needs very special 
attention, both because of the importance of an efficient use of available 
resources, so scarce in relation to such urgent problems, and in order to 
give a greater impetus to the authorities and society in general to find a 
solution for these problems. This last involves the countering of the 
view held by many today that funds allotted to social assistance are a form 
of charity which brings no benefit to society as a whole. Let us see, what 
methodologies of evaluation are available today. 
(i) Cost-benefit analysis, particularly in its version of the social 
assessment of projects, is probably the most complete and ambitious 
methodology for measuring the efficiency and equity of social policies. 
In practice, however, it runs into several problems. The first of these 
is that the greater part of future benefits cannot really be measured in 
monetary terms, either because they are unknown (product of ignorance of 
the results of the lack of satisfaction of needs) or because they are 
intangible (the evaluation, for example, of a housing programme aiming 
to create a friendly and peaceful neighbourhood); and there are others 
which for very good reasons are not considerable measurable in money 
(life, for example). Apart from this serious problem of the impossibility 
of measuring certain benefits in money terms, it must be remembered that 
to achieve a "maximum of efficiency" a function of cost and benefit must 
be defined. The definition of this function creates even more problems 
for its calculation, especially that of benefit; but here we shall only 
refer the reader to the abundant literature on the subject. 
Another basic problem for cost-benefit analysis is that of equity. 
To deal with this, the use of distribution weightings has been proposed; 
that is, that those goods or processes which benefit the lower income 
groups more than proportionally should have their "value" multiplied by a 
specific weighting. The calculation of these, as has frequently been shown 
in the literature, can have no objective basis, so that value judgements 
are employed when using them. 
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It would seem, then that the social evaluation of projects presents an 
interesting methodological scheme, but stil insufficient for the assessment 
of social programmes and policies, 
(ii) The "planning balance" aim to establish the profits and losses 
for particular groups arising out of the programme or policies. This scheme 
has many of the disadvantages of the cost-benefit analysis, but, in not 
attempting to achieve a "maximum" zt only to specify the groups which will 
gain or lose, it suppresses at least the use of general distribution 
weightings. 
Moreover, this scheme can be expanded to incorporate the indirect 
effects of investment on social activities, as already described in the case 
of the matrices of social accounting. In this sense this methodology is 
rather a form of organizing existing information than a list of criteria 
for assessing or deciding between the alternatives of social action. 
- Cost-efficiency analysis has been used in various countries to 
measure the relative efficacy of a project or programme in achieving a 
specific standard, and is basically a simplified version of cost-benefit 
analysis. In face of the impossibility of measuring benefits, a standard 
is determine' (in terms of a completely inelastic benefit at a certain level) 
which an attempt is made to reach at a minimum social cost. In so far as 
the cost of the projects and programmes is effectively measured at social 
prices efficient solutions will be obtained. 
This alternative seems to be the most realistic in view of the type 
of information available in Latin America today. The possibility of using 
it depends basically on the fillin in of gaps in the macro and microeconomic 
information described in the preceding paragraphs. 
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the fixing of social standards 
-especially in view of our very limited knowledge of the consequences of 
social problems- requires a certain social consensus of opinion, which 
brings us to the need for organized participation in development planning. 
Although we shall not deal with this important subject in the present paper, 
we are convinced that the only way to ensure that social standards really 
reflect the levels socially desired is through the conscious participation 
of the population in the decision-making process. This conscious 
participation is achieved in two ways, which should be pursued conjointly: 
one is an intensive campaign to provide the basic conditions for this 
participation (education, mainly), and the other is the creation of 
channels of democratic participation which would enable the State to 
become the effective political ex7Yession of the organized community as 
a whole. 
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SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
All that has been said can be summed up in the conclusion that the 
enormous changes and exertions required of Latin America to solve 
social problems have great economic implications, which must be taken 
into account in systematic form. These changes and exertions do not only 
involve the amount of financial resources that must be utilized to meet 
the social challenge, but, over and above this, the social, political and 
structural transformations needed to stimulate, and to make viable and 
effective, a development strategy capable of satisfying the basic needs of 
the whole population. Nonetheless, the financial aspects are important. 
We consider that social policy cannot only be a compensatory action, 
subsidiary to economic growth, but that the economic model in force should 
be propitious and conducive to the integral solution of social problems. 
From this standpoint it is essential to ensure that its functioning is 
compatible with the objectives of well-being for the majorities. To 
achieve this, consideration might be given to the following five aspects 
which seems to us fundamental: 
(1) The enormous scope of the theoretic work required to incorporate the 
economic and social variables into development planning and the inadequacy 
of traditional economic theory and instrumentation for carrying out this 
task. Hitherto development planning has devoted perhaps too much attention 
to supporting the prolongation, or intensification, of a process of growth, 
without sufficiently considering the need to transform the existing 
structure. The reason for this is that in many cases it is assumed that 
growth will automatically result in the solution of the existing social 
problems. 
The first task of a new mode of "thinking" the economic problem is 
to analyse situations as they are, accepting, therefore, the diversity and 
particularity of the problems and the ways of solving them with which the 
different countries of the region are faced. There are indeed in Latin 
America very differing degrees of social inequality. 
There are countries where social development is extremely low; 
developing countries with considerable nuclei of social backwardness; and 
more developed countries which still have foci of social backwardness 
and factors that can unleash social imbalances. In each of these 
situations economic and social policies will need to be defined in 
accordance with their specific characteristics. 
The market is not a complete and sufficient arbiter of social values, 
and hence the need arises to define in democratic form, and with the 
participation of the State, the values that should be sought. Access to 
an adequate standard of living becomes a right and the economy and society 
should be organized to achieve it for the majorities. Planning and economic 
policy should therefore be guided by certain socially accepted values and 
should seek for society a better economic and social situation. This 
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"better" situation should envisage such objectives as the reduction of 
poverty, a more equitable distribut ion of income, an increase in productive 
employment, and other more traditic an aims such as price stability and 
economic growth. The attainment 	 these goals cannot be left to the 
possible imperfections of the marb, n: or to the fluctuations of the world 
economy. 
It is a question of promotin a social view of the economy and of 
discarding the traditional pattern. that inhibit the advance towards a 
more egalitarian society. This ne view should be based on the idea that 
social problems are surmountable al ovided that the appropriate 
transformations are made. The rod( of a "social economy" will be to direct 
a multidisciplinary enterprise in he definition of new development styles 
and the selection of the ways in which to achieve them. 
(2) In this connection, the analyais made in this paper of the economic 
considerations in the designing bH social policy and the social 
implication of economic policy demonstrates the importance of proceeding 
along these lines in order to achieve efTicient action in the practical field 
of social programmes and policies. 
In fact, as we have said, the economic implications of social 
programmes and policies, especially in developing regions such as Latin 
America, are particularly important, both from the perspective of the 
costs incurred and from the standpvint of the beneficient effects these 
programmes and policies can have on production and on the denamism of 
growth in general. To ensure the efficient designing and execution of 
social policies these economic implications must be adequately taken 
into account. This requires an understanding of the interrelations 
between the programmes with social aims and a whole series of realities 
in relation to investment and production on the one hand, and, on the 
other, between the purely economic strategies and policies and their 
social effects. 
Without a sufficient understanding of these interrelations, develop- 
ment planning in Latin America, vhich should combine social and economic 
objectives, will run into great difficulties. This is partly becat7.se it 
does not consider the structural conditioners of the economic and social 
problems that keep the region in its underdeveloped state (which has 
hitherto meant that the public policies applied have in many cases not 
created a situation which would ensure the dynamic satisfaction of the 
basic needs of the whole population). Moreover, a segmented view of the 
economic and social problem can lead, and in fact has often led, to two 
types of imbalance, both having serious effects on the proposal. to build 
dynamic equitable and democratic societies. One of these occurs when 
economic policies, through the absence of considerations or measures 
to correct the social desequilibria, lead to an aggravation of the social 
problems instead of their solution or alleviation. The second imbalance, 
on the other hand, occurs when the measures of social change, the social 
programmes, the policies of assistance for the poorest groups, are less 
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beneficial than their authors had planned, either because the priorities 
of the actual projects had not been well chosen, or because the projects 
themselves had not been efficiently organized or financed, or because the 
transfers of resources representing the social cost has a negative effect 
on the overall economic growth, thus affecting employment and the 
availability of additional resources to continue pursuing the solution of 
social problems. 
The complexity of these interrelations is very great, and there have 
been only brief references in this paper to some of the aspects which 
need consideration. At all events, it seems clear that economic science 
has lagged behind on these problems, and the governments have been tardy 
in showing a practical will to take account of them in their development 
plans and policies. The clearest example of this is that in most of the 
university study programmes, as in practically all the formulated 
development plans that include programmes, policies and projections on 
social problems, there is no articulation between the social and the 
economic aspects, so that the greater part of the interrelations mentioned 
or described in this paper have not been the object of formal consideration 
in academic circles or in development plans or policies. It could be said 
that, up to a certain point, those concerned with the theory and practice 
of social planning form a group apart from those who perform similar tasks 
in the economic field, which inevitably results in a failure to profit 
from the reciprocal complementarities between the projects on behalf of 
social change and those on the side of growth and stability. 
The present paper should be regarded essentially as an attempt to 
highlight the problems and to suggest the type of research needed to 
analyse in detail the relation between social and economic policies and 
objectives. 
(3) Employment constitutes one of the central links between the economic  
and the social problem. It seems impossible to eradicate poverty in 
Latin America without surmounting the problem of unemployment and, above 
all, underemployment. Consequently employment is the aspect which perhaps 
should receive special attention in a strategy directed towards the 
satisfaction of basic needs. In this connection we should recognize the 
contribution made by PREALC in defining the characteristics and conditioners 
of the employment problem in Latin America and in suggesting policies 
destined to overcome it. We believe that this line of activity should 
be given the fullest support. 
(4) Another central feature of the social problem is the regional  
dimension of inequality and poverty. It seems to us indispensable that 
economic and social development planning should be based on a substantive 
redefinition of the use of regional territories, of the assignment of 
resources among these, of the population flows and the policies of human 
settlements. Unless economic and social policies explicitly include the 
regional dimension of the social policy and the differentiated impact 
that these have on the different regions, it will be impossible to 
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implement a more equitable development style. We believe, therefore, 
that support should be given to the efforts -mainly stimulated by ILPES-
which aim to operationalize regional planning and to integrate it 
effectively into national planning. 
(5) Finally we wish to stress the importance of the crucial subject of 
the political viability of social objectives. We believe that this 
fundamentally depends on the basing of the political power of the State on 
a broad social coalition in which the interests of the lower income 
majorities are adequately represented and in which there are effective 
channels of communication between these groups of society and the various 
institutions of the State. An essential condition for the achievement 
of the social aims of development is the construction of an effectively 
democratic and representional society. 
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JAMAICA. ECONOMIC POI.ICY AND "f7,0NOMIC PERFORMANCE 
IN THE 1972-1980 RIOT) AN INTERPRETATION 
Richard Lynn Ground* 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1980 the gross domestic product at factor cost (GDP) decreased 3.5% according to 
preliminary calculations, marking the se\ enth straight year in which this indicator has either 
stagnated or declined.' Over the course of this period the GDP has dropped by somewhat over 18%, 
while the per capita GDP has sunk by well over 25% (see table 1). 
In addition to the severe foreign exchange constraint that has depressed the level of output 
throughout this period, but especially since 1976, other factors which disrupted economic activity 
in 1980 were recurrent adverse weather conditions and an accentuation of the already turbulent 
social climate. Hurricane Allen caused big losses in agriculture, including the obliteration of 
between 75% and 90% of the banana trees that remained standing in the wake of Hurricane David 
in 1979, and overall agricultural production dropped almost 9%, following the 7% reduction in 
1979. Manufacturing output fell over 5% , while construction activity plunged by one-fifth, owing 
in large part to a cutback in government-sponsored projects. Of the goods-producing sectors, only 
mining showed a gain (7.5%) in 1980. This performance was conditioned largely by the 26% rise 
in the relative international price of bauxite, although the reduction of the bauxite levy in late 1979 
also may have played a role. As far as the rest of the economy is concerned, the level of production 
diminished about 2%. 
As a result of the further contraction of economic activity, especially in agriculture, the rate of 
unemployment climbed well above 30% towards the end of the year, according to provisional 
estimates, while the rate of inflation accelerated from around 20% to 30%, owing in large measure 
to the pronounced intensification of external inflation. Indeed, the increase in the import price 
index (22.5%) was the largest since 1974. Another contributory factor, however, was the marked 
expansion of domestic credit, which maintained or even increased the level of domestic demand 
while domestic supply was declining. This occurred because the deficit of the central government 
was greater, and its foreign borrowing lower, than projected. In the circumstances, the authorities 
resolved to accomodate both the central government's financing requirements and the private 
sector's demand for credit, rather than reduce the availability of credit to the private sector and risk 
an even larger downturn in economic activity. Compensatory measures, such as ceilings on 
consumer credit (which were not respected) and price controls, were relied on to mitigate and 
repress inflationary pressures. 
The balance of payments result for 1980 was perhaps less than hoped for but probably 
considerably more favourable than could have been expected when the government decided to 
break off negotiations for an interim standby agreement with the IMF in March. At the time the 
Bank of Jamaica possessed liquid reserves of only some US$ 25 million (or less than one week of 
In fact, it declined in every year of this period with the exception of 1977, when it was stationary. 
Economist, in the Economic Development Division, Economic Commission for Latin America. This study originally 
appeared in Part Three of the United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Surrey of Latin 
America, 1980, Santiago, Chile, 1982 The text has not been altered. 
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Table 1 
JAMAICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Gross domestic product at factor 
cost (millions of dollars at 
1970 prices) 1 	 318 1 	 447 1 	 463 1 	 406 1 384 1 298 1 298 1 294 1 237 1 	 194 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 1.89 1.93 1.97 2.01 2.04 2.07 2.09 2.11 2.14 2.17 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(dollars at 1970 prices) 697 750 742 700 678 627 621 613 578 550 
Growth rates 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 2.3 9.8 1.2 -3.9 -1.6 -6.2 -0.4 -4.3 -3.5 
Per capita gross domestic product 0.1 7.6 -1.1 -5.3 -3.1 -7.5 -1.0 -2.2 -5.7 -4.9 
Gross income (b) 1.2 11.4 -2.0 3.1 2.9 -9.2 1.9 -3.7 -6.0 -2.1 
Terms of trade of goods and 
services -2.7 3.8 -7.7 18.1 13.5 -8.1 6.5 -10.6 -4.5 3.2 
Current value of exports of 
goods and services 4.4 13.2 2.5 63.3 6.7 -15.1 4.9 14.6 7.6 23.6 
Current value of imports of 
goods and services 6.1 12.8 8.1 39.6 21.1 -13.8 -17.5 13.6 16.3 23.1 
Consumer price index 
December - December 5.1 9.3 29.5 20.6 15.7 8.3 14.1 49.4 19.8 29.5 
Variation between annual averages 4.6 4.6 19.8 24.4 17.4 9.6 11.4 34.9 29.1 26.8 
Money 24.5 10.3 20.8 27.3 20.2 2.4 37.6 17.6 7.6 35.5 
Wages and salaries (c) 7.3 -6.2 18.6 6.2 4.5 -7.8 -14.0 -12.0 
Rate of unemployment (d) ... 23.2 21.9 21.2 20.5 22.4 24.2 24.5 27.8 29.5 
Current income of government 13.3 16.1 21.2 48.8 23.8 -5.3 7.5 59.0 7.8 -2.3 
Total expenditure of government 16.2 21.0 23.5 59.0 32.5 21.1 3.1 36.9 11.9 14.2 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government (d) 17.2 20.5 22.1 26.6 31.4 46.3 44.0 34.9 37.2 46.2 
Millions of dollars 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) -131.9 -151.9 -178.3 -49.2 -207.7 -193.0 50.1 66.1 -20.3 -19.0 
Balance on current account -166.8 -190.0 -240.3 -82.9 -287.8 -306.6 -73.1 -97.4 -153.0 -213.0 
Variation in international 
reserves 25.6 -22.1 -65.0 67.1 -33.5 -186.8 -12.0 -55.8 -162.7 83.3 
External debt (e) 148 210 354 528 706 965 1 052 1 236 1 495 1 607 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Gross domestic product plus terms-of-trade effect. 
(c) Real wages and salaries. 
(d) Percentage. 
(e) Public debt plus State-guaranteed private debt; and use of IMF credit (disbursed only). 
imports), while the economy faced an overall balance of payments deficit in the neighbourhood of 
US$ 300 million (or more than 10% of GDP), if the decline in output were to be held to 
manageable proportions. Yet it proved possible to maintain the existing volume of imports and 
record a surplus in the balance of payments (for the first time since 1974). Several developments 
were involved here: the 34% hike in the unit price of merchandise exports; the emergency 
arrangement to defer the amortization of loans falling due to foreign commercial banks; an upturn 
in official capital inflows; the further accumulation of arrears; and a sizeable increase in the foreign 
exchange earnings of the parallel economy. As a result, the current account deficit turned out to be 
US$ 213 million, or about half the amount that was originally forecast, and the overall balance of 
payments surplus was US$ 85 million, one-half of which corresponded to the accumulation of 
arrears and the other to a reduction in outstanding obligations with the IMF. 
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In February 1980, the then Prime Minister announced that elections were to be held ahead of 
schedule and as soon as possible, in order tc: resolve the basic economic issues facing the country in 
the wake of the suspension of access to the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in December 1979 
and the failure of the stabilization plan adopted in connexion with the EFF to halt the contraction of 
the economy. In March, the Goverment informed the nation that it had resolved to stop 
negotiations for a new agreement with the I MF, because it would be impossible to comply with the 
performance criteria sought by the Fund An alternative economic programme, designed to 
maintain the existing level of activity until the elections were held, was then adopted. The 
elections took place in October and the governing party was defeated. The new Government 
indicated that it would seek a fresh accord with the IMF in the context of its strategy for economic 
recovery. 
In addition to the discussion and analysis of the evolution of economic activity during the past 
year, this survey includes a description and interpretation of some of the outstanding aspects of the 
evolution of the Jamaican economy over the course of the 1972-1980 period. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
(a) Total supply and demand 
The evolution of total supply and demand is shown in table 2, which gives the percentage 
breakdown (current prices) for 1970 and 1979 and the growth (in constant prices) of the main 
components in recent years. Only a few of the principal aggregates are available for 1980. During 
the year, total supply dropped by close on 3(70, following no change in 1979 and a modest increase 
in 1978. In 1978 and 1979 the increase in the quantum of imports was large enough to offset the 
decline in the GDP, but the import volume could not be augmented in 1980, owing to the 
exacerbation of the foreign exchange constraint in the wake of the breakdown of the IMF accord 
and to a marked upturn in international inflation. Data on the evolution of consumption and 
investment in 1980 are not available, but indirect indicators strongly suggest that investment 
amounted for more than a proportionate share of the downturn in demand, following a partial 
recovery of investment activity in 1979. 
As may be appreciated from the data in table 2, the structure of demand underwent big 
modifications over the course of the 1970s The large increase in the participation of the external 
sector in the economy was accounted for by the systematic contraction of the GDP after 1973 and by 
the pronounced change in relative prices, rather than by any real increase in exports and imports. 
The reduction of the resource gap likewise occurred because of a variation in relative prices (i.e., 
due to the improvement of the terms of trade). The marked shift in domestic demand was first a 
cause and later a consequence of the depression of economic activity. Investment demand, which 
averaged around one-quarter of the product between 1950 and 1970, peaked in 1969/1970 when it 
soared to more than 31% of the product. It fell appreciably in 1971 (to 27.8% of GDP) and again in 
1972 (to 25.5%), as the investment cycle in the mining sector came to a close and an expansionary 
phase in tourism waned. This presented a major challenge to the country, inasmuch as the high 
rates of growth of the economy during the preceding two decades were attributable in large part to 
the creation and successive waves of expansion of the mining industry and tourism. 
The new government elected in 1972 expected to offset the autonomous reduction in 
investment and foreign capital inflows by an expansion of public sector capital formation financed 
by external borrowing, and by big joint venture projects with foreign firms in oil refining and with 
other countries in bauxite. Initially, it was possible to mitigate the extent of the decline in 
investment and capital inflows. Between 1972 and 1975 in spite of a notable rise in consumption, 
the investment coefficient was maintained relatively high and international reserves at adequate 
levels, through a big increase in the government capital expenditure programme, foreign borrow-
ing, the internationalization via the Bauxite Levy of a sizeable proportion of the mining sector 
rents that had previously accrued to foreign-owned bauxite companies, and a marked improve- 
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Table 2 
JAMAI2A: 	 TOTAL SUPPLY 
1970 




(a) 	 Growth 	 rtes 	 (h) 
1979 	 1975 	 1979 
150.4 	 1.71 
100.0 	 -0.5 
19110 
-2.6 
Gross domestic product at market prices 	 100.0 
Imports of goods and services 50.4 6.1 0.4 
Total 	 demand 	 1 37.4  150.4 1.2 
Domestic demand 
	 104.2 101.6 - -Eq 
Gross 	 domestic 
	 investment. 	 31.6 19.0 7.8 16.7 
Gross 	 fixed 	 investment 	 21.4 17.6 2.5 20.4 
Changes 
	 in stocks 	 0.2 1.4 122.4 -2N.2 
Total 	 consumption 	 72.6 82.6 -5.4 -4.9 
General government 	 11.7 19.6 3.9 -0.2 
Private 	 60.9 6-3.0 -8.1 -6.5 
Exports of goods and services 19.7 2.0 
Income terms of trade 7.0 0.9 
Source: 	 Jamaica, 	 Department. 
	 of 	 Statistics, 	 National Income 	 A Product, 	 197',; Bank of Jamaio a, 
Report and 
	 Statement of 
	 4c5ounts, 	 1980. 
(a) Current prices. 
Up)  Constant prices. 
ment in the terms of trade. In the meantime, however, the oil refinery project was cancelled as a 
result of the petroleum crisis, and the multinational aluminium project did not get beyond the 
planning stage. 
On another front, investment by the local private sector had begun to decline in the wake of 
escalating wage settlements. Then, in 1976, a severe economic crisis broke out. As output and 
income plunged, both the private and public sectors moved to protect existing levels of consump-
tion, and that year investment fell below 17% of GDP (against almost 24% in 1975) and 
international reserves were virtually exhausted. In 1977 the economy remained depressed, but the 
prevailing level of consumption was maintained even though real wages and salaries were slashed. 
The rate of investment dropped to less than 12%, and net savings became negative.' Subsequently, 
one of the primary aims of economic policy was to reduce consumption in favour of investments 
and exports. Some success was achieved, as investment rose to 17.6% of the product (in 1979) and 
the resource gap diminished (in 1978) but the objective of halting the decline in output and 
commencing economy recovery was not achieved. 
(b) Evolution of the main sectors 
(i) Introduction. In 1980 all of the goods-producing sectors, with the exception of mining, 
registered production declines. The decreases ranged from over 5% in manufacturing to close to 
9% in agriculture and as much as 20% in construction. On the other hand, mining output rose 
7.5%. Overall, the value of output in the goods-producing segment of the economy dropped about 
6%. A breakdown of the results for services is not available, but the total value of production of 
services contracted somewhat less than 2% (see table 3). 
The systematic contraction of the level of economic activity since 1973 has affected every 
major sector of the private area of the economy with the exception of agriculture, which expanded 
appreciably until the severe weather conditions of 1979 and 1980. On the other hand, some of the 
service subsectors (e.g., transportation, storage and communications) were still producing more at 
'Between 1975 and 1977 investment was cut by more than one-half in real terms. 
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1978 






Basic services 153 
Electricity and water 24 
Transport, 	 storage and 
communications 129 
Other services 1 013 
Commerce and finance 403 
Real estate and business 
services 210 
Public administration and 
defence 344 
Miscellaneous services 	 (b) 56 
1 970 	 1980(a) 
1 	 9 -- ,L. 	 1 	 866 
	
1970 	 1980 
	
100.0 	 100.0 





































1978 	 1979 	 1980(a) 
	
-0.4 	 -2.0 	 -3.5 
	
0.6 	 -5.0 	 -6.1 
	
9.4 	 -7.0 	 -8.6 
	
1.4 	 -1.3 	 7.5 
	
-4.9 	 -5.1 	 -5.4 
	











JAMAICA: DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Millions of constant 	 Percentage 
Jamaica dollars 
	 breakdown 	 Growth rates 
Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, National Income and Product, 1979; Bank of 
Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, 1980. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Includes miscellaneous services and household and private non-profit institutions, less 
imputed service charges. 
the end of the decade than in 1973, but no complete sector recorded growth over the course of this 
period. The reductions in output were especially marked in construction (60% between 1971 and 
1980); in commerce (40% between 1972 and 1979); and manufacturing (25% between 1973 and 
1980). In contrast, the value of production in the public area of the economy climbed over 
three-quarters in the period in question.' Initially, the expansion of the public sector was intended 
to stimulate and complement growth in the private sector. Subsequently, the Government 
indicated that the public sector would assume a much greater role in the economy, in connexion 
with the pursuit of its objectives in the areas of growth and employment, income distribution, and 
external economic relations, but by the middle of the decade the course of events had placed the 
public sector in a position in which it was struggling to offset the decline in private sector output. 
The size of the reductions to be counter-balanced, the numbers of entrepreneurs, managers and 
skilled workers to be replaced, and in particular the magnitud of the foreign exchange gap to be 
filled, however, made this task impossible to achieve, in spite of the fact that the Government was 
able to increase substantially its command over domestic resources and mobilize a considerable 
amount of international sympathy. 
(ii) Agriculture. In 1979 Jamaica was ravaged by recurrent floods caused by heavy rain, 
including the especially intense flooding provoked by Hurricane David in June. Losses in agricul-
ture were extremely high.4 Especially hard-hit was the banana subsector, as approximately 
'Between 1970 and 1979, the proportion of (01' accounted for by the public sector rose from 9.1% to 18.8%. 
'The following quatation extracted from a special study on the effects of the June 1979 rains sheds light on the severity 
of the flooding and recalls the devastation major hurricanes can wreak on small island economies: "The year 1979 was the 
wettest year for the decade of the 1970s. There were four periods of heavy rainfall and of these the ones on June 12 were the 
most severe in terms of the amount and the effect on the spatial economy. Flash floods, debris wash and landslides 
disrupted physical communications, destroying or blocking roads and bridges and completely cut off the Western end of the 
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one-third of the banana stands was simply annihilated. Also, the harvesting operations in sugar 
cane were disrupted. Overall, more than 20 million dollars' worth of exports were foregone, while 
as a whole the crop losses translated into a reduction of almost 7% in the sector's output (see 
table 4). Furthermore, the flood damage to farm installations and rural infrastructure, which was 
appreciably greater than originally estimated, continued to hamper farm operations and reduce 
crop yields into 1980. As a result, by the end of the first half of the year it was estimated that total 
output would fall at least another 2% in 1980. And then Hurricane Allen struck the island in 
August. Preliminary tabulations suggest that the extent of the destruction of property and the loss 
of output was even more severe than that of the previous year. Damage to farms and infrastructure 
was placed at well over J$ 500 million ()$ 1.78 = US$ 1), while the devastation of crops translated 
into a loss of exports valued at some US$ 30 million. The banana subsector again bore the brunt of 
the onslaught: this time, however, fully three-quarters of the stands were wiped out. Moreover, the 
havoc wreaked on coffee farms was just as intense. 
Production data for the principal export crops are given in table 4. As may be seen, with the 
exception of citrus, which turned in a strong performance, all of the commodities shown suffered 
substantial downturns. In the case of bananas (exports only) the drop amounted to 46%; in that of 
coffee, more than 55%. The outputs of copra, cocoa and pimento decreased by proportions ranging 
from 14% to 25%. The decline in sugar cane, however, was under 8%, or substantially less than 
the 19% reduction registered in 1979. Greater losses in 1980 were avoided only because the bulk of 
the crop had already been harvested when Hurricane Allen hit the island. 
Overall, the preliminary data reveal that the cutback in production approached 9% in 1980, 
following the 7% contraction of the previous year. 
Given the existing dearth of resources on the one hand, and the extreme dislocations caused 
by the weather on the other, public and private efforts were directed mainly at overcoming 
emergency situations and restoring damaged or destroyed production capacity. In the case of 
banana acreage, the damage made necessary two massive replanting operations, the second of 
which was initiated shortly before the end of the year. Owing to the multiplicity of needs and acute 
scarcity of resources, several urgent problems could not be fully attended to. Thus, for instance, in 
some areas plant diseases began to spread: sugar cane was plagued by rust and smut disease, 
bananas by leaf-spot blight, and tobacco by blue mould disease. However, in the last quarter, when 
the resource constraint eased somewhat, a rehabilitation programme in agriculture was began. 
Under it some 120 000 acres of sugar cane, or about 80% of the area currently devoted to the crop, 
are to be replanted with disease-resistant varieties. The programme also financed the replacement 
of the destroyed banana stands. 
While the pronounced decreases suffered in 1979/1980 forced total agricultural output back 
to the levels recorded at the beginning of the 1970s, it may be recalled that between 1972 and 1978 
island from vehicular traffic. Reports vary as to the actual volume of water which fell. The estimated return period for 
similar or greater rainfall in the four western parishes ... varies from 50 to 150 years. 
The rains gave rise to about 125 separate bodies of water; of significance was the flooding in Chigivell where water rose to 
8.25 feet. At New Market the lake which was formed attained a maximum height of 11.168 feet. The town became 
non-functional as houses and public buildings were inundated or submerged. In all, the June rains resulted in damage to a 
land area of approximately 975 square miles (almost a quarter of the area of the island). Between 130 000 and 160 000 
persons were directly affected in some 1 150 villages and towns. The death toll was forty-one. 
It has been assessed by the Geological Survey Department that no feasible drainage system could have adquately coped with 
the large volumes of surface run-off generated ... 
The Ministry of Works estimated that islandwide damage to roads and bridges, for which they are responsible, amounted to 
20 million dollars ... (This damage) created dislocation in many communities which were cut off by inundation, landslips, 
breakaways of the roadside and roads which were completely washed away ... 
Damage to railways in the West was estimated to be 1.2 million dollars ... 
Approximately 60-70% of the water systems in the West were rendered non-operational and many others were badly 
damaged. 
It is estimated that most of the damage to housing was due to flash floods simply washing away houses.-  
Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey, Jamaica, 1979, Jamaica, 1980, pp. 271-276. 
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Table 4 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(1 970 = 100) 
1977 	 1978 1979 	 1980(a) 
Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 	 1980(a) 
Index of agriculture, 
forestry and fishing 
production 	 114.0 	 124.5 116.1 	 106.1 7.9 9.3 -6.8 	 -8.6 
Agriculture 	 134.0 	 158.3 149.7 9.1 18.1 -5.4 
Export 	 74.6 	 84.3  75.1 -17.8 13.0 -10.9 
Domestic 	 151.0 	 181.5 175.3 25.1 20.2 3.4 
Livestock 	 109.5 	 105.6 93.7 8.3 -3.6 -11.3 
Forestry 	 78.2 	 45.5 29.8 -9.2 -41.8 -34.5 
Fishing 	 115.6 	 115.6 94.6 2.8 -18.2 
Production of some 
important export crops 
Sugar cane (milled) 
	
3 252 	 3 641 2 965 	 2 744 -11.1 12.0 -18.6 	 -7.4 
Bananas 	 (b) 	 80 	 75 69 	 33(c) 3.8 -6.3 -8.0 	 -45.9(d) 
Citrus 	 (e) 	 63 	 69 50 	 79 -3.8 10.0 -27.8 	 58.2 
Pimento 	 2 022 	 2 585 1 	 255 	 943 -52.d 27.8 -51.5 	 -24.9 
Copra 	 3 090 	 1 	 927 1 	 835 	 1 	 577 -39.1 -37.6 -4.8 	 -14.1 
Cocoa 	 4 502 	 4 493 3 416 	 2 627 2.6 -0.2 -24.0 	 -23.1 
Coffee 	 1 	 208 	 1 	 504 2 	 267 	 1 	 011 35.6 24.5 50.7 	 -55.4 
Source: 	 Jamaica, 	 Department of Statistics, National Income and Product, 1979 and Production 
Statistics, 	 1979; 	 Jamaica National Planning Agency, 	 Economic and Social Survey, 1979; 	 and 
data supplied to CEPAL. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Exports only. 
(c) January-October only. 
(d) January-October 1980 compared to January-)ctober 1979. 
(e) Oranges and grapefruits only. 
the production performance of this sector --in contrast to that of the rest of the economy- was on 
the whole satisfactory and -in the case of crops destined for the domestic consumption-
impressive. Furthermore, it showed a notable improvement over that recorded in the previous 
decade. 
During the course of the 1960s as a whole the agricultural sector (including forestry and 
fishing) stagnated in per capita terms, even though the rate of growth of the population was 
relatively modest. Agriculture proper, in fact, registered a reduction in total output in this period, 
owing mainly to an acute contraction of export commodities but also to a generalized drop-off in 
crop production in the second half of the decade. Thus, the outputs of sugar cane and bananas, the 
first and second most important crops, plunged from 500 000 to 370 000 tons and from 235 000 to 
134 000 tons, respectively, between 1965 and 1970. As a consequence of the stagnation of total 
production per inhabitant and the rise of 3.4% per annum in gross domestic income per capita in 
the 1960s, Jamaica became, for the first time, a net importer of agricultural products in 1970. This 
turnaround, which persisted in subsequent years, was one of the important underlying factors 
involved in the progressive deterioration of the balance of payments that commenced with the 
foreign exchange squeeze in the second half of 1972 and the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar at 
the beginning of 1973, about a year before the initial round of oil price hikes in December 1973. 
Some of the causes of the decline of agriculture were explored in previous economic surveys. 
Suffice it to note here that an intensive structural and geographic shift of the population led to a 
shortage of labour at wages which farmers, if not estate-owners, could offer without producing at a 
loss, notwithstanding the exceptionally elevated and increasing level of unemployment prevailing 
in the economy as a whole. This, coupled with the declining marginal fertility of the land, an 
inadequate allocation of resources to support activities -which led to a gradual multiplication and 
intensification of institutional and infrastructural bottlenecks and thus rising production costs, and 
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diverse policy measures that placed agriculture at a competitive disadvantage, left the sector in 
position in which it was unable to respond adequately to changing market conditions. Moreover, 
with the recurrent adverse weather conditions in the last half of the 1960s, output fell appreciably. 
In view of the highly unsatisfactory production performance of agriculture and its repercus-
sions on rural poverty, growth of urban population and unemployment, and the balance of 
payments on the one hand; and the sector's considerable potential for output growth, as suggested 
by the underemployment of both land and labour and good-to-excellent market opportunities on 
the other, the Government which assumed power in early 1972 resolved to attach high priority to 
increasing agricultural production. 
Following an exhaustive study of the sector commissioned by the Government and carried out 
by the World Bank and a team of experts headed by Arthur Lewis, a host of measures designed to 
overcome agricultural stagnation were acted on. The most important among these included the 
extensive reorganization and upgrading of the Ministry of Agriculture and other agencies 
responsible for making agricultural policy and providing support services to the sector; stepped-
up central government investment in infrastructure; the expansion and reorientation of credit as a 
function of market opportunities; an integrated rural development project; the "land-lease 
programme", designed to match idle and abandoned farmland with underemployed farm labour; 
and the rehabilitation of the sugar industry.' 
The degree to which each of these and other measures were implemented varied substan-
tially, but as from 1974 and especially from 1976 onward the execution of a host of policies, 
programmes and projects was interrumpted or delayed by the loss of professional staff, the 
growing frequency and length of strikes, the acute shortage of foreign exchange and, eventually, 
budgetary cutbacks. One of the most successful programmes, in terms of the proportion of the 
agricultural labour force benefitted and the production gains realized, was the "land-lease pro-
gramme". Between 1972 and December 1979 some 36 500 farmers and agricultural labourers —a 
number equivalent to fully 19.5% of the population economically active in agriculture in 1970 and 
23.5% in 1979 benefitted from the -land-lease- scheme under which the Government acquired 
arable but idle farm land for leasing to underemployed farmers and selected landless agricultural 
labourers. In addition it provided necessary support services to the beneficiaries, including 
guidance in the selection of the output mix. 6 
 As well as encouraging more efficient utilization of 
land and labour, the authorities sought to increase the output of crops aimed at satisfying the 
domestic demand for food, and in this respect they achieved substantial advances, to the extent that 
the appreciable expansion of domestic agriculture (i.e., those crops consumed domestically) is 
attributable to the "land-lease" and other programmes. In any event, the output of domestic 
agriculture climbed almost 82% between 1970 and 1978, and until the second half of 1979 this 
notable gain more than compensated the marked cutbacks in food imports forced by the foreign 
exchange crisis and thus permitted the maintenance of generally adequate food supplies at 
approximately constant relative prices. 
In contrast, efforts to arrest the deterioration of export agriculture were unsuccessful. Thus, 
sugar cane output had already dropped an additional 15% between 1970 and 1978, before the 
sharp contraction suffered in 1979/1980. Forestry output, together with construction activity, fell 
drastically from 1974 onward, while the output of the livestock and fishing subsectors rose only 
marginally between 1970 and 1978. Overall agricultural output rose somewhat less than one-
quarter between 1970 and 1978, and because of the appreciable reductions in both 1979 and 1980, 
the level of production in 1980 was a mere 6% above that recorded in 1970. 
(iii) Mining. The volume of output in the bauxite industry rose 7.5% in 1980, following a 
modest downturn in 1979. The increase in bauxite production was somewhat less than 6%, while 
'For further details on these and other programmes, see, for example, Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic 
and Social Survey of Jamaica, 1972, Jamaica, 1974, especially pp. 130-131. 
cover 67 500 acres, or about 31% of the arable land identified as abandoned in the 1970 agricultural census, had been 
incorporated into the programme as of December 1979. 
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that of alumina expanded 18%,  (see table 5). Nevertheless, owing to the dramatic production 
cutbacks of 1975/1976, the output of the former was still 19%, and that of the latter 12%, below 
the respective peak production levels recorded in 1974. 
The improvement of the sector's production performance in 1980 may be attributed mainly 
to the upturn of one-quarter in the relative international price of bauxite, but it is also due to the 
apparent resolution of long-standing differences between the Government and the transnational 
corporations which control the industry. In this latter reLard the most important development was 
the agreement concerning the modification of the Bauxite Levy in late 1979. Previously, this levy, 
which was imposed by the Government in 1974 following inconclusive talks with the bauxite 
corporations on new contracts, was applied at the rate of 7.5% of the average realized price of 
primary aluminium, divided, by a factor of 4.3, which is the rate of conversion of bauxite into 
aluminium. 
Under the new accord, arrived at through negotiations between the Government and the 
corporations, the revised levy is linked to the world market price of aluminium and to the rate of 
utilization of capacity (in each enterprise ) 
As the average realized price of aluminium rises, the marginal levy declines. Up to 53 US 
cents per pound, the levy is 7.5%; between 53 cents and 58 cents the levy drops to 6.8%, and at 
higher prices a dual formula is applied involving a base, or "cap" price. Between 58 cents and 63 
cents, the cap price is 58 cents; between 63 cents and 68 cents, it is 59 cents; and so on. A cap price 
of 58 cents or 59 cents draws a base levy rate of 6.8%; higher cap prices draw a base levy rate of 
6.5%. The difference between the cap price and the average ralized price is assessed at a rate that 
commences at 5% in the 58 cents to 63 cents range and falls to 3% in the 83 cents to 88 cents range 
(where the cap price is 63 cents and the base levy is 6.5%). 
Table 5 
JAMAICA: MINING PRODUCTION 
Thousands of metric ton 	 Growth rates 
1978 	 1979 	 1980 	 1978 	 1979 
Bauxite 	 11 736 	 11 505 	 12 150 	 2.6 	 -2.0 
Alumina 	 2 114 	 2 096 	 2 475 	 3.2 	 -0.9 




Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, Production Statistics, 1979, and Central Bank of 
Jamaica, Statistical Digest, January 1981. 
These rates also vary according to production levels: as output rises above a floor equal to 
85% of each firm's capacity, the marginal levy likewise decreases. Up to the floor level production 
is assessed at 100% of the rates quoted above. For the first increment of 200 000 tons above it the 
levy is reduced to 75% of the rate applicable given the average realized price. For the next 
increment of 400 000 tons, the levy is reduced to 50% of the applicable rate. The assessment on 
further increases will be subject to negotiation. 
According to the agreement, the new levy system will be reviewed in January 1980, or when 
the average realized price reaches 85 cents, whichever occurs first. 
In order to compare this somewhat involved formula with the previous straight 7.5% levy, 
the price of aluminium and the expectations of its future evolution prevailing at the time the new 
agreement was reached (October 1979) must be taken into account. 
First, it may be noted that the price of aluminium in the world market has risen continuously 
since 1972 and has been above 53 cents —or the level at which the levy falls below 7.5%— since 
the third quarter of 1977. Between then and the fourth quarter of 1979, the price climbed more 
than 39%, to 74.5 cents, or the level where the next to lowest levy rates obtain under the new 
formula. At that price, and assuming capacity utilization were 85%, the effective levy would be 
109 
5.95(X.. Furthermore, the price prospects for aluminium in the foreseeable future are highly 
favourable, owing mainly to the increasing substitution of aluminium for other, heavier metals. 
In the light of these factors, the new levy system represents a substantial concession to the 
bauxite corporations. It translated into a reduction of more than 207/ in the levy rate at the 
moment the agreement was concluded, and will permit the bauxite companies to capture a 
progressively increasing proportion of the expected windfall gains. In exchange, the firms made 
informal committments to expand production and capacity. 
In 1980 aluminium prices averaged 85.1 cents or some 22 (.'/(' more than in 1979. At that price 
the levy fell to 5.52 . Nevertheless, owing to the marked increase in price and the sizeable upturn 
in production, the nominal value of the revenue from the levy decreased by only 3.5 (/'(' . In the third 
quarter of 1980 the international price of aluminium surpassed the 85 cents mark that would 
normally trigger a new round of negotiations over levy rates under the October 1979 agreement. 
Because of the pressing obligations associated with the elections in October 1980 and the resultant 
change in administrations, however, the negotiations were postponed until 1981. Presumably it 
was the same confluence of events that led the bauxite corporations to delay the implementation of 
their informal committments to expand capacity. On the other hand, the appreciable reduction in 
the levy rate may have encouraged the firms to expand output in 1980. But, as suggested at the 
outset of this section, the principal inducement seems to have been the steep rise in aluminium 
prices. 
The creation and expansion of the bauxite industry was the principal source of the 6.5 
	 per 
annum growth obtained between the early 1950s and the early 1970s in Jamaica. During this 
period the increases in the rate of investment ( in several years over 30(X of the product ); the level 
of capital inflows ( which accounted for an average of 32 
	 of total investment); the growth ')f 
exports (6.8(7 per year), and the growth of the overall external sector (7.57 per year) were all 
generated primarily by successive cyclical expansions (roughly in 1953/1957, 1961/1965 and 
1967/1972) in the bauxite sector. Thus, in addition to the direct (over 18c'7( ) and indirect (e.g., via 
the stimulation of the construction industry) contribution to growth, the product and capital flows 
that the sector occasioned entailed both a large and persistent deficit on the current account and a 
sizeable and consistent surplus on the overall balance of payments. During the course of the last 
expansionary phase in bauxite —the final year of which coincided with the first election of the 
previous Government— the extent of the sector's contribution to the 7.17 per annum growth of 
total output and to the buoyancy of the external sector (gross reserves almost doubled) assumed 
even greater proportions. In effect, investment in bauxite and alumina alone accounted for fully 
one-third of investment; the increase in its product provided almost 27W of the rise in the GDP; 
and the increment in the value of bauxite and alumina exports provided more than two-thirds of 
overall export growth. And in 1973/1971, when the rest of the economy began to contract in the 
wake of the pronounced acceleration of inflation, a marked drop in construction-related invest-
ment, and the stagnation of import volume, mining output still climbed an additional 262 . 
In the light of these facts it can be appreciated that the bauxite corporations' decision to slash 
production was a heavy blow to the economy. The real value of the industry's output plunged 2 1(X 
in 1975; the following year it dropped a further 21(X . The rest of the economy was in fact 
recovering from the 1974 recession when mining production first tumbled. In 1976, however, 
output in the rest of the economy dropped almost 6 2  , as import volume was compressed more 
than 16(X-, and at the end of the year operations in the foreign exchange market were suspended 
because the gross international reserves were nearing depletion. 
While other factors, such as the international recession, the multiplication of petroleum 
prices, labour/management disputes and an explosion in Alcoa s alumina refinery (1976) also 
incided in the severe cutback in bauxite mining and refining in 1975/1976, the principal factor 
involved appears to have been the extremely adverse reaction of the transnationals to the 
In this connexion, it may be mentioned that long-planned construction by the Government of a USS 550-600 million, 
600 ton refinery at South Manchester was delayed once again because the required additional financing —some USS 250 
million— did not materialize. 
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Government's decision to enact the bauxite levy (which was followed by the Caribbean producing 
countries but not other major producers ). With respect to the question of its effects on corporate 
investment in the sector, however, it should be noted that the various companies did not have any 
existing plans to undertake a further expansion of their respective mining and refining capacities 
in Jamaica. Indeed, and notwithstanding the last round of expansions there in 1967/1972, the 
bauxite firms had begun intensive development of sources outside Jamaica (and outside the 
Caribbean in general) in the mid-1960s, even though Jamaica was the lowest-cost producer. As 
early as 1971 Australia had already overtaken Jamaica as the world's principal producer of bauxite, 
and by 1974 it accounted for 24.4% of world supply, against the 18.7% share originating from 
Jamaica. On the other hand, the controversy over the levy definitively precluded any additional 
transnational investment in Jamaican bauxite. 
The value of mining output ( in constant terms) not realized between 1975 and 1980 
—calculated as the difference between act u al a  and 1974 production— equalled an average of 2.5 
of GDP in that period.8 In terms of GNP, the proportion falls to 1.6%, owing to the remittances of 
profits which the added production would have occasioned.' In spite of the dimensions of these 
losses they were more than offset by the total value ( in constant terms) of the bauxite levy collected 
during the period. In effect, levy income exceeded the value of production lost by almost 37% and 
was more than double the proportion that would have remained in Jamaica. 1 () But these resources 
were not employed to enlarge the mining industry's production capacity, nor directly utilized in 
development projects, as was originally intended. Instead, the course of events made necessary the 
use of the levy income to finance part of the fiscal deficit. 
(iv) Manufacturing. Preliminary data show a downturn in excess of 5% in manufacturing in 
1980 (see table 6). The sector's output had declined systematically since 1976, with the cumulative 
reduction approaching 25 %. Moreover, the level of output in 1980 was about 16% below the 1970 
figure. The depression of manufacturing accounted for almost 26% of the drop in GDP experienced 
between 1973 and 1980 and well over 33! of that registered between 1975 and 1980. The results 
for some specific products in 1980 are shown in tables 7 and 8. However, data on performance by 
subsectors are not yet available. As of 1979, eleven of the sixteen principal industrial branches 
were producing less than in 1970. The proportions involved ranged from -51% (furniture and 
fixtures) to -9% (food). Moreover, the real extent of the cutbacks was generally even greater, 
because production peaked around 1972/ 1973 in most branches. In this connexion it may be 
observed that the only branch to reach its maximum production level in 1979 was tobacco and 
tobacco products. 
Between 1960 and 1972 five other sectors of the economy registered growth rates greater 
than that of manufacturing. Nevertheless, the 6.3% per annum increase obtained in that sector 
was higher than the economy-wide average. Also, manufacturing accounted for one-sixth of the 
expansion of tii\i0 —a contribution which was surpassed only by that of mining— while it 
provided over one-third of the jobs created during the period and the increase in manufacturing 
employment was equivalent to fully 84% of the net gain in jobs. 
Owing to diverse factors, such as the dearth of opportunities to achieve economies of scale, 
the country's brief industrial history, and incentives schemes that encouraged the manufacture of a 
broad range of products, the industrial sector that developed in Jamaica depended heavily on the 
external market for input supply and on the internal market for output demand. Thus, in 1972, for 
example, imports attributable to the sector totalled about one-half of the vallie of its production, 
while the domestic market absorbed some 83% of the value of its output. In that same year the 
sector's imports gave rise to almost 28% of total imports, but manufactured exports provided only 
slightly over 13 % of total exports. The trade deficit thus generated by the sector was equivalent to 
"In 1974 the sector's output reached almost 9 	 of capacity. 
The ratio of profit remittances to product was taken from the 1970/1973 accounts. The data are from the World 
Bank. 
11 the comparisons are limited to 1975-1980, [he above figures become 79t and 72(7i. 
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more than one-third of the value of its output, and equalled the entire amount of the overall trade 
deficit. 
Given these characteristics, the subsequent depression of manufacturing activity is traceable 
primarily to developments in the rest of the economy, namely, the collapse of investment demand 
in construction and mining; the balance of payments crisis; and the deflation of consumer demand. 
Thus, the close of investment cycles in construction and mining, together with the first squeeze on 
the balance of payments, led to a decline in manufacturing growth from almost 12% in 1972 to less 
than 1 % in 1973 and in 1974 the sector's output dropped 3.5 %. With the transitory let-up in the 
pressure on the external sector, which translated into a 5% rise in import volume following two 
years of stagnation, manufacturing rebounded slightly to record an increase of somewhat more 
than 2% in 1975. However, the full-fledged balance of payments crisis that surfaced in 1976 forced 
a reduction in import volume amounting to fully 37%; in 1976/1977. This severe blow, which was 
accentuated in 1976 by the first important reduction in the domestic demand for consumer goods, 
provoked a decline in manufacturing of 5% in 1976 and almost 7% in 1977. In 1978/1979 the 
additional 9% decrease was a result mainly of the deflationary policies adopted under the IMF 
accords. The intensification of the severe slump in manufacturing activity in 1980 was as much a 
consequence of the persistent contraction of domestic demand as of another marked cutback in the 
supply of imported intermediate inputs. 
Table 6 
JAMAICA: MANUFACTURING OUTPUT BY SUBSECTOR 
(1970 	 = 100) 
Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
Index of manufacturing 
production 	 (1973) 100.6 95.7 90.8 85.9 -6.8 -4.9 -5.2 -5.4 
Food 	 (1972) 1 17.9 108 	 1 91.3  2.3 -8.3 -15.5 
Sugar, molasses and rum (1965) 80.3 78.2 77.6 -17.2 -2.7 -0.8 
Alcoholic beverages 	 (1975) 134.8 140.0 138,3 -2.3 3.9 -1.2 
Non-alcoholic beverages 	 (1974) 106.3 96.8 85.9 8.3 -8.9 -11.3 
Tobacco and tobacco products 
(1979) 122.7 118.5 131.0 0.2 -3.4 10.5 
Textiles and wearing apparel 	 (1973) 101.0 92.9 67.6 -6.6 -8.0 -27.2 
Leather and leather products (1978) 135.8 174.3 162.6 5.2 28.4 -6.7 
Footwear 	 (1970) 75.5 62.7 53.1 9.9 -17.0 -15.3 
Wood, 
	 wood and cork products (1977) 226.3 140.4 121.7 26.4 -38.0 -13.3 
Furniture and 	 fixtures (1972) 83.5 64.3 49.2 -3.4 -23.0 -23.5 
Paper and paper products, 
printing and publishing 
	 (1975) 103.6 108.3 139.0 -20.9 4.5 28.3 
Petroleum refining (1970) 64.5 59.6 71.3 -15.0 -7.6 19.6 
Chemicals and chemical petroleum 
rubber and plastic products 	 (1973) 120.9 128.2 115.5 -13.2 6.0 -9.9 
Non-metallic products 	 (1972) 76.0 70.4 65.5 
-5.6 -7.4 
-7.0 
Metal and fabricated metal 
products, machinery and 
equipment 
	 (1973) 76.4 70.9 57.7 -21.5 -7.2 8 
 




Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics. National Income and Product, 1979. 
In the 1973/1976 period the sector's performance was also hampered by an appreciable fall in 
the real exchange rate. The steep rise in the costs of production at the prevailing (nominal) rate of 
exchange reduced the international competitiveness of Jamaica's manufactured exports, and this, 
in conjunction with the severe limits on the supply of imported inputs, occasioned the closure of a 
large number of firms that produced for the external market under a free trade zone-type of 
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arrangement. Between 1972 and 1976 the value of manufactured exports as a proportion of the 
value of total manufactured output dropped from 17% to 13.6%. 
Finally, factory operations were prejudiced also by the migration of professional, technical 
and skilled manpower, industrial unrest, recurrent disruptions of basic services and, in 1976 and 
1980, by the atmosphere surrounding the election campaigns. 
Policy initiatives directed mainly or partly at halting the decline of this sector were focused 
almost exclusively on improving export performance. They included the successive devaluations 
of the Jamaican dollar between 1977 and 1979, which translated into a rise of almost 39% in the 
real exchange rate. This notable adjustment doubled the extent of the decline recorded between 
1973 and 1976 and left the real exchange rate at its highest level since World War II. Also, the 
Government created the Certified Exporters Scheme, designed to ensure that producers geared to 
the export market, or those capable of meeting a specified level of exports, receive priority in the 
disbursement of foreign exchange for import needs. Finally, the Government obtained from the 
World Bank a sizeable loan to set up and finance an Export Development Fund (EDF). This 
revolving fund was used to cover the foreign exchange requirements of certified exporters. 
According to World Bank records, 80 firms, accounting for some 75% of the export volume of 
non-traditional exports, had made use of the EDF by December 1980. In addition to directly 
expediting the international transactions of exporters, the EDF also permitted firms to obtain 
better terms from overseas suppliers and from the Jamaican branches of foreign commercial 
banks. 
In 1977 and 1978 exports of manufactures remained sluggish, but in 1979 the current value of 
manufactured exports climbed well over 32%. No comparable data for 1980 are yet available. 
However, it appears that little or no further growth took place. 
(v) Construction. According to the preliminary figures on GDP, the value of construction 
output dwindled more than 207 in 1980. Selected indicators of construction activity are contained 
Table 7 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY 
Thousand of metric tons 
1278 	 1979 	 1980(a) 1978 
Growth rates 
1979 1980(b) 
Production of selected manufactures 
Sugar 292 283 226 -1.0 -3.1 -14.7 
Flour 	 (wheat) 49 42 47 -10.0 -13.4 35.1 
Animal 	 feeds 21 203 169(c) 6.6 -3.8 - 
Rum and alcohol 	 (d) 17 18 18(e) -5.1 7.1 6.1 
Fertilizers 30 31 16(f) 38.5 4.4 21.1 
Petroleum products (d) 1 173 1 	 371 982 1.6 16.9 -20.9 
Textile 	 fabrics 	 (g) 9 330 5 944 2 986(f) 16.4 -36.3 15.9 
Indicators of manufacturing 
production 
Electricity sales to industry 
by public utilities 
	 (h) 635 588 527 - -7.3 -2.8 
Industrial employment 
	 (i) 79 74 73 3.4 -6.9 -2.9 
Source: Jamaica, Department of Statistics, Production Statistics, 1979, and Statistical Digest, 
January 1981. 
(a) January to November. 
(b) January-November 1980 with respect January-November 1979. 
(c) January-October. 
(d) Millions of litres. 
(e) January-September. 
(f) January-June. 
(g) Thousands of metres. 
(h) Millions of KWH. 
(i) Thousands. 
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in table 8. As may be seen, the production of two of the main building materials, cement and steel, 
contracted by one-third and one-sixth, respectively, during the twelve months ending in 
November 1980. The marked drop-off in cement was caused by the recurrent shut-down of the 
kilns at the Cement Company because of the inability to obtain spare parts. The scarcity of cement 
in turn forced reductions in other firms that supply materials (e.g., concrete blocks and tiles) to the 
construction industry. The contraction of the domestic production of building components was 
aggravated further by the appreciable reduction in the supply of imported construction materials. 
As a result of the big drop in construction, employment in the sector was slashed by more than 
one-third (see again table 8). 
The level of construction output had spurted ahead by almost 21% in 1970, as the last 
expansion of capacity in mining and tourism peaked. In 1971, however, the value of the sector's 
output rose less than 1 %, and construction activity commenced what was to become a relentless 
contraction, notwithstanding a substantial increment in residential building in the middle of the 
decade. In 1980, the value of the construction GDP was a mere 40% of that recorded in 1971. After 
having dropped 15% between 1971 and 1973, when the rest of the economy expanded by over 
14%, the persistent decrease in construction accounted for over 30% of the fall in the total product 
between 1973 and 1980. 
While overall building activity systematically declined, housing completions rose from 
approximately 3 000 per year at the beginning of the 1970s to a high of 6 837 in 1977. In 1978, 
however, the total dropped to 4 876, and in 1979 4 940 units were built. No data for 1980 are yet 
available. Of the residences completed in the 1977/1979 period, 76% were constructed by the 
public sector. 
In spite of the stepped-up effort in housing development in the 1970s, the pronounced shift 
in the age distribution of the population led to the doubling of the number of families formed as 
the decade progresses, so that the annual increment in the housing deficit registered a marked 
expansion. 
Table 8 
JAMAICA: 	 INDICATORS Or CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
1978 	 1979 	 1980(a) 
Growth rate 
1978 1979 	 1980(b) 
Production of selected buildings 
materials 
Cement 
	 (c) 294 225 135 -11.7 -23.5 	
-33.5 
Paint 	 (d) 	 5 513 
	 5 782 17.7 4.9 	 ... 
Steel 
	 'c) 14 10 8 37.9 -30.3 	 -16.2 
Bagasse board 
	 (e) 6 60 -83.0 963.0 
Employment 
	 (f) 33 32 24 -0.3 -3.0 
Source: 
	 Jamaica, 	 National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey, 1979, and Statistical 
Digest, 	 January 	 1980. 
(a) January-November only. 
(b) January-November 1980, compared to January-November 1979. 
(c) Thousands of metric tons. 
(d) Thousands of litres. 
(e) Thousands of cm2. 
(f) April of each year. 
(vi) Tourism. Following the recuperation of the tourist industry in 1978 and the achievement 
of a record number of tourist arrivals in 1979, the total number of visitors through October 1980 
was 6% less than in the corresponding period of the previous year (see table 9). The traditionally 
volatile short-stay (one or two nights) and cruise-ship segments of the market accounted for this 
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downturn as the first category dropped almost two-thirds and the second about one-sixth. On the 
other hand the number of long-stay visitors ( three or more nights) showed a slight increase. Partly 
for this reason, but mainly due to a rise in average spending per tourist, estimated tourist 
expenditures climbed almost 31%., . This development, however, largely reflected price inflation. 
Full-year data from the travel account nt z he balance of payments reveal an increment of slightly 
more than 1 (X. in current US dollars, and a decrease of well over 181 in constant dollars. 
The determinants of the recession in touristy) in Jamaica in 1980 are broadly similar to those 
that led to the severe depression of 1976/ I ' '77. First, owing to the marked reduction in the growth 
of the developed market economies, part t, ular it in the United States, where the product dipped 
0.2 	 and in Great Britain, where it declined 3 , and to the new rounds of fuel price hikes, 
tourism in the Caribbean as a whole fell amour 2% in 1980. This negative panorama was further 
exacerbated by the upsurge in violence and disturbances associated with the continued deteriora-
tion of the economy and the election campaign in Jamaica, with the consequent effects on the 
image of the country as a destination for v.o ations. The 11% reduction in the real exchange rate of 
the Jamaican currency in terms of US dolla!s may also have influenced the decline in the number of 
tourists from Jamaica 's principal market. although the country's price levels became highly 
competitive again following the huge exchange rate adjustments of the 1977/1979 period. 
The total number of tourists increased somewhat more than 621 per annum in the 1960s in 
Jamaica. However, the number of long-stay visitors climbed well over 137 per annum, and by the 
second half of the decade the average hotel room occupancy rate surpassed 67% . In view of these 
and other developments, such as the rise of .barters and group travel associated with the entry into 
service of the jumbo jets, and of the abseriCe of convention-type hotels on the island, in the late 
1960s the Government resolved to active k encourage a major enlargement of hotel capacity. For 
this purpose it obtained in 1968 the enactment of the Hotel Incentives Act. This initiative 
provided for the waiver of import duties o.. capital goods and exemption from taxes on profits for 
ten to fifteen years for the erection of hot ek. with 350 or more rooms. Also, the central government 
decided to make available government guarantees on loans raised to finance hotel projects. 
Largely in response to these incentive,, the total number of tourist rooms more than doubled 
between 1968 and 1973. In 1970, when hotel building activity attained its zenith, the room capacity 
was augmented by fully 2277, and while r he rate of increase thereafter tailed-off progressively, 
additions were sufficient to lead to a rise of at least 1023 in each of the folowing four years. 
In the meantime, the growth of overnight tourism remained strong (10% ), but was in no case 
sufficient to cover the massive expansion 	 hotel rooms. Consequently, between 1968 and 1973 
the average room occupancy rate plunged t rom 66.8% to 18.1% , and when the number of tourists 
peaked in 1975, the occupancy rate \V LiS down to only 43.5%. In 1976, the occupancy rate tumbled 
to 32.21 in the wake of the drop of 1821 in tourist arrivals and the completion of the final projects 
commenced under the Hotel Incentives At.t. The bottom was reached the ensuing year, when the 
number of visitors contracted a further 	 The fact that the occupancy rate only fell to 28.1% 
was due to the bankruptcies which had resulted in a 9% contraction in the supply of rooms. A 
greater cutback was avoided because the ( overnment decided to take over and subsidize a number 
of facilities that otherwise would also have closed.
I I 
Thus, the inordinate expansion of capacity in the late 1960s and early 1970s had already 
depressed the average occupancy rate below the breaking point prior to the severe 1976/1977 
slump. Marginal operations —including many of the new projects— were flirting with bankruptcy 
before 1976. 
The pronounced reductions in tourist arrivals in 1976 and again in 1977 would appear to be 
attributable primarily to the notable deterioration of the media image of Jamaica in the principal 
tourist markets. And as in 1980, this factor may be traced to the intensification of violence in 
Jamaica during the electoral campaign, and to the deterioration of Government- to-Government 
relations. But also of importance was the steady decline of the real exchange rate of the Jamaican 
The number of rooms decreased another 5 	 in 1978. 
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Table 9 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF TOURIST ACTIVITY 
  
   
Growth rates 






    
Total visitors (c) (d) 	 533 	 594 	 457 	 37.9 	 11.4 	 -5.3 
Long stay (c) (e) 
	
370 	 401 	 338 	 45.3 	 8.3 	 2.3 
Short stay (c) (f) 
	
12 	 26 	 9 	 14.3 	 1 1 7.5 	 -6=-7 
Other (c) (g) 
	
151 	 167 	 114 	 24.9 	 10.5 	 -15.7 
Hotel room occupancy rat- 
	 40 	 48 	 ,16 	 38.4 	 20,0 	 0.9 
Average length of stay (h) 
	 9 	 9 	 9 	 -2.3 	 3.5 	 -8.3 
Estimated expenditure H_) 
	
146 	 194 	 215 	 41.8 	 31.1 	 30.6 
Direct employment (J. 
	 10 166 	 li 757 	 21.1 	 15.2 
Source: Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey, 1979, and Bank of 
jamaica, Pepparch Department, 5tptisticalDlg,•2,st, January 1981. 
(a) January-October only. 
(b) January-October 1950, with respect to January-October 1979. 
(c) Thousands. 
(d) Excludes nationals residing abroad. 
(e) Three or more nights. 
(f) One or two nights. 
(g) Includes cruise-ship passengers .oC members of the armed forces. 
(h) Nights. 
(i) Millions of current jamaiPa dollars. 
(j) In hotels, guest house: and ndttasns. 
dollar in terms of US dollars between 1973 and 1976, because the United States provided around 
80% of Jamaica's tourists at the time. 
In spite of the 1976/1977 experience, and thanks to the remarkable rebound of 1978, the total 
number of tourists arriving in Jamaica in 1 
	 was 43'W.' above the 1970 figure, or about half the 
growth rate recorded in the Caribbean as a whole. On the other hand, overnight visitors in 1979 
were still slightly below the record 1974 level, and 1980 tourist expenditures, as measured in 
constant US dollars, were 12% less than in 1970 and 29% less than 1972, as the peak level was 
registered prior to the first devaluation of the Jamaica currency in 1973. Finally, in 1980 the 
occupancy rate remained excessively low (16(X) 
(c) Employment and lille711P/o9ment 
Notwithstanding a high rate of c corms -, [Pic growth and a modest rate of growth of the 
working-age population in the two decades ending in 1972, the relative and absolute levels of 
unemployment recorded very substantial increases in Jamaica. During the 1960-1972 period the 
asymmetry between the evolution of the product and the evolution of employment became 
increasingly pronounced: in fact, in the final years these two variables moved in opposite 
directions. Simultaneously, the steady stream of emigration of skilled technical and professional 
personnel, together with appreciable shifts in the structure of production, led to a growing 
shortage of skilled and managerial labour. 
The disarticulation of the labour market from the expansion path of the economy and the 
marked division within the labour market between the unorganized unskilled segment and the 
highly organized, high wage one had a profound impact on the formation of both the short-term 
economic policy and the long-term development strategy of the Government elected in February 
1972. 
In 1960 the rate of unemployment in Jamaica stood at 13.0% (9.0% for males and 19.2% for 
females). In the 1960s total economic growth averaged 5.5% per annum, while per capita growth 
averaged 4.0%. After emigration, the average annual increase in the labour force attributable to 
the expansion of the working-age (15-64) population was a mere 0.4%. If it had not been for the 
massive net emigration which took place and affected principally those of working age, the growth 
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of the population aged 15 through 64 would have reached the figure of 3.6575 per annum, or nine 
times greater than the actual rate. Part of this outflow was offset by a pronounced rise in the female 
labour force participation rate. But the overall annual increment of the labour force remained at 
the relatively low figure of 1.40 . A total of 94 500 individuals thus entered the labour force during 
the decade. 
But high economic growth and low lab }ur force growth was not accompanied by an improve- 
ment in the employment situation. t jol-) creation it wnted to some 51 000, or less than 1.0(7: 
per year. Asa result, the rate of unemployment climbed to 17.67 : 10.7% for males and 26.5% for 
females. The number of persons affected l),• unemployment rose by a total of 49%, or 4.6% per 
year.12 
In the meantime, the high natural rdt , • of growth of the population (3.1 ), combined with 
the large-scale emigration of labto_ir t, hr e  :members, led to a notable rise in the dependency ratio, 
which climbed between 1960 and 1970 from 834 te 1 065 (per 1 000 working-age inhabitants), and 
in 1970 children under 15 constituted 46 	 of the population. Moreover, the elevated vegetative 
growth of the population in the 1960s meant that the rate of growth of the labour force would 
accelerate appreciably in the 1970s, unless emigration were to register a systematic, proportionate 
increase. On the other hand, the pattern of the depletion of the labour force through emigration 
created a serious imbalance between experienced and inexperienced workers. The number of 
people of prime working age actually decreased between 1960 and 1970. Furthermore, the 
confluence of the population and emigration trends would exacerbate dramatically the proportion 
of this imbalance in the 1970s. 
'=The labour force data are from the Jamaica Nat ional Planning Agency. , EcInouric.nrd Social .curzr(),various years; 
and the World Bank. 
Before proceeding further, account should be taken of the particular manner in which unemployment is officially defined in 
Jamaica. In this connexion, the National Planning Agency has observed: "In the Jamaican situation, unemployment levels 
include both active job-seekers as well as non-seekers, that is, persons who made no effort to find a job during the survey 
week but who indicate that they wanted work and were available to accept it. This approach has been judged to be more 
appropriate for the local context in view of the very high proportions of non-seekers among the unemployed, and because it 
is recognized that in situations of chronically high unemployment job-seeking activity is not a sufficient indicator of 
availability for work. In October 1979 about -41'7 of all unemployed males and 7057 of all unemployed females were 
classified as non-seekers, while the highest levels of job-seekers were recorded in the urban parishes of Kingston and St. 
Andrew. Job-seeking activity is clearly related to personal judgements as to the likelihood of finding a job, as well as to the 
existence of formal agencies for securing employment Whereas 2957 of the unemployed labour force lived in the Kingston 
and St. Andrew area in October 1979, some 38'7 of 	 active job-seekers were found in those two parishes. 
It should he noted that the inclusion of non-seekers leads to a wider definition of unemployment than is used in many 
countries, and that it does serve to provide a higher est imate of the labour force and of the unemployed." IJ aminca, National 
Planning Agency, Economic. and Social Seryti. 1979. 	 p. 162.) 
Thus, while the rate of unemployment (and the labour force) as defined in Jamaica are not directly comparable with 
unemployment rates obtained under the conventional concepts, the Jamaican authorities consider that the broader 
definition of unemployment is the one most relevant to the characteristics of Jamaica's labour market. 
If the unemployment and labour force data are modified to correspond to the most common usage, that is, if those who 
want to work but were not actively seeking work is hen interviewed are excltided from the labour force and from the 
unemployed, the rate of unemployment diminishes appreciably. In 1972, the first year for which it is possible to make this 
adjustment, the unemployment rate becomes I 4.5'7 s ersus 22.9!.;" according to the official definition. The large difference 
stems from the fact that 5857 of the unemployed females and 1457 of the unemployed males were not actively seeking 
work. 
It is important to note that the proportion of unemployed who actively seek work does in fact decline as the rate of 
unemployment decreases. Thus in 1979, when unemployment officially reached 27.8'-.7i around 70',7(.  of unemployed 
females and 41 57 of unemployed males did not actively look for work. 
The 1960 census, from which the 1960 unemployment rate is taken, did not make a distinction between those who were or 
were not actively seeking work. It merely tabulated those who wanted to work. Consequently, the magnitude and direction 
of the trends in the 1960s remain identical under either concept of unemployment, unless the substantial rise in the labour 
force participation rate detected between the 1960 (population census) and 1968 (first labour force survey) data is 
attributed to the possibility that in 1960 non-seekers were excluded from the labour force. In the 1970s the situation is 
straightforward. The adjusted unemployment rate declines from 62.2(7i of the official unemployment rate ('1972) to 47.257 
(1979). 
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As these developments began to materialize, the limited capacity of the economy to generate 
a net again in employment along the existing growth path simply vanished. Thus, while output 
expanded more than 26% between 1969 and 1972, total employment actually declined by 1%. This 
breakdown, together with the acceleration in the growth of the labour force despite an upturn in 
emigration gave rise to a 40% leap in the number of unemployed and the unemployment rate 
soared to 23.2% (see table 10). Male unemployment was 14.3% and female unemployment was 
35.3%, which unemployment in the 14 to 24 age bracket was 40.9% (30.2% for males and 54.4% 
for females). 
In addition to its direct consequences, the intensive increase in unemployment made for a 
deterioration in the already highly skewed distribution of income and created a climate in which 
crime and other social ills flourished. 
On the face of it, the explanation of the inability of the economy to create enough jobs to meet 
even the minor increment of the labour force in the 1960/1972 period is straightforward: the 
growth of the product was concentrated in sectors in which the relative share of total employment 
is modest, the capital costs of job creation high, or the employment elasticity low. At the same 
time, the elasticity of employment in the sectors which account for the lion's share of jobs became 
negative. Suffice it to note here that the 150% expansion of bauxite mining and refining, which 
accounted for more than one-sixth of the rise in GDP and thus constituted the principal source of 
growth, generated a mere 3 500 jobs: sufficient to absorb just 3.7% of the new labour force 
entrants. On the other hand, employment in agriculture, which provided 41% of total employ- 
ment in 1960, contracted by over 13 
	 The extent of the decrease surpassed by 4.6 times the total 
employment in mining in 1972. 
On another level, the lack of correspondence between growth and employment was in large 
part attributable to the intensive exploitation of the country's abundant natural endowment in 
minerals and tourism: not only did these low-employment activities attract the largest part of 
economy-wide investment, but also their development depressed the level of relative profitability 
in the rest of the economy. In manufacturing this effect was largely offset by the array of policies 
adopted to foment industry. But agriculture was not compensated, under circumstances in which 
the profitability of the full utilization of the island's natural resources in agriculture was already in 
decline. 
Employment and unemployment were also affected by the changing characteristics of the 
labour supply. The marked imbalance that developed in the labour force as a result of emigration in 
the 1950s and 1960s aggravated unemployment to the extent that: (i) the general level of 
employment was a function of the ratio of experienced workers to inexperienced workers; and 
(ii) it altered the relation between the overall supply of labour and the general level of wages and 
costs in the economy. Also relevant to the latter question were the repercussions of the creation of 
cases of high-wage employment (in mining) on the economy-wide wage structure. Large-scale 
rural to urban migration, for its part, led to a regional disequilibrium in the labour market, whereby 
unskilled labour was in short supply in agriculture, yet unemployed in the urban areas. Finally, it 
may be added that the long-run situation of high unemployment in Jamaica is partially rooted in 
sociological and demographic factors that have impinged on the conformation of an unusually 
high rate of labour force participation in relation to the working-age population." 
In the light of the grave situation and the dramatic implications of the impeding surge in the 
growth of the labour force, the administration which assumed power in early 1972 placed a very 
high priority on the creation of jobs. 
To this end a host of initiatives were undertaken: (i) first, and perhaps most important, was 
the reorientation of the growth strategy as a function of job creation: that is, as a function of the 
"Approximately half the households in Jamaica are headed by females. This, coupled with the consistently high levels 
of emigration of labour force members in the past four decades, has led to an extraordinary rate of participation of women 
in the labour force. In 1979, for example, some 807c of the women of working age appear as labour force members, while 
over 477c of the total labour force is composed of females. (Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic and Social 
Surrey, 1979, op.cit.) 
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Table 10 
JAMAICA: EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1969 . 	 100) 
197 2 973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Labour force 106 ''7.6 109.5 114.5 118.0 121.5 125.4 127.3 130.2 
Employment 99.0 1 42.0 104.7 110.5 111.1 111.8 114.8 111.6 113.0 
Agricultural 
	 (b) 86.9 -6.7 96.8 97.4 104.8 104.8 110.4 99.7 
Mining (c) 1Ji. '17.3 149.0 146.0 153.9 144.1 116.7 149.0 
Manufacture 1111.1 '6.4 117.3 118.8 108.1 110.5 111.5 107.9 
Construction 9:.4 .8.6 95.0 105.7 89.9 78.1 78.0 75.6 
Transportation and communication (d) 111i: 1.0 121.0 144.1 143.8 134.9 133.8 133.8 
Commerce 124.6 1 J9.3 112.8 119.3 117.8 129.0 136.1 131.2 
Public administration :0.7 138.9 180.0 194.5 203.5 198.8 201.2 
Other 814.4 91.4 90.6 95.2 82.5 80.9 82.9 92.5 
Unemployment 140.1 :-4.0 131.9 133.2 150.2 167.3 175.1 200.9 218.6 
Rate of unemployment jJ,.J 1 .9 21.2 20.5 22.4 24.2 24.5 27.8 29.5 
Source: Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey, various years; and the World Bank. 
(a) Estimates based on Statistics for the first half-year. 
(b) Includes forestry and fishing. 
(c) Includes quarrying and refining. 
(d) Includes public utilities. 
sectors capable of making the largest contribution to employment. Apart from long-term plan-
ning, this involved the implementation in 1972 of a set of policies known as Operation GROW, 
designed to stimulate growth and employment in agriculture; (ii) a package of measures designed 
to address the labour force imbalance on the one level, and the expected shift in labour demand, on 
the other. It consisted of training and literacy programmes and the establishment and upgrading of 
various social services in rural areas, including employment information offices; (iii) the creation 
of employment through public sector work programmes; and (iv) the implementation of an 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. 
Between April 1972 and April 1975, the labour force increased at an annual average rate of 
2.8% , against only 1.7`X in the previous three-year period and a mere 1.4% in the 1960s. This 
radical upturn was a product not only of the expected bulge in the number of labour force entrants 
but also of a 60% plunge in net emigration Nevertheless, the number of jobs created was not only 
sufficient to absorb this sudden influx, but even to effect important reductions in the number of 
individuals affected by unemployment. This was accomplished by augmenting employment 3.8% 
per year, providing a total of 82 000 new jobs in the three-year period. This figure may be 
compared with the 31 750 jobs added to the market in the twelve years ending in April 1972. 
The outcome of the above trends was a decline in the rate of unemployment from 23.6% to 
19.9% 	 the lowest rate recorded since 190). Male unemployment dropped from 14.3%: to 11.1%, 
and female unemployment from 33.2% to 31.2c; .11  
The turnaround in the employment situation mainly reflected the expansion of employment 
in the public sector, including public works projects, together with an appreciable rise in the 
number of jobs in agriculture. Indeed, employment continued to expand in the face of the 
downturn in output in 1974, and again in 1975 was almost solely a consequence of special public 
works programmes and increases in the regular public administration. The 44% enlargement in 
the labour force financed by the public sector between April 1974 and April 1975 was made 
possible by the enactment of the bauxite levy and the special tax on windfall gains in the sugar 
sector, which together led to a 62% leap in central government revenues in that fiscal year. 
'If the size of the labour force had continued to 41-ow at the same pace as in the 1969/1972 period, theoverall rate of 
unemployment could have been reduced to 17. -1C). 
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Contrary to expectations the economy did not recover quickly from the 1974/1975 recession. 
Employment continued to expand, but not enough to prevent the rate of unemployment from 
inching up over the course of the ensuing year. When output receded sharply between April and 
October of 1976, and the public sector was no longer in a position to offset the consequent loss of 
jobs, the rate of unemployment soared from 20.5% to 24.2% (see table 10). 
The persistent decline of the product and the deterioration of public finances, was not, 
however, accompanied by a further aggravation of unemployment until the second half of 1978. In 
fact, by April of 1978 the rate of unemployment declined to 23% thanks to an appreciable 
expansion in agricultural employment.' 5 
Unemployment rose sharply once again in the second half of 1978, and following a downturn 
in the first half of 1979 it climbed drastrically to 31.1% in October of that year. In addition to the 
progressive contraction of the economy, the implementation in mid-1978 of highly restrictive 
monetary and income policies under the second IMF agreement conditioned the evolution of 
employment in this period. The exceptional upswing in unemployment in the second half of 1979 
was largely a repercussion of the effects of flooding on agriculture, however. 
Disastrous weather conditions in the second half of 1980 likewise propelled the rate of 
unemployment well beyond the proportion attributable to the reduction of output. Thus, while 
27.9% of the labour force was whithout a job in April, 31.5% was in that position in October 
1980.'6 
Statistics by age and sex are not available for 1980, but in October 1979 male unemployment 
reached 19.9% and female unemployment 43.5 %. Over 34% of males and 63% of females aged 14 
to 29 were unemployed. 
When the then Prime Minister announced that the Government had resolved to discontinue 
negotiations for a new agreement with the IMF in March 1980, one of the main justifications he 
cited for this decision was that the additional budget cuts sought by the IMF would lead to a further 
11 000 unemployed. 
Between April 1972 and April 1980 employment increased 17.7%, while the product declined 
by a similar proportion. About one-half of the expansion in employment took place in agriculture, 
two-fifths in public administration, and the remainder in commerce. During this period the 
increase in overall employment averaged 1.8% per annum, against 0.45% between 1960 and 1972, 
when the product climbed over 90%. 
3. The external sector 
(a) Introduction 
When the government decided to terminate the IMF talks in March 1980, the Bank of Jamaica 
possessed a mere US$ 25 million in liquid reserves under circumstances in which the economy 
faced a projected current account deficit of some US$ 390 million, or 13.5% of the GDP, if the 
anticipated contraction in the product were to be limited to 2.5%. This, however, implied a 
US$ 300 million overall balance of payments deficit unless additional external finance were to 
materialize. Otherwise import volume would in fact have to be slashed by a larger proportion than 
planned, with the result that the decrease in output would be greater than originally contemplated. 
"The rate of growth of the labour force also slowed at this time due to an upsurge in net emigration. But this type of 
development may have aggravated, rather than eased, the panorama, as was suggested in connexion with the discussion on 
the evolution of employment in the 1960s. 
'6Sectoral figures for October 1980 are not available. However, it may be noted that between April and October 1979 
employment in agriculture dropped 14%. This decline appears to be wholly attributable to flood damage and disruption, 
inasmuch as the level of agricultural employment in April 1980 returned to the April 1979 level. In any case, the fall in 
agricultural employment in April-October 1979 accounted for 70(7 of the increase in unemployment in that period. 
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In spite of a decrease in export volume and an increase in import prices and interest rates 
beyond the dimensions projected, the country managed to avoid external insolvency and internal 
collapse through a combination of fortuitous circumstances: an unforeseen increment in official 
capital inflows; an emergecy agreement with overseas commercial creditors; and an upturn in the 
foreign exchange earnings of the parallel economy. In fact, the overall balance of payments 
registered a surplus of some US$ 83 million, after taking into account a US$ 42 million reduction 
in outstanding obligations with the IMF. This was the first time since 1974 that a surplus had been 
achieved. 
The current account deficit turned out to be US$ 213 million (7.3% of the GDP), which was 
substantially more than in 1979, but markedly less than expected. The current value of exports of 
goods and services rose almost 24% thanks to a 34% hike in the unit price of merchandise exports. 
The increase in the current value of imports of goods and services was about the same and likewise 
reflected price bahaviour. As a result, the deficit on the commercial account was somewhat smaller 
than in 1979, instead of the expected four-fold increase. On the other hand, payments of profits 
and interest rose more than anticipated, to US$ 267 million, equivalent to fully 9.2% of the GDP. 
The actual current account outcome translated into a reduction of US$ 120 million in the 
originally identified gap in the overall balance of payments. This, together with unanticipated 
capital inflows from both formal and informal sources and an increase of US$ 43 million in 
arrears, was responsible for the accumulation of US$ 42 million in gross reserves. From another 
point of view, it may be observed that the increase in total foreign exchange inflows made it 
possible to keep the decline in import volume, and hence the decrease in the product, in the 
neighbourhood of the proportions planned for. 
In the light of the failure to reach a new agreement with the IMF and the size of the projected 
payments gap, the actual performance of the external sector was remarkable. On the other hand, it 
continued to be mired in crisis: gross international reserves were still insufficient to cover a 
month's supply of imports of goods and services, while the renewed accumulation of arrears 
endangered the existence of the remaining sources of supplier credits. 
The development and evolution of the crisis is outlined in table 11. The first signs of strain 
surfaced in the final months of 1972 and continued throughout 1973. The immediate cause was the 
steep downturn in private direct foreign investment, coupled with an acceleration in the growth of 
imports. The decrease in foreign investment in the bauxite sector was not accompanied by 
moderation in import growth because a midly expansionary fiscal policy and a liberal monetary 
policy, together with a revaluation of the Jamaican dollar vir-,)-ris the US dollar, stimulated the 
demand for imported consumer goods. In 1973 price rises, import controls, devaluation, and a 
slowdown in the growth of credit combined to reduce imports in real terms. But a decided 
worsening of the terms of trade led to a further deterioration in the balance of payments. As a 
result, by the end of that year gross international reserves were sufficient to cover only 1.5 months 
of imports, versus 3.4 months in 1971. 
In 1974 the panorama improved substantially notwithstanding the dramatic increase in the 
value of imports, the tripling of interest payments on the foreign debt and the second successive 
downturn in earnings from tourism. In effect, the current value of merchandise exports leaped by 
more than 90% on the strength of an unprecedented rise in international prices. Simultaneously, 
the Government enacted the Bauxite Levy, which slashed the outflow of profits on foreign capital 
by two-thirds. As a result of the above developments, the current account deficit was reduced to 
3.5% of the GDP, compared wit 12.6% in 1973 and an average of 10.4% between 1969 and 1972. 
Private foreign investment continued to taper off and short-term capital flows turned highly 
negative, but long-term credits received by both the public and private sectors offset most of this 
difference. The overall capacity to import climbed 17%, but the increase in import volume was 
limited to 3%. Consequently, international reserves climbed almost 50%. But in terms of the 
prevailing cost and level of imports, the improvement in reserves was appreciably less (see again 
table 11). 
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In spite of further large gains in export prices the 1974 turnaround began to lose impetus the 
following year, as an intensification of the principal adverse trends was accompanied by a marked 
reduction in export volume. 
In 1975 foreign direct investment became negative (as late as 1971 it had been equivalent to 
fully 11.3% of GDP), while payments of interest on the foreign debt doubled to almost US$ 44 
million, compared to a mere US$ 8 million just two years earlier. Furthermore, the flight of 
capital, which first became apparent the previous year, assumed considerable proportions. Never-
theless, net capital inflows reached a new high in nominal terms, owing mainly to the loans 
contracted by the public sector. In the meantime, the deficit on the trade account quadrupled, 
primarily because of a 20% plunge in export volume, but also because of another substantial rise in 
import prices and the persistence of the recession in tourism. The pronounced contraction in 
export volume, it will be recalled, reflected the decision of the bauxite corporations to slash 
production in response to the Bauxite Levy. 
Table 11 
JAMAICA: CAPACITY TO IMPORT, IMPORT VOLUME AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(1970 . 	 100) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
and services 112.7 106.7 129.0 122.3 100.8 99.3 106.2 103.4 104.3 
Purchasing power of net imports 
of capital (a) 72.9 80.3 74.4 98.6 38.8 (b) (b) 10.1 21.5 
Capacity to import 106.1 102.4 120.0 115.9 90.7 79.7 84.1 88.1 90.7 
Import volume (c) 114.1 113.9 117.7 126.7 106.0 82.1 87.0 91.6 91.9 
Gross international reserves (d) 97.8 59.2 75.4 52.7 15.8 18.8 20.1 20.9 27.5 
Gross international reserves/ 
imports (e) 2.4 1.5 1.8 1.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Current account deficit/ 
gross domestic product (f) 10.6 12.6 3.5 10.0 10.3 2.2 3.6 6.4 7.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Defined here in the difference between the global balance and the commercial balance plus the use made 
of IMF credit. (See the balance-of-payments data in table 15). 
(b) Less than zero 
(e) Goods and services. 
(d) Deflated by the price index of imported goods and services. 
(e) Months of imports of goods and services obtainable with the level of reserves and imports of each 
year. 
(f) At the prevailing rate of exchange. 
The deficit would have reached enormous proportions -or import volume would have had to 
be compressed- if it had not been for an additional 34% advance in export prices. Even so, 
however, the current account deficit rose from 3.5% to 10% of the GDP. 
While relatively less than the record 1973 deficit and even somewhat smaller than the 
1969/1972 average, the relation between the deficit and the structure of demand in 1975 was 
appreciably different from the one prevailing in the earlier period. Between the mid-1960s and 
early 1970s the large current account deficits were associated with high rates of both investment 
and savings, and this pattern reached its zenith when investment climbed to almost one-third and 
savings more than a quarter of the product in 1969 and 1970. Consumption was then around only 
70% of output. Between 1970 and 1974, however, the investment coefficient tapered off, while 
consumption rose to about 78% of the product, and in 1975 consumption climbed to 82.5% of the 
product, while savings fell to less than 15%. 
This shift in the allocation of income between consumption and savings is traceable to a 
substantial modification in the distribution of income in favour of wage earners, a surge in 
inflation to a rate well above nominal interest rates, and an expansionary fiscal policy. 
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One of its main effects was to maintain the demand for imports in spite of the evaporation of 
the large foreign investment inflows; that is to say, when investment declined, one of the factors 
that prevented the deficit on the current account from contracting was the stimulation of 
consumer demand for imports. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that 85% of the 
doubling of the current value of imports between 1971 and 1975 was accounted for by price 
inflation —at constant prices imports increased only 18%.' 
In 1975 the capacity to import contracted slightly more than 3%, but the volume of imports 
rose close to 8%. As a result gross international reserves dropped 30% to a level sufficient to cover 
only somewhat more than one month of imports (see again table 11). 
As 1976 unfolded, both the capacity to import and the payments position deteriorated 
steadily, and by the end of the year the authorities suspended foreign exchange transactions in 
order to avoid the total depletion of the gross reserves. 
In 1976 the full effects of the international recession were thus finally manifested in Jamaica's 
external sector, as foreign demand for the country's principal exports, including tourism, con-
tracted appreciably. The price of sugar, for instance, plunged 60%. At the same time, labour-
management disputes and technical problems in the bauxite/alumina sector reduced the supply of 
mineral exports, while domestic strife aggravated the depression in tourism. As a result of these 
circumstances the value of the exports of goods and services declined by US$ 166 million, or by 
more than 15%. 
In the meantime, a 50% jump in interest payments on the external debt and a cut-off of 
private transfers on the one hand, and a more than 50% reduction in net short and long-term 
capital inflows on the other, pushed the net contribution of total capital flows to the capacity to 
import close to zero. However, this heavy blow was partially offset by the use of IMF credit under 
the petroleum and compensatory facilities and loans from other official sources. 
The decline in exports and in capital flows translated into a drop of fully 22% in the overall 
capacity to import, and since the 17% reduction in import volume was somewhat less,'8 the global 
balance of pyaments suffered a record deficit of US$ 187 million, equivalent to 6.3%, of the GDP. 
The result was the virtual exhaustion of gross reserves: indeed, the net international reserves fell 
below zero. The current account deficit —10.3% of the GDP— was, on the other hand, similar to 
the one experienced in 1975. From this angle, the rundown of reserves appears as the counterpart 
of the pa ralyzation of commercial bank lending to Jamaica. In any case, the economy was squeezed 
between impending bankruptcy and an abrupt cutback in supply. The product decreased more than 
6% and gross national income dropped almost 11%. 
In the following year (1977) the precarious external payments situation improved considera-
bly, thanks mainly to a remarkable 23(„4" contraction in import volume, but also to a 15% 
increment in the current value of merchandise exports. The overall trade account in fact registered 
a surplus —the first one in the post World War II era. This performance, together with a partial 
recovery of private transfers, permitted reduction of the current account deficit to a level 
equivalent to 2.2% of the GDP. But the inflow of long and short-term capital once again decreased 
sharply, with the result that even this modest deficit entailed another, albeit small, deficit in the 
overall balance of payments. However, gross reserves rose slightly because of the use made of IMP 
credit. 
The enormous reduction in imports —which clearly bore the brunt of the attack on the 
crisis— was accomplished through a combination of severe controls, an incomes policy, increased 
taxes and devaluation. And in the second half of the year the Government added to its arsenal a 
programme of fiscal and monetary restraint under a two-year US$ 75 million stand-by agreement 
with the IMP. However, this accord was terminated in December and the scheduled US$ 15 million 
' 	 this connexion, it should be emphasized that these data are highly sensitive to the choice of the base year, which in 
this case is 1970, owing to the radical change in relative prices in 1974.11 the prices prevailing in 1974 are used, the quantum 
of imports did nor increase at all in this period. 
'The volume of merchandise imports was actually compressed by 20.5%. 
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credit instalment cancelled when one of the performance criteria was not met. This setback also 
held up the disbursement of a large World Bank loan and a loan package negotiated with a group of 
commercial banks. The interruption of this agreement thus largely explains why the dramatic 
turnaround in the current account was not accompanied by any improvement in the capital 
account. 
Most of the principal external aggregates evolved about the same in 1978 as they did in 1977. 
Thus, another surplus was achieved on the overall trade account, but once again the net movement 
of capital flows was negative, and the small current account deficit did not translate into a surplus 
on the overall balance of payments. In fact the deficit on the balance of payments widened. The 
small gain in gross reserves was made possible by the use of credit under a new agreement with the 
IMF. 
On the other hand, for the first time since 1974 the capacity to import did not contract, thanks 
mainly to a major recuperation by tourism, but also to a modest recovery of mineral exports. The 
small increment in import capacity was matched by an expansion in import volume, following the 
enormous contraction of the previous three years. 
In spite of a new downturn in the income terms of trade and an actual outflow of funds on the 
capital account, the country was able to augment import volume by an additional 5% in 1979 
without depleting the gross reserves, thanks to a large infusion of IMF credit. But as had occurred 
with the first accord, the Government failed to comply with one of the performance criteria arid 
the agreement was cancelled in December. 
In early March 1980, the negotiations for an interim one-year agreement with the IMF were 
deadlocked over the question of the extent of further budgetary cutbacks and the effects of these on 
employment. At this juncture, the Government received a report from the Ministry of Finance 
indicating that by September at the latest the country would be unable to comply with the net 
international reserves performance test (the same one it had failed to pass in December). In the 
light of this, and owing to the further unemployment the new accord would entail, the Govern-
ment resolved to break off the talks and call ...at-1y elections. The alternative short-term economic 
programme it adopted rested on a crucial assumption: that the existence of a balance of payments 
gap would bring forth the necessary finance. And, in fact, the course of events did accomodate to 
Jamaica's external financing requirements, without the IMF agreement: the inflow of funds on the 
capital account was not only sufficient to finance a current account deficit equal to 7.3% of GDP 
—the largest since 1976— but also to cover the repayments to the IMF and attain a surplus on the 
overall balance of payments for the first time since 1974. Furthermore, the net inflow on the 
capital account turned out to be the largest, in constant terms, since 1975: over three times the level 
of 1977, and over five times the level of 1978. As already mentioned, 1979 saw a net outflow. After 
accounting for the movements of IMF credit, the net flow in 1980 was still one-third larger than in 
1979, four-fifths larger than in 1978, and well over twice the 1977 one. 
(b) Merchandise trade 
(i) Exports. The improvement in the overall balance of payments in 1980 was in large part 
attributable to the performance of the bauxite sector. In effect, the total value of bauxite and 
alumina exports climbed over 29% (see table 12). While the volume of alumina exports climbed 
15% to its highest level since 1974, the chief factor here was the 39% leap in international prices 
(see table 13).'9 
 The evolution of the other main traditional exports was not favourable. The value 
'in this connexion it is of interest to note that bauxite is the mineral whose value has best stood up to the petroleum 
price onslaught. Between 1973 and 1980 the price of bauxite multiplied 3.5 times, while its relative international price rose 
almost four-fifths. It thus managed to retain about one-third of its value in terms of petroleum through 1980, with 1965 as 
the base year. If 1970 were chosen as the base, the deterioration is greater (over four-fifths). On the other hand, over the 
period 1974-1980 the price of bauxite in terms of petroleum did not decrease at all, in spite of the 1979/1980 round of 
petroleum price hikes. In the same period the price of tin in terms of petroleum declined close to one-third; and that of iron 
ore, over one-half. 
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of banana exports dwindled to US$ 10 million (from US$ 18 million in 1979), owing to the 
massive destruction of plantations by Hurricane Allen. For its part, the value of sugar exports 
expanded less than 1% notwithstanding the tripling of the international price of sugar and the 
23% adjustment of the EEC price. As has occurred for the last several years, Jamaica was unable to 
fulfill its quota with the EEC in 1980 and for this reason could not take advantage of the sharp rise 
in the free market price, the shortfall in production in 1980 being provoked by poor weather. 
Table 12 
JAMAICA: EXPORT OF GOODS, FOB 
Millions cf dollars 
Percentage 
breakdown Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1970 1980 1978 1979 1980 
Total 795 815 992 100.0 100.0 7.6 2.5 21.7 
Main traditional exports 649 639 810 75.8 81.7 8.7 -1.5 26.8 
Alumina 418 368 552 38.9 55.6 10.8 -12.0 50.0 
Bauxita 171 214 201 26.7 20.3 6.8 25.1 -6.1 
Sugar 60 57 57 10.2 5.8 - -5.0 - 
Other exports 146 176 182 24.2 18.3 12.1 20.5 3.4 
Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, 1980; and Jamaica Department of 
Statistics. External Trade, 1979. 
(ii) Imports. The value of imports (Cif) rose over 19% in 1980, or somewhat less than that of 
exports (see table 14). The sole cause of this movement was external inflation, inasmuch as the 
import quantum did not vary.20  In this respect, the outstanding development was, of course, the 
jump of two-thirds in the international price of petroleum. In last year's Survey some of the effects 
of the oil price revolution on the Jamaican economy were explored. Suffice it to recall here that the 
economy is very energy-intensive, due primarily to the energy consumption of the bauxite sector, 
while at the same time 99% of the island's commercial energy supply comes from imported oil. 
The further marked increase in the price of oil was thus a heavy blow, particularly in the light of 
the severe constraints operating on the availability of foreign exchange in the economy. The 
increase in the oil bill accounted for 70% of the rise in the value of imports, and absorbed 41.5'0: of 
total imports in 1980, against only 22.8% just two years before.21  
The substantially higher expenditures on food imports, for their part, were made necessary by 
the large reduction in agricultural production. 
Together, the much enlarged outlays for energy and food resulted in a cutback in the nominal 
expenditure for other imports (see again table 14). 
(iii) The terms of trade. In 1980 the terms of trade index, with 1970 as the base year, showed a 
gain of about 6%, and thus stood close to one-fourth higher than in 1970. On the other hand, it 
remained some 7% below the high registered in 1975 (see table 15).22 
"The volume of merchandise imports in fact dropped 7%. 
21 Petroleum and petroleum products make up virtually the entire value of mineral fuel imports. 
"As was discussed in connexion with the evolution of the import volume in the introduction to this section, the use of 
1970 as the base year results in a distortion of the post-1973 situation in countries in which petroleum constitutes a 
relatively larger share of exports or imports. In the case of Jamaica the evolution of the terms of trade would appear much 




JAMAICA: NOMINAL AND RELATIVE PRICES OF BAUXITE 
(1965 . 100) 
Year Nominal price Relative price 
Price of bauxite/ 
(a) 	 price of 
petroleum 
1966 112.6 107.1 112.6 
1967 130.4 119.1 130.4 
1968 133.7 116.8 136.8 
1969 131.6 109.4 136.8 
1970 131.6 103.2 134.7 
1971 153.8 113.9 123.9 
1972 165.5 115.9 115.8 
1973 188.4 120.3 92.8 
1974 223.3 123.7 30.4 
1975 327.0 159.5 40.6 
1976 364.2 159.3 42.1 
1977 418.7 161.5 44.9 
1978 429.9 145.2 45.0 
1979 473.9 142.3 37.1 
1980 659.8 178.8 30.6 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various volumes. 
(a) Nominal price deflated by world prices. 
Table 14 
JAMAICA: IMPORT OF GOODS, CIF 
Millions of Jamaica 
	 Percentage 
dollars 	 breakdown Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980 1970 1980 1978 1979 1980 
Total 865 1 	 003 1 	 196 100.0 100.0 10.4 16.0 19.3 
Food 169 130 192 17.2 16.1 26.1 
-23.5 48.2 
Mineral fuels 197 335 470 6.4 39.3 -12.2 70.3 40.2 
Manufactured goods 222 221 205 26.1 17.2 29.9 -0.3 -7.1 
Machinery and transport 
equipment 110 143 139 32.3 11.6 16.7 30.5 -2.9 
Other 167 174 190 18.0 15.8 7.0 4.1 9.2 
Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, 1980; and Jamaica, Department of 
Statistics, External Trade, 1979. 
(c) Services trade 
The modest surplus on trade in non-factor services was more than offset by the outflow in 
respect of profits and interest. Receipts from tourism stagnated in 1980, but other non-factor 
services showed a large expansion. In the meantime, remittances of profits climbed markedly, and 
exceeded US$ 100 million for the first time since the enactment of the Bauxite Levy, while interest 
payments on the debt continued to rise at a fast pace. The sum of profits and interest payments 
equalled an unprecedented 9.2% of the GDP in 1980. On the other hand, private transfers 
remained buoyant as Jamaicans residing overseas responded to the distress caused by Hurricane 
Allen. 
(d) The current account position and its financing 
The outcome of the movements on merchandise and services trade was an overall current 
account deficit of US$ 213 million, or 7.3% of the GDP (see table 16). This was the third successive 
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Table 15 
JAMAICA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1975 	 1976 
Annual growth rates 
1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Exports of goods 
Value 7.5 	 -18.4 15.2 4.5 2.5 21.8 
Volume -19.5 	 -10.4 2.2 2.5 -4.9 -9.1 
Unit value 33.6 	 -9.4 12.8 2.0 7.8 34.0 
Imports of goods 
Value 19.5 	 -18.4 -15.8 12.5 17.7 20.2 
Volume 5.2 	 -20.5 -20.5 4.8 5.9 -2.1 
Unit value 13.6 	 2.6 6.0 7.3 11.1 29.5 
Terms of trade 18.2 	 -11.6 6.4 -4.7 -2.9 6.4 
Indexes 	 (1970 	 = 	 100) 
Terms of trade 134.4 	 118.8 126.5 120.5 117.0 124.4 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 137.3 	 108.7 117.6 114.8 106.5 105.8 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
and services 122.3 	 100.8 99.3 106.2 103.4 104.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
year in which the current deficit increased both as a percentage of the product and in real terms, 
following its drastic reduction in 1977. But it remained modest in comparison to the ones sustained 
prior to 1977, when the average deficit equalled about 10% of the GDP. 
Complete information on the breakdown of the financing of the deficit in 1980 is not yet 
available. However, provisional data of the Bank of Jamaica reveal that net public sector borrowing 
amounted to US$ 120 million, or about 40% of the net inflow on the capital account. Precise 
figures on gross borrowing have yet to be published, but it may be mentioned that the Government 
raised well over US$ 100 million from various OPEC nations. Of this amount, US$ 50 million came 
from Libya, while USS 38 million represented advances under the Venezuelan petroleum loan 
facility." 
A significant proportion of the difference between the overall net movement of capital and 
the net borrowing of the public sector apparently originated from the parallel economy.24 
For the first time since 1974, a surplus was registered on the overall balance of payments. One 
half of this was absorbed by the debt with the IMF, while the other half was used to augment the 
gross reserves. However, the increase in gross reserves may be viewed as being offset by an 
increment of virtually the same amount in arrears. In any event, the extent of the expansion of 
arrears was less than 40% of that originally anticipated. 
(e) External indebtedness 
Following an expansion of two-fifths between 1977 and 1979, the external debt outstanding 
rose by 7.5% to slightly more than US$ 1 600 million in 1980,25 but after allowing for the increase 
"Bank of Jamaica, Reporl and ,Statement of Accounti, 1980, Kingston, 1981. 
"Estimates of the size of the parallel economy vary widely, but there is general agreement that the foreign exchange it 
generates made an important contribution to financing the observed current account deficit. Strictly speaking, these 
foreign exchange inflows are payments for illicit exports. Hence, the current account deficit was in fact less than the 
recorded one by an amount equal to the value of these exports. 
''Note that the external debt as defined in table 17 excludes public and State- guaranteed debt having a maturity of less 
than one year and private debt not guaranteed by the State. In 1980 the debt on thee accounts totalled approximately 
USS 200 million. 
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Table 16 
JAMAICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Exports of goods and services 
	 1 030 1 099 933 979 1 122 1 208 1 	 492 
Goods FOB 752 808 660 760 795 815 992 
Services 	 (b) 278 291 273 219 327 393 500 
Transport and insurance 60 74 77 69 100 114 150 
Travel 133 129 106 72 147 195 198 
Imports of goods and services 	 1 079 1 307 1 	 126 929 1 056 1 228 1 	 511 
Goods FOB 811 970 791 667 750 883 1 	 061 
Services 	 (b) 268 337 335 262 306 345 450 
Transport and insurance 162 193 171 148 182 203 300 
Travel 21 52 59 12 10 11 10 
Trade balance -49 -208 
-193 50 66 -20 -19 
Profits and interest -68 -103 -116 -138 -178 -203 -267 
Profits 
-47 
-59 -50 -38 -92 -82 -115 
Interest 
-21 -44 -66 -100 -86 -121 -152 
Unrequited private transfer payments 34 23 2 15 15 70 73 
Balance on current account -83 -288 -307 
-73 -97 -153 -213 
Unrequited official transfer payments -9 5 4 5 10 10 9 
Long-term capital 226 228 144 46 -32 -9 ... 
Direct investment 23 -2 - -7 -27 -26 
Portfolio investment -1 -4 4 - - - 
Other long-term capital 204 234 140 53 -5 17 
Official sector (c) 107 154 129 48 172 71 
Loans received 119 159 160 96 275 174 
Amortization payments -7 -4 -29 -47 -104 -111 
Commercial banks (c) - - - - - 
Loans received - - - - - 
Amortization payments - - - - - - 
Other sectors (c) 97 80 11 5 -177 -54 
Loans received 89 115 57 33 - 
Amortization payments -14 -21 -29 -37 -177 -54 
Basic balance 134 -55 -159 -22 -119 -152 
Short-term capital -49 95 9 56 40 1 
Official sector 5 26 48 -9 - 
Commercial banks -12 2 5 - 5 3 
Other sectors -42 67 -44 65 35 -2 ... 
Errors and omissions -15 -83 -34 -48 26 -15 287 
Counterpart items (d) -3 9 -3 2 -3 3 
Global balance 67 -34 -187 -12 56 -163 83 
Total variation in reserves (- sign 
indicates an increase) -67 34 187 12 56 163 -83 
Monetary gold - - - - - - - 
Special Drawing Rights 2 1 4 -16 12 5 1 
IMF reserve position - - - - - - 
Foreign exchange assets -62 58 88 3 -19 -8 -41 
Other assets -7 -25 31 3 - ... 
Use made of IMF credit - - 64 22 63 166 -42 
Source: 1975-1979: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, (magnetic tape, 
March 1981); 1980: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Services also include other official and private transactions, but exclude profits and 
interest. 
(c) In addition to loans received and amortization payments made, this entry includes net loans 
granted and other assets and liabilities. 
(d) Includes counterpart items in respect of monetization or demonetization of gold, allocation 
or settlement of Special Drawing Rights, and variations due to revaluation. 
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in gross reserves, the net position registered an increase of less than 5 %.26 Owing to the modest 
increment in money terms and to an acceleration in international inflation, the external debt 
decreased --for the first time in a decade by 12% at constant prices. It also declined in relation to 
the product: from 62.4% to 55.3% at the prevailing rate of exchange, and from 53.4% to 48.1% at 
the real rate of exchange. This was also the first year since the 1960s in which the debt/product 
ratio fell. 
Measured in terms of the exports of p pids and services, the burden of debt service lessened for 
the second consecutive year, thanks to both the expansion of exports and to an interruption in the 
growth of debt payments. On the other hand, interest on the debt continued to absorb an even 
larger proportion of the GDP, due mainly to the persistent contraction of the product (see 
table 17). 
Table 17 
JAMAICA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1 970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
Debt (b) 
	
(millions of US dollars) 129 210 354 528 706 965 1 052 1 	 236 1 	 495 1 607 
Gross reserves (millions of US dollars) 139 160 127 190 126 32 48 59 63 105 
Debt index (1970 = 	 100) 
Current prices 100 163 274 409 547 748 816 958 1 	 159 1 	 246 
Constant prices 100 155 242 267 409 543 556 609 667 585 
Debt/gross domestic product 
Prevailing rate of exchange 9.2 11.7 18.5 22.1 24.6 32.3 38.7 49.1 62.4 55.3 
Real rate of exchange (c) 9.2 11.6 17.6 23.5 27.3 38.3 39.0 44.0 53.4 48.1 
Debt service (percentages) (d) 
Exports (e) 0.5(f) 1.4 3.6 4.1 7.3 13.3 22.2 25.1 24.2 21.7 
Gross domestic product (g) 0.4(f) 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.5 2.2 3.7 3.4 5.0 5.2 
Debt sources 
Official lenders 41.0 37.1 36.2 29.9 27.8 41.9 45.6 53.8 66.8 68.9 
International organizations 22.7 16.6 11.0 7.9 7.7 7.8 9.6 12.8 13.2 16.6 
IMF _ 4.2 3_1 2.2 8.3 10.2 14.6 23.5 19.2 
Governments 18.3 20.5 21.0 18.9 17.9 25.8 25.8 26.4 30.1 33.1 
Private lenders 58.6 62.9 63.8 70.1 72.2 58.1 54.4 46.2 33.2 31.1 
Debt uses 
Interest 56.5 22.0 10.6 16.2 24.0 20.7 43.1 24.0 23.6 68.6 
Amortization 43.5 90.9 12.2 14.8 14.6 21.7 56.9 41.4 28.3 32.4 
Investment 25.8 54.3 16.1 61.4 - 34.4 34.1 - 
Consumption 20.3 22.9 52.9 57.6 
1-1(.-; 
- 
Average rate of interest verage  8.3 8.2 9.7 9.5 7.7 ... 
Average maturity 	 (h) 	 (years) 9.4 12.8 15.9 11.5 14.3 15.2 17.6 17.7 12.2 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data proviOod by the World Bank, INF and the Bank ob 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Disbursed public and State-guaranteed, priv .te debt and use make of IMF credit. 
(o) Trade weighted. 
(d) From the balance of payments. 
(e) Amortization and interest payments an i pr ,rtion of exports of goods and her 
(f) Receipts. 
(g) Interest payments as a proportion of grout:_ 	 32 tie product. 
(h) On commitments of each year. 
The main developments affecting the external debt situation in 1980 includeu Inc break-off of 
talks with the IMF, the conclusion of an emergency agreement with the country's commercial 
creditors, and an upturn in the flow of credits from official sources other than the IMF 
The March decision to terminate negotiations for a new accord with the IMF not only closed 
the door to the additional use of IMF credits, but entailed a reduction in the outstanding obligations 
with the Fund over the course of the year, and this accounted for the slowdown in the growth of the 
251t should, however, be recalled that the increase in gross reserves in 1980 was achieved by allowing arrears ' 
accumulate. The total of US$ 120 million in arrears at year's end exceeded the holding of gross reserves. 
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external debt in 1980. Thus, whereas Jamaica received IMF credits totalling US$ 73 million in 1978, 
and US$ 171 million in 1979, it effected amortizations of US$ 43 million on this account in 1980 
(see table 18). 
The Government managed, however, to augment net borrowing from other sources by an 
amount sufficient to cover repayments on its debt with the Fund and make up for most of the 
hypothetical inflow that would have been available had a new arrangement been reached with the 
Fund.2' 
Table 18 
JAMAICA: USE OF IMF CREDIT (a) 
(Millions of US dollars) 
Credit tranche drawings, 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
ordinary - - 23 25 16 7 
Compensatory drawings 16 46 48 62 98 94 





Extended facility, ordinary 
- - 55 102 87 
Extended facility suplementary 
- - 
- 103 99 
Oil 	 facility drawings - 34 36 38 31 21 
Total 16 80 107 180 351 308 
Net yearly flow 64 27 73 171 -43 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. 34, May 1981. 
(a) Cumulative totals. 
The principal factors involved here were the temporary scheme to refinance the public and 
State-guaranteed debt owed to foreign commercial banks, and an increase in loans from official 
lenders. 
In mid-1979 the Government had negotiated an accord with the banks to postpone 87.5% of 
the principal payments falling due between April 1979 and April 1981. The deferred sum was 
converted into a 3.5 year loan, with payment commencing in April 1982 but the existence of the 
agreement depended on Jamaica's compliance with the following conditions: (i) the amortization 
of the balance of the debt as it matured; (ii) the timely cancellation of interest charges on the entire 
debt; and (iii) the satisfaction of the quarterly performance criteria under the IMF agreement then 
in force, which was scheduled to last until April 1981. Consequently, the refinancing arrangement 
was placed in jeopardy when Jamaica failed the performance tests in December 1979, and the 
Government's decision to end negotiations for an interim agreement with the Fund in March was 
tantamount to the repudiation of the arrangement. Nevertheless, in April the Government 
persuaded the bankers' bargaining team (Steering Committee of Bankers) to allow the refinancing 
'-The use of the term -hypothetical- stems from the fact that the receipt of the full amount (US$ 135 million) of the 
credit under the agreement being discussed in early 1980 with the IMF would have been contingent on the fulfillment of 
certain performance tests over the course of the year. However, as noted previously, the Ministry of Finance authorities 
were convinced that one or more of the tests would be failed by September at the latest. And in this connexion it should also 
be reemphasized that the magnitude of the net borrowing that actually materialized could have been less if an agreement 
had been concluded with the Fund. The bibliography on theitde-Jamaica relationship in the period under review is lengthy. 
The principal sources consulted here include: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts (especially 1978, 1979 
and 1980); R.L. Bernal, -Transnational Commercial Banks, The International Monetary Fund and Capitalist Crisis in 
Jamaica 1972-1980" (paper presented at the Conference on Finance Capital and Dependence in the Transnational Phase: A 
Latin American Perspective, Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales y Centro de Estudios Economicos y 
Sociales del Tercer Mundo, Mexico City, March 4-7 1980; N. Girvan, R.L. Bernal and W. Hughes "The IMF and the Third 
World: The case of Jamaica 1974-1980-, Development Dialogue, 1980:2; G.R. Kincaid, "Fund aids Jamaica to restart its 
economic growth'', cue Survey, 22 December 1980, and -Conditionality and the use of Fund resources, Jamaica", IMF, 
Finance and Development. June 1981, Vol. 18, No. 2; People's National Party "The Way Forward. An Alternative 
Self-Reliance Economic Path Prepared by the People's National Party", Kingston, Mimeo, 1980. 
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scheme to remain in force, subject to monthly reviews and the payment of interest charges on 
deferred debt each month instead of every six months, and in September the Steering Committee 
agreed to the suspension of all debt amortization for the rest of the year. The deferred loans were 
rolled over on a monthly basis. 
The previous and revised schemes permitted a reduction in principal payments totalling 
more than US$ 62 million in comparison to the previous year. These temporary savings, together 
with the increase in loan receipts from official lenders, equalled over 90% of the IMF credits 
extended to Jamaica in 1979, and amounted to almost four times the repayments made to the Fund 
in 1980. On the other hand, the inflow of capital from formal sources did in fact fall short of the 
level the authorities sought, and given the rise in interest rates, turned out to be insufficient to 
cover the servicing of the debt in spite of the decrease in amortization (see again table 17). The 
injection of foreign exchange from informal sources more than offset this gap. In the case of 
central government finances, however, the shortfall  placed the burden of the financing of the large 
fiscal deficit on the domestic banking system. 
The evolution of various aspects of the external debt over the course of the 1970/1980 period 
is traced in table 17. As may be seen, in 1970 Jamaica was in an unusual position for a middle-
income country: it was a net creditor with the rest of the world. This situation turned around in 
1972, however, and between that year and 1976 the external debt multiplied 4.6 times in nominal 
terms (and 3.5 times at constant prices ) while the gross international reserves plunged by 
four-fifths; the debt/GDP ratio climbed from 11.6% to 38.3% at the real rate of exchange; and 
amortization and interest payments as a share of exports leaped from 1.4% to 13.3%. Subse-
quently, the growth of the debt slowed markedly: it rose two-thirds between 1976 and 1980 in 
nominal terms and merely 8% at constant prices, while in the meantime holdings of gross reserves 
increased. However, the debt climbed from 38.3% to 48.1% as a proportion of the product, and 
interest on the debt absorbed more than 5',% of the GDP in 1980, versus 2.2% in 1976 (and 0.1 cy  in 
1972). 
In the first period, running from 1972 to 1975, the most important factor in the expansion of 
the debt was the stepped-up central government investment programme. Initially, this pro-
gramme, as well as the decision to finance an important part of it through foreign borrowing, arose 
mainly as a response to the end of the investment cycle in the mining sector. Also of importance, 
however, was the expansion of social programmes on the one hand, and the attractive external 
debt terms available to the country, on the other. Subsequently, the progressive enlargement of the 
budget became a reaction to the generalized downturn in investment and in the overall level of 
activity. The appeal of financing a substantial proportion of the growing fiscal deficit from 
external sources was reinforced by the intensification of balance of payments problems. Thus, 
almost 53% of the increase in the external debt between 1972 and 1975 went to finance part of the 
capital expenditure programme of the central government. The other half of the growth of the 
debt was divided between financing diverse investment projects in the rest of the public sector and 
hotel expansion in the private sector.2 ' While the foreign borrowing that took place in this poeriod 
was thus channelled into ivnestment, an analysis of the destination of the almost five-fold increase 
in the external debt from the perspective of the expenditure patern of the economy as a whole 
reveals a different picture. As may be observed in table 17, the implied distribution of the 
increment in debt shows that around one-fifth of it went into consumption in 1972 and 1973, while 
in 1974 fully one-half of the total external loans received financed current consumption. On the 
other hand, in 1975 all net borrowing financed investment.2  
"These private debts were guaranteed by the public sector under a programme implemented by the previous 
administration to encourage the expansion of capacity in tourism. 
2 'The analysis of the uses of debt follows from the observations that interest and amortization have the first claims on 
loans receipts and that ear-part, net borrowing finances consumption to the extent that it exceeds the increase in 
investment (as occurred in 1972 through 197•4). 
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The following year —one of profound crisis for the economy— marked the end of the period 
of rapid growth of the external debt and the beginning of the one in which the central government 
used foreign loans to help finance its current expenditures. For the 1976/1980 period as a whole, 
the accumulated current deficit exceeded total available foreign financing to the central govern-
ment by 54.5 %.3° In only one year, 1978, were foreign loan receipts sufficient both to cover the gap 
on the current account and to finance an appreciable proportion of capital expenditures. 
As far as the overall economy was concerned, the results were mixed. Thus, in 1976, when the 
GDP dropped by more than 6% and gross national income by almost 11%, over half of the large 
increment in the foreign debt was diverted to consumption. In 1977 the total net borrowing was in 
fact slightly less than the interest charge on the past debt. In 1978 and 1979, on the other hand, 
somewhat more than one-third of the much enlarged inflow was devoted to investment. In this 
connexion, it is interesting to juxtapose the reallocation of private expenditure in favour of 
investment in 1978 and especially in 1979, with the emphasis placed by the Government on the 
maintenance of current consumption, and to compare this pattern with the one that emerged in 
1972/1974, when the increase in public investment was accompanied by the eventual diversion of 
an appreciable share of foreign loan receipts to consumption purposes in the private sector. 
From the very outset commercial banks constitute the principal source of Jamaica's foreign 
borrowing, and by 1975 private lenders held over 72% of the country's outstanding foreign debt 
(see again table 17). This distribution of course raised the average rate of interest and shortened 
the maturity structure of the debt in comparison to one in which greater reliance is placed on 
official sources. Furthermore, it appears that the rate of growth of the external debt in the first half 
of the decade was so rapid that it exceeded the ability of the public sector to prepare projects fast 
enough to take advantage of the lower cost financing that otherwise could have been requested 
from official lenders. In any event, in what was both a reaction to the economic crisis and a factor 
which severely aggravated it, the foreign banks ceased all lending to Jamaica in 1976, and over the 
course of the ensuing four years their principal aim was the repatriation of their investments in the 
country. 
In 1976 Jamaica applied for and received access to the IMF's oil facility and compensatory 
drawing scheme (available in order to deal with shortfalls in export earnings). All told, it obtained 
US$ 64 million from the Fund that year (see table 18). These resources, together with the loans 
acquired from other official lenders (including US$ 55 million from Trinidad and Tobago), 
temporarily counterbalanced the interruption of commercial bank lending. Nevertheless, by 
December of 1976 the deterioration in the external payments situation had reached the point 
where the authorities were forced to close the foreign exchange market in order to avoid the 
imminent exhaustion of liquid reserves. Following on-and-off negotiations with the IMF and the 
adoption of a series of measures to confront the economic crisis, the government and the IMF 
reached agreement in August on a two-year stand-by arrangement. Under this accord Jamaica 
would have access to US$ 75 million, or 121% of its Fund quota (but only 1.4% of its GDP), over 
the course of a two-year period, provided it satisfied the performance criteria used to assess the 
progress of the stabilization programme to be adopted.31 However, after just one disbursement 
this stand-by arrangement was suspended in December when Jamaica failed to meet the perfor-
mance test relating to the net domestic assets of the Bank of Jamaica. Thus the country actually 
obtained a much smaller amount of IMF credit than in 1976, when the use of the compensatory and 
oil facilities in fact had not entailed any binding conditionality. Furthermore, this failure under-
mined a potential loan package with a group of commercial banks and postponed disbursements 
from a sizeable World Bank loan. Finally, the Government was unable to mobilize additional 
support of any magnitude from bilateral sources. In consequence, and despite the sacrifices 
'"The sum of ordinary and extraordinary foreign borrowing by the Government was slightly greater than the current 
deficit in the central government's budget. However, the extraordinary receipts (the IMF credits), were not directly available 
to fund the Government's budget deficits. 
"The specific policies and performance tests adopted under this and ensuing agreements are described in the final 
section of this survey. 
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entailed in the reduction of the current account deficit from 10.3% to 2.2% of the GDP, only a 
marginal improvement in the overall balance of payments was obtained, since the total amount of 
borrowing was not quite sufficient to cover amortization and interest payments (see again 
table 17). 
Following another prolonged round of strenuous bargaining a new agreement was put into 
place in May of the following year. This rime Jamaica would have the option of purchasing 
SDR 200 million (then about USS 2.10 million) uncle, a three-year Extended Fund Facilitiesd 
(FM. In exchange, the country's authorities were to adopt a package of drastic measures designed 
to turn the economy around. As usual, the release of credits would depend on the progress of the 
stabilization programme as measured by the results of the performance tests. 
The yearly installment available under the EFF worked out at 3.2% of the GDP, or well over 
twice the proportion available in the previous agreement, but still much too modest an amount to 
restore the quantum of imports to the level obtaining prior to the balance of payments crisis, or 
even to the depressed volume of 1976.3  Consequently, it was clear that an additional and very 
substantial sum of external resources was needed to arrest the contraction of output and facilitate 
the growth of exports, and considerable efforts, including in particular the FEE itself, were 
undertaken by the Government and the Rif to attract this support. Mainly as a result of these, the 
Caribbean Group for Co-operation in Economic Development was founded in June 1978. At this 
time Jamaica received loan pledges totalling about US$ 54 million from donor countries and it also 
benefited from a US$ 30 million programme loan from the World Bank. On the other hand, the 
response of the private international financial community was less than expected, as it was limited 
to the refinancing of 87.5% of the public and State-guaranteed debt. No new loans were obtained, 
and as a result net borrowing from this source was negative. The total response (exclusive of IMF 
credits) amounted to US$ 107.4 million on a net basis in 1978. This was equivalent to 4.0% of the 
GDP, a somewhat greater proportion than the one absorbed by interest payments on the external 
debt. 
In 1978 the balance of payments showed some improvement over 1977, in spite of a 
deterioration of the terms of trade and a sharp upturn in profit remittances, as it was possible to 
augment import volume by 6%. and maintain the current account deficit at about the same modest 
level as in 1977, while decreasing arrears and increasing marginally the gross reserves. Notwith-
standing this, and the satisfaction of the various performance criteria of the stabilization pro-
gramme in both September and December, the economy continued to deteriorate, and indeed the 
rate of decline was in fact steeper than in 1977. Import volume needed to be raised much more, and 
in the absence of a dramatic turnaround in exports or the materialization of a massive foreign 
investment project, this meant that the country needed to obtain access to a much larger amount of 
external finance. But this was not to be the case. 
Events in the first half of 1979 unfolded along a similar course. The quarterly performance 
tests were met, import volume rose moderately without leading to a reduction in reserves, and the 
economy continued to contract but at an even faster pace. In June the Government and the IMF 
agreed to modify various aspects of the stabilization programme in the light of the obtained and 
pending results. Simultaneously, Jamaica was able to benefit from a recent liberalization of the 
limits on the use of IMF credit. Thus, during the final two years of the EFT, Jamaica would be eligible 
to draw US$ 340 million from the Fund instead of US$ 160 million. In addition, US$ 80 million 
was to be disbursed in the first two months. The level of financing in the June 1979 to June 1980 
period would have been equivalent to 7.1% of the 1979 GDP. 
Even this greatly expanded availability of IMF credit did not provide the full amount of 
support required to halt the decline of the economy, but it was hoped and expected that it would 
induce complementary flows from other sources. In particular, it was believed that the private 
"Between June and December of 1978 the Fund provided an additional USS 14 million under the Compensatory 
Financing Facility. In 1978, Jamaica made use of USS 7 S million in IMF credits, an amount equivalent to 2.9'7 of the GDP (see 
again table 18). 
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international financial community would reconsider its lending policy. These expectations were 
also based on Jamaica's observance of the performance criteria during the first year of the EFF. 
Finally, as it had done the year before, the IMF supported the Government's efforts to acquire 
additional external finance. The results were disappointing, however. Other official lenders 
stepped-up their lending, but the foreign banks elected to continue to withdraw their existing debt 
from the country. In June the previous refinancing agreement, with some minor alterations, was 
extended for the remainder of the EFF programme.33 However, in September the banks rejected 
Jamaica's proposal to carry out a refinancing of its entire commercial debt and provide a new loan 
package of US$ 200 million. This setback together with a series of new blows to the economy, 
including the severe floods, the new round of oil price hikes, an increase in interest rates and the 
paralyzation of bauxite mining for a lengthy period in the second half of the year, not only made 
unavoidable the continued disintegration of the economy, but paved the way for the failure of the 
performance tests in December and the cutting-off of the IMF resources. 
(1) Exchange rate regimes 
Table 19 shows various indexes of nominal and real exchange rates for the Jamaican dollar in 
the 1960-1980 period. The first is based on the United States dollar and United States prices; the 
second on the SDR and the price level of industrialized countries; and the third, on the currencies 
and prices of Jamaica's trade partners.34 
Until 1970, all of the real exchange rate indexes moved in the same direction. Between 1960 
and 1965 the Jamaican dollar became overvalued, especially in relation to the US dollar, owing to 
the faster pace of domestic inflation. On a trade-weighted basis the degree of overvaluation was 
less, and amounted to only 5% over the course of the five-year period. Subsequently, the real rate of 
exchange rose, and in 1968 soared well above 100 in each index. Here the principal factor was the 
devaluation of the English pound sterling, to which the Jamaican dollar was then linked by law. 
Between that year and 1970 the real exchange rate declined somewhat, but remained slightly 
undervalued. In 1971 there was a parting of ways between the US dollar index, on the one hand, 
and the SDR and trade-weighted indexes, on the other. Thus, the real exchange rate as measured in 
terms of US dollars and prices continued to drop, and in 1972 fell below 100, but measured in terms 
of SDRs and on a trade-weighted basis, it went in the opposite direction, and in 1972 it approached 
120 on the SDR index and 102 on the trade-weighted one. These contrasting movements took place 
within the context of the international monetary crisis of 1971. Following the abandonment of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement and half a year of "controlled floating", the world's major currencies 
were realigned in the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971. During this period of uncer-
tainty in the international monetary system Jamaica moved to break the legal tie that bound its 
currency to the pound sterling, but elected to continue to link its dollar with the pound for the time 
being. As a result, the revaluation of the pound against the US dollar led to a proportionate 
revaluation of the Jamaican dollar with respect to the US dollar. This appreciation amounted to 
somewhat less than 2% in 1971 and somewhat more than 2% in 1972, and translated into a 
similar decline in the real exchange rate in 1971 and one of 3.5% in 1972, in terms of US dollars 
and prices. On a trade-weighted basis the nominal exchange rate of the Jamaican currency varied a 
mere 1% between 1970 and 1972, because its revaluation in terms of US dollars was virtually 
counterbalanced by its depreciation in relation to the currencies of other trade partners. In terms of 
the SDR, however, it experienced a considerable net depreciation. These results were accompanied 
by increases in the respective real exchange rates (see again table 19). 
Against a background of growing stress in the balance of payments, and the marked 
instability of the pound sterling, in January 1973 the authorities decided to devalue the Jamaican 
"In 1978 the banks had provided fresh loans to cover the amortization of 87.5% of the debt maturing that year, but in 
1979 this was changed to deferment of the amortization of the same 87.5% of maturing loans, no new loans being 
provided. 
"See the notes to table 19 for greater details. 
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Table 19 
JAMAICA: EVOLUTION OF NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
(1960 =100) 
Jamaica dollars per 
Year 
US$(a) 
Nominal exchange rate indexes 
SDR(b) 	 EW(c) 
	
IW(d) TW(e) US$(a) 
Real exchange rate indexes (f) 
SDR(b) 	 EW(c) 	 IW(d) TW(e) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1965 100.0 100.0 98.9 97.7 98.3 92.3 97.6 95.8 94.3 95.1 
1966 100.0 100.0 98.8 97.7 98.3 93.2 98.7 97.2 95.5 96.4 
1967 102.5 116.2 100.9 99.9 100.4 95.3 114.8 99.4 97.6 98.5 
1968 116.7 116.2 110.6 139.3 110.0 106.8 112.4 106.9 104.8 105.9 
1969 116.7 116.2 111.1 109.6 110.3 105.9 111.0 105.9 103.7 104.8 
1970 116.7 116.2 111.5 110.2 110.9 102.1 106.7 102.9 100.1 101.5 
1971 117.7 119.1 110.5 109.4 110.0 100.1 111.0 103.1 100.4 101.8 
1972 117.0 129.5 109.8 109.5 109.7 96.6 119.6 103.3 101.0 102.2 
1973 127.3 153.5 126.8 127.3 127.1 97.4 127.2 107.3 106.0 106.7 
1974 127.3 155.8 126.2 126.1 126.2 86.8 117.4 96.3 94.7 95.5 
1975 127.3 149.0 125.7 124.8 125.3 80.8 106.0 92.7 90.0 91.4 
1976 127.3 147.9 120.1 119.0 119.6 78.0 103.4 87.1 84.3 85.7 
1977 153.9 167.5 143.9 143.3 143.6 90.2 114.4 102.3 99.2 100.8 
1978 208.6 313.8 198.4 202.8 200.6 97.4 176.1 113.8 112.9 113.4 
1979 247.4 328.6 241.3 246.7 244.0 99.5 155.2 119.4 118.1 118.8 
1980 249.5 318.1 258.7 261.9 260.3 89.8 125.4 118.6 115.7 117.2 
(a) United States dollar. 
(b) Special Drawing Right unit. 
(c) Weighted by export shares, 1968/1972, as follows (in percentages): United States 46.3; Great 
Britain 25.1; Canada 10.6, Norway 9.4; Sweden 2.9; Trinidad and Tobago 1.4; Bahamas 1.2; 
Guyana 0.8; West Germany 0.6, Barbados C.6; Netherlands 0.5; Japan 0.4; and Switzerland 
0.2 (note that the remnant was allocated proportionately to the top five export markets.) 
(d) Weighted by import shares, 1968/1972 as follows (in percentages): United States 43.6; Great 
Britain 22.4; Canada 9.1; Venezuela 5.?; West Germany 3.6; Japan 2.7; New Zealand 2.0; 
Australia 1.8; Trinidad and Tobago 1.7; France 1.6; Italy 1.4; Netherlands 1.3; Belgium 0.8; 
Hong Kond 0.8; Switzerland 0.7; Sweden -6; Norway 0.3; and Guyana 0.3 (note that the remnant 
was allocated proportionately to the top five import suppliers). 
(e) Weighted by shares in overall trade. See (c) and (d) above. 
(r) Nominal exchange rates (columns 1 through 5) divided by the relevant relative price 
indexes (i.e., Jamaica prices with respect to United States prices, etc.). 
dollar with respect to all currencies and fix its new value in terms of US dollars. One month later a 
10% devaluation of the US dollar was announced, and the Jamaican currency thus experienced a 
further devaluation 	 rit currencies other than the US dollar or ones pegged to the dollar. 
These developments translated into increases in the nominal exchange rate of almost 14% in 
terms of US dollars, of 16% in the trade-weighted index, and of close to 19% in terms of SDRs. 
However, the real exchange rate vis-Y ric the US dollar rose less than 1%, remaining only slightly 
overvalued. On the other hand, in terms of both SDRs and the basket of currencies of the country's 
trade partners, the Jamaican dollar rose appreciably in 1973 -the fourth straight year in which 
both of these indexes recorded increases. 
In 1973 the three indexes thus varied considerably: the US one equalled 97.4, the SDR one, 
127.2, and the trade-weighted one, 106.7. This last index was made up of 107.3 on the export side 
and 106.0 on the import one. 
Between early 1973 and mid-1977 the authorities elected to leave the Jamaican dollar fixed (at 
US$ 0.909), in spite of a notable acceleration of domestic inflation relative to inflation in all of the 
country's principal export and import markets except Great Britain. Consequently, each of the real 
exchange rate indexes declined systematically, and by 1976 the Jamaican currency was seriously 
overvalued, both in terms of US dollars and on a trade-weighted basis. It remained slightly 
overvalued vis-?i-ris the SDR, but the extent of the fall in the real exchange rate since 1973 was 
virtually the same in this case as in the others. 
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In April 1977 a dual exchange regime was introduced. The existing rate, now called the basic 
rate, was retained for transactions involving the Government, the bauxite sector, essential 
consumer goods and intermediate inputs. A devalued or "special rate" was applied to all others. As 
a result, the average real exchange rate vis- - i'is the US dollar was raised by almost 16%; 
the SDR, by about 11%; and on a trade-weighted basis by a proportion approaching 18%.35 
The currency remained overvalued (by an average of 10%) with respect to the US dollar, but 
the dual regime effectively eliminated the full extent of the overvaluation of the trade-weighted 
exchange rate. It remained, however, about 6% below the high registered in 1973. The degree of 
overvaluation with respect to the SDR returned to a level close to that prevailing in the early 1970s 
(see again table 19). In January 1978 the basic rate was devalued by 13.6% and the special rate by a 
further 5.2%. This devaluation followed the breakdown of the IMF Stand-by Arrangement in 
December, and constituted a prelude to the protracted negotiations for an Extended Fund Facility 
Agreement (EFF) in the first half of 1978. As part of the EFF accord that was finally concluded in 
May, Jamaica was to unify the basic and special exchange rates and undertake an immediate further 
devaluation of 25%. Moreover, the authorities agreed to devalue the currency an additional 15% 
over the course of the first year of the EFF programme. These devaluations were adopted at the 
insistence of the IMF. The Fund maintained that they were necessary in order to restore a 
competitive correspondance between domestic and international input and output prices and 
hence, to re-establish the balance between the supply of and demand for external resources. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the deterioration of the external payments situation and the 
reticense of the international financial community had reached such proportions that the mea-
sures to be taken should be immediate and drastic: hence the 25% devaluation. A restrictive 
incomes policy, deflation of the fiscal budget and curtailment of the growth of the money supply 
were also undertaken in order to ensure the effectiveness of the devaluation and to strike a balance 
between supply and demand in the economy as a whole. In this scenario, the expected increases in 
exports and capital inflows, together with the large injection of credit from the EFF, would permit 
an increase in import volume consistent with economic recovery and a surplus in the overall 
balance of payments. 
In response to the questions that arise here, it should first be re-emphasized that the dual 
exchange regime had the effect of restoring the cost/price competitiveness of the economy in 
relation to its trade partners as a group. The additional devaluation in January 1978 measurably 
reinforced this situation. However, the Jamaican currency did remain overvalued in US dollars. 
From this angle, the May devaluation only appears appropriate insofar as the US dollar is 
concerned. On a trade-weighted basis, it was clearly excessive, as may be seen by reference to 
table 19.36 
To the extent that the devaluation was in fact superfluous, it merely engendered inflation. 
Hence, the most relevant question are : Did the medicine lead to a cure? How did exports and the 
overall balance of payments evolve in the wake of the May and ensuing devaluations? 
With regard to exports, the most germane concept is their net change, in constant prices. The 
sole available measure here is the foreign exchange budget of the Bank of Jamaica, because it is the 
only gauge of the amount of foreign exchange actually returned to the economy by sales abroad. On 
the other hand, its use does introduce a source of bias, inasmuch as not all of the foreign exchange 
circulating in the economy necessarily passes through the Bank of Jamaica. 
An examination of the foreign exchange budget shows the following. Returns from merchan-
dise exports declined over 7% in current prices between 1977 and 1978. In constant prices the 
decline was 9%. This decrease reflects the reduction in foreign exchange receipts from bauxite and 
alumina exports. The gross value of bauxite and alumina exports in fact rose, but the devaluation 
lowered the domestic costs of production in terms of foreign currency. Consequently, the bauxite 
"These figures refer to the difference between annual averages for 1976 and 1977. 
"The May and subsequent mini-devaluations, together with the depreciation of the US dollar vii-'4"-vis major 
currencies, translated into a leap in the real exchange index in SDR, of fully 54% (to 176) in 1978. In terms of the major 
markets of the world, Jamaica's goods and services thus became extremely undervalued. 
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companies returned less foreign exchange to the economy. On the other hand, the net receipts 
from tourism climbed over 36%. Nevertheless, the May and later devaluations were accompanied 
by an overall decline of 3.5 %, in the net receipts from the exports of goods and services in 1978. In 
1979, the net returns from merchandise exports rose 3% in current prices but fell 3.4% in constant 
prices. However, the net receipts from the total exports of goods and services increased somewhat 
less than 5% thanks to the further 10% expansion in the return from tourism. 
Between 1977 and 1979, the real exchange rate increased by 18% on a trade-weighted basis. 
The response of the export sector was an increment of 1% in the foreign exchange returned to the 
economy, at constant prices. The juxtaposition of these two figures does not necessarily imply that 
the exchange rate policy favoured by the IMF was a failure. On the other hand, it would appear to be 
much more problematic to argue that these figures suggest that it was a success. 
Yet, it has been observed that while devaluation does not appear to help the trade balance, it 
does engender an improvement in the overall balance of payments.37 It was indeed expected that 
the aggressive exchange rate policy would induce a return of capital flows to Jamaica. But this did 
not take place, as was discussed in the preceding section. 
The poor response of exports and of the international financial community made it impossi-
ble to augment import volume by an amount sufficient to halt the contraction of the economy. The 
main effect of the devaluations, then, was to accelerate inflation. 
The monthly devaluations of the Jamaican dollar were continued until May 1979. On a 
trade-weighted basis the real exchange rate index reached almost 119 in 1979, or the highest level 
in the post-war era. In 1980, this index declined about 1%. 
4. Prices and wages 
(a) 	 Prices 
In 1980 the proportional increase in the average level of consumer prices declined for the 
second consecutive year; yet the rate of inflation intensified considerably. Thus, the average annual 
rise in price levels approached 26%, against 29% in 1979 and almost 35% in 1978. But the rate of 
inflation, as measured by the variation between the December consumer price indexes, climbed to 
29.5%, versus about 20% in 1979 (see table 20). As occurred the previous year, the categories in 
which inflation was greatest in 1980 were food and beverages, and fuels. Food prices climbed by 
one-third in each of these years, mainly in response to the considerable production losses sustained 
in the wake of recurrent adverse weather conditions. Fuel prices soared 46% in 1979 and 41% in 
1980, owing primarily to the increased cost of imported petroleum, but also to appreciable 
reductions in subsidies. 
Price stability in Jamaica was interrupted in 1973, when the average increase of the consumer 
price index shot up to 20%, or more than four times the ones recently experienced. The outbreak 
of inflation was engendered by both external and internal factors. Thus, import prices rose well 
over 8% that year, following increments of less than 4% in 1971 and 1% in 1972. This increase, 
together with the involuntary and programmed devaluations of the Jamaican dollar, caused import 
prices in domestic currency to rise by almost 26%. This alone directly accounted for six-tenths of 
the increase of 20% in the general price level, given the share of imports in domestic supply. It 
likewise caused severe upward pressures on price formation in the rest of the economy. Between 
1970 and 1972, in contrast, the domestic cost of imports had advanced a mere 3%, owing to the 
stability of import prices and the involuntary appreciation of the Jamaican currency. This played 
an important role in the stability of domestic prices in these years, especially in the light of the 
build-up of inflationary pressures of domestic origin. But the unintentional appreciation of the 
r See, for example, M.A. Miles, The Effects of Devaluation on the Trade Balance and the Balance of Payments: Some 
New Results'', Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 87, No. 3, June, 1979, pp. 600-620. 
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currency, in conjunction with other factors, such as a brusque upturn in the expansion of domestic 
credit and the uncertainty caused by the disarray prevailing in the international monetary system, 
gave rise to growing strains on the balance of payments, in response to which, in January 1973, the 
authorities raised the exchange rate and fixed the Jamaican dollar in terms of US dollars. 
Subsequently, the currency was subjected to a further devaluation when the US dollar was 
devalued. 
On the domestic side, an unusually large expansion in credit in 1972 eventually led to an 
upsurge in consumer spending and money supply growth. In that year, the price situation 
remained stable, partly because output and domestic supply rose markedly (9.8% and 11.3%, 
respectively) and more than gross national income, and partly because of a major decline in the net 
international reserves. In addition, the stabilizing effects of these developments were reinforced 
by the course of external prices and of the exchange rate. But in 1973 the environment underwent a 
radical change. Real interest rates began to decline about as fast as the domestic prices of imports 
began to rise. On the other hand, the rate of growth of output slowed abruptly, and for the year as a 
whole amounted to just over 1 %. Agricultural output, in fact, dropped 6% and the production of 
food fell by close to 8%. Simultaneously, import volume was slashed in a move designed to stem 
the loss of international reserves. As a result, domestic supply did not increase at all. 
In the meantime, the growth of credit was cut in half, while the net international reserves 
continued to shrink notwithstanding corrective measures. Moreover, virtually the entire amount 
of the increase in credit was spent. From another angle, the resulting upturn in the growth of the 
money supply in spite of the marked decline in the growth of factors of expansion appears as a 
lagged response to the bulge in credit in 1972.38 1n any event, the surge in the supply of money ran 
up against the stagnation in the supply of goods and services. 
Finally, the abrupt inflation in prices provoked and escalation in wage demands from the 
highly-organized labour force, giving rise to a price-wage spiral which was not to run its course 
until 1977. In 1973, unit wage costs rose more than 14%, against 2% in 1972. However, compared 
to 1972, the major factor in this leap was not the increase in money wages, but the drop in labour 
productivity. 
In the following year inflation intensified, soaring to more than 24% . Import prices shot up 
fully 35%, and almost two-thirds of the rise in consumer prices may be traced directly to this factor. 
Export prices climbed at an even faster pace, however, permitting the doubling of the net 
international reserves in spite of the much enlarged outlays for petroleum imports. As a result, the 
rate of growth of the money supply climbed to 27%, even though the expansion of credit was 
reduced for the second consecutive year. In addition, the large gain in the terms of trade allowed 
income to increase while output was contracting. 
The pronounced heightening of inflation and inflationary pressures in the external sector 
was accompanied by mounting tensions on the domestic side. Output commenced its rapid 
downward trend in 1974, sliding by 4%, and the efforts to shore-up the balance of payments 
position and the large increases in import prices precluded an offsetting hike in the supply of 
imports, so that domestic supply tumbled by 3%. But the enactment of the Bauxite Levy, together 
with the notable improvement in the terms of trade led to a rise in gross national income of more 
than 8%. 
This marked disproportion between the changes in supply and demand was accompanied by 
only a marginal increase in savings, as the increase in gross national income was transmitted 
throughout the economy via leaps of 60% in government spending and 50% in money wages and 
salaries. Consequently, it exerted a decided upward pressure on price levels. 
Looking at the cost side, this extraordinary rise in wages, in conjunction with a substantial 
decline in labour productivity, translated into a 60% increase in unit wage costs. 
"In 1972, the factors of expansion registered an increase of over 19%, due entirely to the 377 growth of credit. That 
year the money supply increased 10%, or about the same as the product. In 1973, the factors of expansion increased only 
77, with credit rising 187, but the supply of money jumped almost 21%. 
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In the light of all these developments, it is rather remarkable that the rate of inflation was 
limited to 24%. Food output did recover in 1974, and also the rate of exchange declined, but it 
appears that it was price controls and subsidies which played the biggest role in mitigating the 
enormous and varied tensions to which the level of prices was subjected. 
The following year witnessed a let-up in inflation, thanks primarily to the sizeable reduction 
in external price increases and a large rise in domestic supply, coupled with the stagnation of gross 
domestic income, but also to a further small decrease in the exchange rate. The increase in import 
prices dropped from 35 7. to 12.5%, involving a rise in the overall price level of somewhat more 
than 5Y, versus 16% the year before. In the meantime, domestic supply climbed almost 9%, 
against an increment of only 1.4% in gross national income. This turnaround virtually offset the 
extent of the disequilibrium experienced in 1974. Finally, the exchange value of the Jamaican 
currency appreciated an additional 1% . 
On the other hand, government spending and unit wage costs continued to expand very 
rapidly. In the case of the Government, however, the potential inflationary effects of the rapid 
growth of its expenditure in 1975 were in part counterbalanced by the major loss of international 
reserves and the contraction of income in the private sector. But the further 24% hike in nominal 
wages was not compensated by gains in labour productivity, which in fact dropped by 7%. The 
resultant one-third expansion in unit wage costs emerges as the major inflationary factor in 1975. 
Between 1973 and 1975, unit labour costs more than doubled. 
In 1976 gross national income declined some 11%, while the liquid reserves were almost 
exhausted. The severe deflation of the economy, together with a steep decline in external inflation 
and an appreciation of the US dollar against other major currencies, permitted a reduction in the 
rate of inflation to 9.6%. The marked contraction of gross national income more than offset the 
fall of over 9% in domestic supply, due to a substantial deterioration in the terms of trade. At the 
same time, the increase in import prices was so small (3%) that the decrease in the exchange rate 
(5%) led to a decline in the cost of imports in domestic currency which implied a direct decrease of 
1%,  in the overall price level. Furthermore, the virtual depletion of the international reserves kept 
the increase in the money supply to just 2 	 in spite of the doubling of credit to the Government. 
Consequently, the fact that the level of prices rose a further 10% must be attributed to the 
momentum of previous years, transmitted primarily via wages. In effect, unit wage costs climbed a 
further 23% in 1976. 
Notwithstanding the considerable imbalance between the changes in supply (-7.3%) and 
demand (1.9%), an increase of 20% in the exchange rate, and a jump of 38% in the money supply, 
the rate of inflation drifted up less than two percentiles, to 11.4%, in 1977. Three factors 
moderated the effects of these pressures of the level of prices. Firstly, import prices rose less than 
7%, while the output of food leaped 25%. But the most important countervailing force was the 
abrupt curtailment of wage inflation. After climbing 162%, over the course of the previous three 
years unit wage costs rose less than 3% in 1977. 
Domestic supply and gross national income evolved in a balanced fashion in 1978. Moreover, 
the output of food rose a further 20%. Import prices registered an average increment similar to 
that of the previous year. The growth of the money supply was pared back to less than 18%, a rate 
substantially below the one consistent with the magnitude of the expansion of nominal GDP, while 
the increase in nominal wages was limited to 12%. 
Yet, inflation intensified drastically. The average annual change in prices soared to 35%, 
while the December 1978 consumer price index soared more than 49% above the December 1977 
one, the principal determinant of this unprecedented rate of inflation being the 40% devaluation 
of the Jamaican dollar. To that shock was added the effects of the liberalization of pricing policy in 
most areas of the economy. In this respect, a share of the acceleration of inflation in 1978 was the 
counterpart of the past repression of price increases, and the bulge in money supply growth in 
1977 may also have exerted an effect on prices in 1978. In any event, more than one-half of the 
jump in prices in 1978 may be traced directly to the devaluation. 
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In 1979 prices continued to advance at a rapid although somewhat slower pace. The exchange 
rate was on average almost 22% higher than in 1978, and this, together with an increase of almost 
11 % in import prices, explains six-tenths of the rise in domestic prices. Again, income declined 
more than domestic supply. However, in contrast to the enormous gains achieved in 1977/1978, 
food production dropped some 3%. Money supply growth was reduced to below 8%, or about half 
the expansion of the nominal GDP. The advance in unit wage costs, on the other hand, amounted to 
somewhat more than 20%. 
In 1980 the average change in the level of prices eased somewhat further, but the rate of 
inflation picked up over the course of the year. The main determinant of this acceleration appears 
to have been the 23% escalation of import prices, although a host of other inflationary factors 
were present. Thus, the average exchange rate moved up a further 7% and, as occurred in 1979, 
food production contracted while price controls on food were liberalized. Moreover, the rate of 
growth of the money supply accelerated markedly to 35.5%, as the projections of the central 
government deficit and the supply of extraordinary foreign finance turned out to be way off target. 
Finally, wage demands and settlements rose appreciably subsequent to the breakdown of the 
IMF-Government EFF agreement. 
Table 20 
JAMAICA: EVOLUTION OF INTERNAL PRICES 
1975 	 1976 	 1977 
Variation between annual averages 
1978 1979 1980 
Total 17.5 	 9.7 11.2 34.8 29.1 26.9 




17.7 14.1 49.4 19.8 28.6 
Food and beverages 19.8 	 17.5 12.3 54.1 24.5 33.7 
Source: 
	 Jamaica, Department of Statistics, 
	 Consumer Price Indices, Annual Review, 	 1978, 1979 
and data supplied to CEPAL. 
(a) January-November 1980 with respect to January-November 1979. 
(b) Wages 
Much has already been said about the evolution of wages, details of which appear in table 21. 
Sustained by a jump of almost 10% in labour productivity in the economy as a whole, real wages 
rose more than 7% in 1972, but virtually the entire amount of this gain was forfested in the wake 
of the advent of inflation in 1973. Over the course of the ensuing three-year period, however, the 
labour force managed to obtain a one-third hike in real wages and salaries, notwithstanding 
systematic declines in output and labour productivity. Subsequently, real wages and salaries were 
forced to move in the same direction as output and productivity by devaluations and wage controls. 
The outbreak of inflation in late 1972/early 1973 provoked an immediate escalation of wage 
demands, strikes and wage settlements. Real wages deteriorated only because two-year contracts 
were the norm: about half of the organized labour force did not have the option of negotiating that 
year. The contracts which were renewed involved wage increases ranging from about 25% in 
transportation, storage and communications, to over 50% in mining. In 1974 the average nominal 
increase reached an incredible 50%. In consequence, real wages soared by almost 19% even though 
the rate of inflation intensified. This enormous advance took place alongside a 4% drop in the 
gross domestic product and a decrease of well over 6% in total labour productivity, although the 
extent of the disproportion was tempered by the large expansion of gross national income. In fact, 
between 1971 and 1974 the 19.4% change in the index of real wages and salaries was not much 
greater than the 17% change in gross domestic income. But the gains in money wages and salaries 
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in both 1975 and 1976 continued to outdistance the (by then declining) rate of inflation in 
circumstances in which labour productivity continued to descend at a very fast pace. Furthermore, 
the gross domestic product did not rise in 1975 and fell sharply in 1976. 
As a result of the divergence between the evolution of wages and of output, in 1976 real wages 
stood almost one-third above the 1973 level, while labour productivity was one-third below it. An 
interpretation of this marked contrast is beyond the scope of this survey, inasmuch as it would 
involve a lengthy discussion of the peculiar institutional characteristics of the Jamaican labour 
market and of the effects of the political change of 1972 on the Jamaica labour movement. In any 
case, this asymmetry evaporated in the 1977/1979 period. 
Efforts to curtail the escalation of wage settlements beyond the variation in the cost of living 
got underway in August 1975. They were part of a package of corrective measures whose aim was 
to offset the effects of the international recession and the shift in the pattern of demand on the 
balance of payments and on growth. 
In the absence of the sought-for agreement with the trade unions on an incomes policy, the 
Government established temporary guidelines for the private sector and commercially operated 
public enterprises which were to be in force from September 1975 to March 1976. For workers 
earning less than J$ 7 000 per annum, real wages would be restored to the level prevailing in the 
last contract to expire before June 1973. For those earning between J$ 7 000 and J$ 12 000 per 
year, a ceiling equal to the highest increase obtained in the first group was established. For those 
earning between J$ 12 000 and J$ 16 000 per year, increases could not exceed one-half the highest 
increase received in the first group. All salaries above J$ 16 000 were to be frozen. This morato-
rium applied to all types of emoluments. 
Table 21 
JAMAICA: NOMINAL AND REAL WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND UNIT WAGE COSTS 
(1971 = 	 100) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Nominal wages and salaries (a) 112.2 126.1 189.2 233.7 269.0 275.1 308.6 365.3 - 
Real wages and salaries 107.3 100.6 119.4 126.8 132.5 122.1 105.0 92.4 - 
Exployment 100.0 103.0 105.7 111.6 112.2 112.8 115.9 112.7 112.7 
Labour productivity 109.8 107.9 101.0 94.2 87.8 87.4 84.5 83.2 80.3 
Unit wage costs 102.2 116.9 187.3 248.2 306.2 314.8 365.1 439.1 - 
Source: Jamaica, National Planning Agency, Economic and Social Survey,  various years, and the World Bank. 
(a) Betwa0r. 1971 and 1973, based on the industrial wage index. Between 1973 and 1979, based on the median 
weekly income of income earners. 
These guidelines were in fact highly restrictive, inasmuch as only a relatively small share of 
the labour force was then earning less in real terms than in June 1973. At the same time, they were 
designed to diminish the disparity between incomes. In this connexion, three other steps were 
taken: the implementation of a national minimum wage; the freezing of the rate of profits at a 
proportion equivalent to the average for the previous three years; and the limitation of dividends 
before taxes to 7% of net work for a period of one year. 
Following a new round of negotiations between the Government and the trade unions the 
wage and salary guidelines were extended, with some modifications, for a one-year period 
beginning in March 1976. The changes and additions included the following. Wage and salary 
increases, where permissible, were restricted to a maximum of IS 10 per week, unless the amount 
required to restore real earnings to the June 1973 level was larger. Also, other exceptions were 
possible if certain stipulations concerning profitability, productivity and hardship were met. On 
the other hand, most allowances and fringe benefits were to remain at the levels existing at 
1 September 1975. Finally, wages and salaries of employees of the central government and 
statutory boards were frozen. 
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Following its re-election, the Government instituted in January 1977 another set of policies to 
deal with the worsening economic crisis. With respect to wages and salaries, the existing 
guidelines were maintained, with several adjustments that had the effect of returning to the more 
restrictive features of the original guidelines, while retaining the more stringent aspects of the 
March 1976 ones. In addition, the moratorium on wage and salary hikes in the central government 
and statutory bodies was extended to 31 March 1978. The Government renewed its commitment 
to a restrictive incomes policy in April, when it introduced the dual exchange rate, and in July, 
when it entered into the standby agreement with the IMF. 
There was a lag in the effectiveness of the successive guidelines in bringing the inflation of 
wages in the economy as a whole to a halt, but the size of wage settlements was compressed in 1975 
and again in 1976,' and in 1977, when inflation accelerated once more and the average increase in 
money wages was limited to about 2%, real wages and salaries were cut by an average of almost 
8%. 
As part of the Extended Fund Facility (Err) agreement of I May 1978, increases in wage 
contracts expiring after that date were limited to 15% per year, for a two-year period. This ceiling 
applied to all categories of emoluments, and to both the private and public sectors. The purpose of 
this restraint was to ensure that the simultaneous devaluation of the Jamaican dollar restored the 
real rate of exchange to the level prevailing in the early 1970s. In this respect it was more than 
successful. As regards the effect of the programme on wages, suffice it to note that the index of real 
wages and salaries plunged 14% in 1978. 
For the second year of the FEE, the ceiling on wages and salaries was lowered to 10%, in 
conjunction with the suspension of the monthly devaluations. In contrast to the outcome in 1978, 
the variation in money wages in 1979 surpassed the limit. But the momentum of the inflationary 
process unleashed by the marked devaluation of the currency raised the average 1979 price level so 
far above the 1978 one that real wages were compressed a further 12%. At that point they were 
30% below the 1976 high, and substantially lower than at the beginning of the decade. Another, 
albeit smaller, decline appears to have taken place in 1980. 
5. Economic policy 
a ) Introduction 
The Jamaican electorate opted for change in 1972, voting into power the party which had 
been in opposition since Independence in 1962. The priorities of the new administration were 
defined in large part in function of the factors which had prompted the election outcome. The 
burgeoning unemployment crisis, the deteriorating distribution of income, the lagging coverage 
and quality of social services, and the widening housing deficit were problem areas into which the 
new Government thus intended to channel a major share of public resources. Also, it was by then 
clearly appreciated that past demographic trends were on the verge of translating into a radical 
surge in the growth of the labour force. This of course greatly heightened the concern over the 
employment crisis and, together with the growing social tensions it was engendering, created a 
sense of urgency about dealing with it. As far as the longer term was concerned, it was recognized 
that the existing expansion path of the economy would have to be modified appreciably, inasmuch 
as it had proven incapable of generating enough jobs to satisfy even the very modest increment in 
the labour force registered over the previous decade. This, in conjunction with the multiple 
problems provoked by the massive rural to urban migration then taking place explains the 
prominence of agriculture in the Government's development plans. The long-term development 
programme was also conditioned by the need to face up to the impending decline in investment 
and in foreign capital inflows arising from the recent completion of a major investment cycle in 
"As far as the central government was concerned, real wages and salaries —which had increased much less than those 
in the private sector— were slashed appreciably in 1976 and were left only slightly higher than in 1972. 
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mining and the approaching conclusion of one in tourism. Another important factor in the 
formation of development plans was t he decision to seek greater autonomy from the course of 
events in the international economy. In this connexion, it was envisioned that the acquisition of 
assets in the foreign exchange earning sectors of the economy would play an important role. 
The agenda thus included a set of difficult challenges, but the possibilities of success seemed to 
be reasonable. For more than a quarter of a century the international economy had grown year 
after year at a very fast pace without inflation and the Jamaican economy had behaved in exactly 
the same manner. Furthermore, the consistent expansion in the output of goods and services, 
together with a tradition of sound fiscal and monetary management, had placed the public sector in 
a position to finance a relatively ambitious capital investment programme without resorting to 
advances from the Central Bank. Over the course of the 1960s current savings financed about half 
of a capital expenditure programme that fluctuated around a figure equivalent to 6% of the GDP.4° 
The other half was financed principally through bond issues on the highly developed local capital 
market. External capital markets, including multilateral development banks, had yet to be tapped 
on more than a token scale. Foreign reserves were then at an all-time high and in fact were greater 
than the external debt. 
The confluence of pressing needs and propitious conditions thus impelled the country 
towards an experiment with a new set of policies. But the international environment was on the 
verge of a succession of crises that would pound the Jamaican and other small open economies 
throughout most of the decade. The monetary crisis had in fact already surfaced, although much 
more was still to come, while the petroleum and food crises were just around the corner. Soon to 
follow was the outbreak of international inflation and the subsequent recession. The end of the 
decade would be plagued by another round of petroleum price hikes and international stagflation. 
As it turned out, the times were not favourable for social experimentation in a small, fragile and 
highly vulnerable economy. Yet, for several years the attempt was made. By 1977, however, the 
principal focus of attention was on how to stop the economy from contracting, and by the end of 
1980, when a new government was elected, the principal preoccupation was avoiding total 
economic collapse. 
At the outset of its term in office in February 1972 the new administration implemented and 
expansionary fiscal policy and set about drawing up plans for a much enlarged capital expenditure 
programme.1I Current expenditures were augmented and redirected in favour of social pro-
grammes, especially in the area of employment and low-income housing. The increase approached 
27% in nominal terms and more than one-fifth in constant prices, and was the largest increase in 
any one year since Independence. Current receipts were bery buoyant, owing primarily to the 10% 
expansion in output, but they were less than projected and thus not sufficient to prevent an 
appreciable deterioration in current savings. On the other hand, capital outlays were raised by 
much less than intended. Consequently, current savings still covered more than one-third of 
capital spending, while the overall deficit was smaller than planned. As in the past, domestic 
borrowing financed the lion's share of the deficit. The level of foreign borrowing was similar to 
that of the previous year. 
The effects of the expansionary fiscal policy on output and employment met or even 
surpassed expectations. Perhaps the principal unintended effect was a marked upturn in imports 
and a deterioration in the balance of payments. The large expansion of government spending led 
to an upswing in bank liquidity and lending, and the resulting increase in consumer demand 
translated into a rise in the import bill beyond the extent implied by the growth of domestic 
output. This, together with a steep decline in foreign investment and the uncertainties over 
exchange rates, brought about a steady reduction in the international reserves. In response the 
40These figures refer to the central government. For the public sector as a whole, savings averaged 5c7i, and 
investment 10%, of the product. 
"Fiscal ;ind monetary policy is described in the Bank of Jamaica's annual Report and Statcment 	 Acconntl. Unless 
indicated otherwise, the data in this section are from that source. 
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monetary authorities introduced some remedial measures in July, including higher interest rates, 
an increase in the statutory liquid assets ratio, and a reduction in discounts from the Central Bank. 
Subsequently, a ceiling on credit expansion was established. At that juncture (October) the 
commercial banks were almost fully lent-up, and interest rates were on the rise. On another front, 
a temporary ban on the importation of automobiles and of some other postponable imports was 
put into effect. Finally, in January, the authorities moved to relieve the growing stresses on the 
balance of payments by devaluing the currency and pegging it to the US dollar. 
In 1973 government spending increased almost 25%, or somewhat less than in the previous 
year. However, in constant dollars the increment was only 4%, since the inflationary process had 
already commenced. Income rose by a somewhat smaller proportion. Consequently, savings 
declined for the second consecutive year as a proportion of the product (see table 22). Capital 
spending was hiked by about one-fifth, but again the size of the increase was less than planned. The 
overall deficit expanded by a quarter, and for the first time it was financed principally from foreign 
sources, in order to offset part of the gap left in the wake of the completion of the investment cycle 
in the bauxite industry. In this connexion the authorities took several additional steps, including 
arrangements for a major foreign investment project (in oil refining) and the negotiation of a 
standby agreement with the IMF. 
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1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980(a) 
19.6 20.2 20.0 23.9 24.5 22.3 21.8 27.6 26.4 23.0 
45.6 50.0 33.9 40.0 33.0 27.7 29.2 30.0 
16.4 19.5 13.2 16.9 25.8 20.8 25.1 
15.9 17.9 19.6 22.7 24.1 28.4 27.9 30.5 30.3 27.8 
28.7 28.1 28.0 25.6 27.4 24.5 25.6 25.7 
41.8 46.5 44.6 44.6 43.7 43.5 37.9 37.5 
9.1 11.9 10.6 12.6 16.0 18.6 24.6 24.0 
3.7 2.3 0.4 1.1 0.5 -6.1 -6.0 -2.8 -3.9 -3.9 
33.2 25.5 3.6 13.7 5.9 307.1(b) 454.9(h) -190.1 -107.3 
7.8 7.6 5.9 9.7 11.7 13.2 11.1 12.0 11.8 8.4 
47.1 44.7 46.4 35.4 37.9 32.2 30.9 38.2 
17.6 34.6 37.2 61.9 158.4 90.5 42.7 
23.6 25.5 25.5 32.5 35.7 41.6 39.0 42.4 42.1 36.1 
4.1 5.2 5.5 8.6 11.2 19.3 17.2 14.8 15.7 12.2 
2.2 4.0 2.4 6.1 7.4 16.2 16.5 7.6 12.8 4.5 
43.6 32.8 59.3 73.9 46.6 47.4 57.3 57.9 
26.7 27.0 30.4 33.1 41.0 60.5 75.4 77.5 76.6 
33.3 34.2 41.2 44.3 39.9 26.8 41.9 42.0 38.3 
Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report of Statement of Accounts, various years, and the Work Bank. 
(a) Budgeted amounts. 
(b) Both central government and economy wide savings were negative. 
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Following some easing of tensions in the first half of the year, the international reserves 
began to dwindle rapidly from July onwards as a result of a shortfall in exports stemming from a 
deterioration in the terms of trade, a renewed upsurge in the growth of credit, and the belief that 
the currency would be devalued again. in response, the Government had resort to the IMF standby 
agreement. In addition interest rates and the liquid assets ratio were raised further. Moreover, in 
November the Central Bank was empowered to control quasi-bank operations that were affecting 
the money supply. Quasi-bank institutions had expanded their activities appreciably in the last few 
years, and it was their lending that had largely annulled the effects of the credit restraints applied 
to the commercial banks. 
It was against this background that OPEC announced the enormous hike in the price of 
petroleum. At the time the Bank of Jamaica observed that: ''The impact of this additional 
foreign exchange bill on a severely weakened reserve position was anticipated to be well nigh 
unmanageable".42 
The year 1974 thus began on a note of impending crisis. An immediate and energetic 
response was forthcoming, however, as in January a comprehensive and far-reaching programme 
was introduced to deal with the crisis. First. the rise in the oil bill was anticipated by a special tax on 
petroleum products, while deliveries of gasoline were cut by 25%, with the savings to be 
exported.'" Also a national energy conservation programme was outlined. On another front, 
existing restrictions on imports were tightened and amplified, with a view to releasing foreign 
exchange to cover part of the higher cost of petroleum imports. Most consumer goods were thus 
subjected to quotas and licensing. Exchange control regulations were also strengthened. Monetary 
policy was made more restrictive, in order to shift the structure of demand by reducing consump-
tion in favour of savings and lowering the demand for imports. For this purpose, the entire range 
of interest rates was moved up, and new credit ceilings established. On the fiscal side, spending was 
to be held below budgeted amounts and reliance on bank financing reduced. Borrowing by 
statutory bodies and public enterprises would be pared back. The revenues that would not be 
received because of the reduction in imports were to be made up through special taxes on luxury 
consumption and on alcoholic beverages Moreover, in a move to improve the management of the 
economy, a cabinet-level economic council with responsibility for the formulation of economic 
policy was established. Finally, several schemes to increase export earnings were formulated. In 
this connexion, it was expected that the upcoming contract negotiations with the bauxite compan-
ies would result in an increase in the share of mining sector earnings retained by the economy. 
Following several months of inconclusive talks with the bauxite companies, the Government 
enacted the Bauxite Act, whereby a levy was assessed on bauxite extracted after January 1. That 
year (1974) the country received USS 116 million from the levy, or slightly less than the US$ 123 
million increase in the oil import bill. In addition, royalties were increased and arrangements made 
to acquire part ownership in the industry. In the interim the prices of Jamaica's exports were in the 
process of climbing to over 90% above the average prevailing in 1973. 
Output had begun to lag in 1973, and with the set of policies implemented in January 1974 it 
actually began to decline. Simultaneously, inflation accelerated. Given the dramatic upturn in 
foreign exchange earnings and government revenues, on the one hand, and the interruption of 
growth on the other, the authorities not only resolved to loosen or lift most of the restrictive 
measures, including the reduction in petroleum supplies, but also to undertake a massive increase 
in spending. Thus, in the fiscal year beginning in May, current expenditures were boosted 45% and 
capital expenditures 100%. Even after allowing for inflation the increase in total expenditures still 
amounted to 28% in constant terms. The expansion in revenues was not much less spectacular, as 
it approached 20%. Asa consequence, nominal savings tripled rising to 1 % of the GOP, but the 
budget deficit climbed to an amount equivalent to 8.6% of the GDP, against 5.5% in 1973 (see 
42Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounty, 1973, Kingston, 1974, p. 6. 
"The export plan concerned petroleum products refined in Jamaica. 
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again table 22). Most of the deficit was financed from domestic borrowing, but foreign borrowing 
was also important, and for the first time ever the Government relied on the Central Bank to cover 
more than a token share of its deficit.44 
Instead of translating into an upturn in domestic output, however, the government spending 
programme and the relaxation of credit and other controls brought about a large expansion of 
imports. In January it was planned that imports would be limited to J$ 645 million; in May this 
ceiling was raised to J$ 725 million; and by December the final figure amounted to J$ 851, versus 
_IS 604 in 1973. Nevertheless, the overall balance of payments showed a surplus for the first time in 
two years, thanks to the Bauxite Levy and the improvement in the terms of trade, and reserves 
reached a new all time high. 
On balance, the view that prevailed was that given the gravity of the crisis, the performance of 
the economy was very satisfactory.15 Yet, in retrospect it now seems clear that an important 
opportunity was lost at this juncture. The timely and energetic measures to reduce the consump-
tion of petroleum, together with the Bauxite Levy revenues and the windfall export gains, could 
have made it possible to confront the petroleum crisis with a less costly and more durable solution. 
Instead, the petroleum conservation measures were laid aside, the resources from the Bauxite Levy 
were diverted to uses other than the expansion of export capacity, and the unexpected export 
earnings were fittered away on consumer imports. 
The evolution of the economy in the first half of 1975 turned in mixed results. The balance of 
payments showed a small surplus, in spite of the steep decline in mining and a recession in 
tourism, thanks to the continued buoyancy of the prices of Jamaica's exports. On the other hand, 
output continued to lag as the prolonged depression of private investment and the marked 
reduction in mining and tourism offset gains in other sectors. But the decline in the rate of 
unemployment persisted, and in April it fell below 20% of the labour force for the first time since 
the late 1960s. The deceleration in the rate of inflation also was sustained in spite of enormous 
wage settlements. This was the context when the Government decided to introduce another 
sizeable increase in spending with the fiscal year beginning in April. Overall expenditures were 
slated to expand 28%, or about 10% in real terms. On the other hand, revenues were projected to 
rise even more, with the result that in constant prices and as a share of the product the deficit 
would be about the same as in 1974. In short, the 1975 budget represented a continuation of the 
policies adopted in May of the previous year, whereby aggressive fiscal measures and a greatly 
expanded public investment programme (including the acquisition of assets in the private sector) 
were directed at offsetting the decline in private sector investment and reflating the economy so 
that unemployment would continue to fall, while the preoccupation with the external sector and 
prices was relegated to a secondary plane. In this approach, the public sector would need to rely on 
the domestic capital market for a much larger amount of support than had hitherto been the case. 
But it was felt that his would not lead to any significant dislocations, inasmuch as private sector 
"That year net domestic borrowing by the entire public sector amounted to 2.9% of GDP (overall public sector savings 
were much higher than central government savings). According to a World Bank study, the public sector could borrow a 
sum equivalent to almost 4% of GOP from the domestic financial system without creating notable inflationary pressures or 
an inadequacy in the supply of credit available for the private sector. 
"In the Bank of Jamaica's words: The year 1974, which at the beginning threatened to be one of the most disruptive 
for the Jamaican economy, ended with a fair degree of stability as a result of the economic policies adopted by the 
authorities. The serious payments problem posed by the increase in oil prices was offset by increased earnings from the 
bauxite industry following the imposition of the new levy. In light of the fact that many other countries, developed and 
developing, had to contend with massive problems of recession, unemployment, inflation and balance of payments deficits, 
the performance of the Jamaican economy in 1974 was creditable. Modest economic growth was achieved, the rate of 
inflation showed some indication of slowing down in the last quarter, some progress was reported in the area of 
unemployment, while the balance of payments recorded an overall surplus of some J$ 54 million. 
Unlike 1974, therefore, 1975 began with a more relaxed atmosphere. The crisis of the previous year had been defused 
and there was general expectation that the gains recorded in 1974 would be consolidated, if not expanded. To this end there 
was a further relaxation in monetary policy by the reduction of the Bank Rate in February 1975 as a continuation of the 
policy of gradual reflation begun in late 1974". Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, 1975, Kingston, 1976, 
p. 1. Note that subsequent revisions of the national accounts indicated a decline in GOP in 1974. 
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investment demand was waning. Should unitended secondary effects of this or other aspects of the 
expansion of the public sector arise, they would be handled by controls. 
As it turned out, expenditure rose more, and revenue less, than envisioned, not only because 
output failed to respond to the stimulus of government spending, but also due to the repercussions 
of the international recession, unanticipated wage hikes, and the unplanned takeover of failing 
businesses (mainly in tourism). Thus, the fiscal deficit climbed to 11.2% of GDP, against a 
projected figure of 8.8%. Consequently, net domestic financing equal to more than 7% of GDP was 
required, and the Bank of Jamaica was called on to provide over-two-fifths of that amount (see 
again table 22). 
While the large budgetary deficit did not have much effect on output, nor for that mater on 
private sector access to domestic credit, it translated into an immediate surge in imports and, 
together with the stagnation of exports, led to a marked deterioration of the current account. In the 
interim the flight of capital had begun to accelerate, and when the Government announced in July 
that it would be taking steps to shore up the balance of payments, an unprecedented outflow of 
foreign exchange took place, in the belief that the currency was to be devalued. In August and 
October a series of remedial measures were taken. The deterioration in the external payments 
situation was to be halted by restraining the escalation in wages and in prices (through an incomes 
policy and price controls) and encouraging savings (via changes in the tax laws, and the establish-
ment of a National Housing Trust to be financed from mandatory employer and employee 
contributions). But these measures proved insufficient to stem the loss of reserves, and in February 
1976 a set of more restrictive and wider-ranging policies was announced. In the area of monetary 
policy, interest rates and liquidity ratios were raised, and Central Bank lending to commercial 
banks was reduced. Also, commercial banks were to cut back on consumer credit. On the fiscal side, 
a tax package designed to curb consumption and raise revenues totalling 3% of GDP was 
introduced, while the temporary wage guidelines were beefed-up and extended for an additional 
period of one year. Furthermore, direct controls were to ensure that imports were slashed by 
one-fifth. Simultaneously, arrangements were made for loans for balance of payments support 
from foreign commercial banks, while an application for access to the IMF's Oil Facility was 
presented. 
During the course of the year the economy was subject to a series of setbacks that prevented 
the stabilization of the external sector in spite of the fact that imports were reduced by the 
intended proportion. Prominent here were the fall in export prices, the further reduction in 
mineral exports, the cessation of foreign commercial bank lending, bad weatherd, and the virtual 
paralyzation of tourism. In addition the general expectation fo a devaluation of the currency 
persisted throughout the year. In the meantime the severe contraction in import volume led to a 
big drop in production, and unemployment rose from 20.5% to 24.2% of the labour force between 
April and October. In the circumstances the Government's finances threatened to spiral out of 
control. Revenues declined, while expenditures climbed by one-fourth. As a result, a current deficit 
equal to 6.1% of GDP was sustained, and the overall fiscal deficit soared to 19.3% of GDP. To cover 
this enormous gap, domestic resources equal to 16% of GDP had to be mobilized. The lion's share 
was provided by the Bank of Jamaica. This massive increase in credit to the Government did not 
lead to inflation, however, as it was offset by a major loss of reserves, and the money supply rose 
only 2% in nominal terms. In fact, without the enormous creation of credit that the deficit implied, 
the money supply would have contracted systematically. 
One week after the December elections, in which the Government was returned to office with 
a much larger majority than in 1972, the foreign exchange market had to be closed to prevent the 
exhaustion of liquid reserves. Towards the end of January (1977) exchange operations were 
resumed under a new set of controls, and at that time additional policy initiatives were taken to 
deal with the balance of payments crisis and get the fiscal budget under control. The import bill 
was to be reduced by a further 30%, while all other exchange outflows were limited to authorized 
transactions. To ensure compliance with these directives the Bank of Jamaica began to monitor 
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and control all foreign exchange flows in the economy. Consumption taxes were again increased 
appreciably, and the wage guidelines were made more stringent. 
In April a fresh set of measures, including a dual exchange rate, a cut in government 
expenditure and a halt to deficit financing by the Bano of Jamaica, were announced. Also, an 
Emergency Production Plan was formulated, geared to boost the output of essential consumer 
goods and exports. Finally, the Government decided to negotiate a standby arrangement with the 
IMF, and in August a two-year US$ 75 million porgramme was hammered out. In return for this 
balance of payments support the Jamaican authorities agreed to pursue a programme similar to the 
one already in place, but with more restraint in fiscal and monetary matters. The fiscal deficit was 
to be sliced in half instead of by one-third, and government domestic borrowing reduced even 
further. Also, targets for improvement in the external sector were established. Progress would be 
checked on a quarterly basis by performance tests relating to net foreign reserves and net domestic 
assets of the Bank of Jamaica, net banking system credit to the public sector, outstanding arrears, 
and foreign borrowing. 
There was considerable improvement in the economy in 1977. The three-year decline in the 
product was halted, although no growth was recorded. Particularly, encouraging was the large gain 
in agricultural output and the marked increase in the production of food. For its part, gross 
national income actually increased 2%, by virtue of an improvement in the terms of trade. Also, 
the rate of unemployment stabilized, while inflation did not accelerate very much, notwithstand-
ing the large devaluation. Important, in this regard, was the complete curtailment of wage 
inflation, while a reduction in the government deficit and in the creation of credit eased the 
pressures on both the level of prices and on the balance of payments. In this latter connexion the 
first trade surplus of the post-war era was recorded, and this made it possible to trim the current 
account deficit from more than loq of GDP to just over 2%, in spite of a marked accentuation of 
the depression in tourism. 
On the other hand, the capital account refused to respond to the stabilization programme, and 
partly for this reason, but also due to a shortfall in central government revenues, the net domestic 
assets of the Bank of Jamaica exceeded somewhat (by 2.5%) the permissible level on the day the 
performance tests were scheduled to be applied. Consequently, the standby arrangement was 
suspended, and Jamaica was prevented from drawing the second credit installment. Instead of 
renegotiating this accord. however, the authorities decided to seek access to the Extended Fund 
Facility (EFT). In January the dual exchange rate was devalued by an average of 10% , and 
negotiations over the characteristics of the stabilization programme that would be adopted in 
connexion with the III' got underway. However, a mutually satisfactory accord proved difficult to 
reach, as there was much disagreement over the question of the need for further devaluation, and 
over the appropriate relation between exchange rate adjustments and incomes policy. Finally, 
faced with growing shortages, large external debt amortizations and a deteriorating social climate, 
in May the Jamaican authorities agreed to the IMF stabilization programme. 
In exchange for access to US$ 240 million from the EFT, the Government agreed to imple-
ment what amounted to a new economic policy. The market and the private sector were now to be 
relied on to turn the economy around. Thus, the maze of controls that had been erected in response 
to the various successive crises was to be phased out, the size of the public sector was to be reduced, 
and every effort was to be made to regain the confidence of, and stimulate output in, the private 
sector. Simultaneously, a drastic deflation of consumption was programmed, and the resources 
thereby released were to be channelled into the external sector via a realignment of relative prices. 
The main policy measures involved the devaluations; the restriction on wage increases; 
reductions in the current and overall government budget deficit; and the dismantling of controls 
on prices and transactions. Targets for the principal macro-variables were fixed, and a set of 
quarterly performance tests were designed to monitor the progress towards these objectives. As 
usual, the targets were not binding, but the breach of a performance test implied the immediate 




JAMAICA: ERR PERFORMANCE TESTS AND RESULTS 
(Millions of Jamaica dollars) 
1978 	 1979 
I 	 ii 	 III 	 IV 	 I 	 II 	 III 	 IV 
1. Net foreign assets of 
Bank of Jamaica (a) 
Ceiling 	 -335.2 	 -300.0 	 -300.0 	 -425.0 	 -425.0 	 -370.0 
Actual 	 -317.0 	 -318.3 	 -279.0 	 -289.5 	 -319.1 	 -381.6 	 -419.6 	 -496.7 
2. Net domestic assets of 
Bank of Jamaica 
Ceiling 	 440.6 	 445.0 	 480.0 	 900.0 	 925.0 	 940.0 
Actual 	 403.0 	 405.2 	 393.6 	 424.6 	 708.2 	 866.9 	 924.5 1 064.1 
3. Net banking system credit 
to the public sector 
Ceiling 	 930.0 1 010.0 1 110.0 	 1 070.0 1 105.0 1 125.0 
Actual 	 841.0 	 856.8 	 887.0 1 021.5 	 992.4 1 059.1 1 072.2 1 265.0 
4. Outstanding arrears 
Ceiling 	 80.6 	 60.0 	 40.0 
Actual 	 82.0 	 79.2 	 48.8 	 30.4 
5. Foreign borrowing 
Ceiling (1 to 5 year 
loans) 	 60.0 	 60.0 	 60.0 
Actual 	 0.9 	 4.5 	 12.9 
Ceiling (1-12 year 
loans) 	 110.0 	 110.0 	 110.0 
Actual 	 0.1 	 21.2 	 41.1 
Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, 1978 and 1979. 
(a) Including outstanding arrears. 
The net foreign assets test measures the evolution of the balance of payments. The net 
domestic assets test gauges the central government's use of Central Bank credit. The test 
concerning net banking system credit to the public sector is meant to check the adequacy of credit 
to the private sector. At the same time all of these tests imply constraints on policy. Finally, the 
original HT agreement also included a timetable for clearing up outstanding arrears. For the 
second year of the programme no specific requirements in this regard were included, although 
arrears continued to affect the net international reserves test. On the other hand, certain limits on 
foreign borrowing were added. 
During the course of the first year of the programme all of the performance tests were met, 
although in the case of net foreign assets compliance sometimes required the curtailment of 
exchange outflows. Adjustments in the area of wages, profitability, relative prices, consumption, 
the real rate of exchange and administrative controls also proceeded more or less according to plan. 
On the other hand, there was some slippage in the fiscal targets, as revenues failed to increase by 
the projected amount. The most important setbacks, however, had to do with the evolution of 
output and the balance of payments. Thus, after showing no growth in 1977, the GDP declined 
0.1' in 1978 and over 1 'X in 1979, as private sector investment, exports and the capital account of 
the balance of payments failed to respond as expected. The approximate equilibrium established in 
the balance of payments in 1977 was maintained in 1978 and 1979 only by the temporary 
expedients of continuing to repress imports and using IMF credit. Indeed, at the existing level of 
foreign exchange inflows the maintenance of equilibrium in the external sector made the decline 
of output virtually inevitable. On the other hand, the devaluations, relaxation of price controls and 
reduction of subsidies sent the level of prices spiralling upwards. 
In the light of the persistence of the severe foreign exchange constraint, and taking advantage 
of a recent liberalization of the ceilings on the use of Fund resources, the IMF augmented its support 
to Jamaica to US$ 310 million in the final two years of the stabilization programme. At the same 
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time, the targets, performance tests and policies were modified. The monthly devaluation of the 
exchange rate was ended, but the limit on wage increases was lowered from 15% to 10%, and more 
restrictive monetary policies were adopted. On the other hand, the fiscal targets were liberalized 
somewhat. On another front, the Government agreed to forge a 
-social contract- with business 
and labour, whereby maximum co-operation and consensus on crucial economic and social matters 
would be sought. Also, negotiations on the question of the modification of the Bauxite Levy and the 
foreign debt were commenced. 
These initiatives met with some success. In particular, the dispute between the government 
and the bauxite companies over the levy apparently was resolved. But talks with the foreign 
commercial banks failed. That setback, together with escalating oil prices and interest rates, on the 
one hand, and an unexpected decline in exports stemming from flood damage in agriculture and a 
strike-related shutdown of mining operations on the other, made it impossible to satisfy the 
December 1979 net foreign assets test (see again table 23). Simultaneously, the evolution of the 
fiscal variables was straying way off target, partly because the anticipated upturn in economic 
activity refused to materialize and government revenues consequently fell short of the anticipated 
level, and partly because spending overshot budgeted amounts in the wake of the floods, the 
increase in interest payments and unexpected wage increases. As a result of this and the inability to 
acquire the hoped-for amounts of foreign financing, the Government absorbed a much greater 
amount of domestic resources than planned, and the permitted levels of net banking system credit 
to the public sector and of the net domestic assets of the Bank of Jamaica thus also were surpassed 
(see again table 23). 
The failure of the foreign assets test triggered the suspension of the EH accord. Notwith-
standing the drastic measures of the stabilization plan and the unprecedented levels of IMF credit, it 
had proven impossible to overcome the foreign exchange constraint. The choice facing the 
authorities was to either implement more severe deflationary policies or lose access to IMF 
resources. 
(b) Fiscal and monetary policies in 1980 
In early February the then Prime Minister announced to the country that elections were to be 
held towards the end of 1980, or well over a year ahead of schedule. The purpose of calling early 
elections was to resolve as soon as possible basic questions concerning the future course of the 
nation, in the light of the failure of the IMF stabilization plan to lead to a recuperation of economic 
activity, of the suspension of access to the FEE and the inability to reach a new understanding with 
the IMF, and of the spreading breakdown of social order. In late March the cabinet, acting on the 
recommendation of the executive committee of the governing party, resolved to end negotiations 
with the IMF, and at the same time an alternative economic programme was outlined to the public. 
As early as the previous September it had been clear that the December performance tests 
would not be met. Consequently the Jamaican authorities and IMF officials had entered into 
discussions over what steps would have to be taken to move the targeted variables back towards the 
established paths, and to secure a waiver from the December performance tests so that the 
agreement and scheduled credit drawing would not be interrupted. Also, the possibility of 
augmenting the amount of credit to offset the unanticipated exchange outflows was considered. 
Simultaneously, however, there was a growing consensus in the governing party that substantial 
costs but no benefits were being incurred under the IMF programme. 
By December, agreement on such questions as the reorganization of the central government 
and of public enterprises was reached, but the size of the budgetary cutbacks continued to be 
disputed. Eventually, the Jamaican authorities decided to seek instead a one-year interim standby 
agreement, in connexion with the decision to hold elections before the end of the year. In the 
meantime an alternative economic programme was drawn up. And when the Minister of Finance 
determined that the performance test figures sought by the IMF under the interim accord would be 
violated by September at the latest, the Government resolved to follow an economic programme 
that excluded the IMF. 
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Table 24 
JAMAICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Fiscal year 	 (a) Growth rates 
1978 1979 1980(b) 1980(c) 1978 1979 1980 1980(d) 
1.  Current revenue (e) 1 	 037 1 	 118 1 	 241 745 59.0 7.8 11.0 -2.3 
Tax revenue 737 823 886 51.1 11.7 7.7 
Non-tax revenue 30 61 40 -21.2 103.3 -34.4 
Transfers from 
capital 268 233 312 143.6 -13.1 33.9 
Development Fund (f) 
2.  Current expenditure 1 	 143 1 	 283 1 	 438 1 	 088 37.2 12.2 12.1 15.8 
Wages 280 328 363 22.8 17.1 10.7 
Goods and services 154 152 170 35.8 -9.3 11.8 
Interest payments 212 315 345 59.6 48.6 9.5 
Current transfers 497 487 561 38.5 -2.0 15.2 
3.  Savings on current 
account 	 (1-2) -106 -165 -198 -343 
4.  Capital expenditure 451 499 434 371(g) 35.7 10.6 -13.0 -8.2 
Capital formation 146 154 166 15.4 5.5 7.8 
Other 305 345 268 48.1 13.1 22.3 
5.  Total expenditure (2+4) 1 	 594 1 	 782 1 	 872 1 	 459(g) 36.8 11.8 5.0 8.6 
6.  Fiscal 	 deficit 	 (1-6) -557 -664 -631 -641(h) 
7.  Financing 
Domestic financing 
(net) 287 541 233 523 -41.7 88.5 -56.9 17.3 
Banking system 136 310 135 419 -40.8 127.9 -56.5 12.5 
Non-bank 151 231 98 104 -42.6 53.0 -57.6 41.7 
Foreign financing (net) 270 122 398 122 	 1 179.1 -54.8 226.2 336.8 
Other - 4 
Source: Bank of Jamaica, Report and Statement of Accounts, 1980, and the World Bank. 
(a) The fiscal year covers the period April to March. Thus the fiscal year 1978/1979 is shown 
under 1978, and so on. 
(b) Budget estimates. 
(c) Provisional outturn, April to December. 
(d) April-December 1980 compared to April-December 1979. 
(e) Includes capital revenues. 
(f) Bauxite levy. 
(g) Includes amortizations. 
(h) Excludes amortizations. 
This alternative economic programme consisted of two parts. One dealt with the long-run 
strategy of economic development, and the other with the short-term policies designed to contain 
the expected deterioration of the economy within tolerable limits, while the election issues were 
resolved. 
The main goals of the short-term programme were to minimize the decline of output and 
employment whithout accelerating the rate of inflation, and to ensure adequate supplies of 
essential consumer goods. Targets were set for the product (-2.5%) and inflation (20%, or the 
same as in 1979), and the required performance levels in the balance of payments, public finance 
and money supply were identified. Above all, the viability of the programme hinged on mobilizing 
a supply of foreign exchange sufficient to plug the gap left in the wake of the breakdown of the IMF 
accord. Otherwise, imports would have to be slashed and the decline in output thus would be 
greater, while the burden of financing the government deficit would be shifted to the domestic 
banking system. The latter would lead either to an excessive creation of credit and hence additional 
inflationary pressures, or an inadequate supply of credit to the private sector, and hence an 
additional reduction in output. Alternatively, government spending could be reduced, but this also 
would entail a further contraction in the product and in employment. 
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In the circumstances, every effort was made to minimize the outflow and maximize the inflow 
of foreign exchange. Exchange controls were strengthened and the sources and uses of foreign 
exchange monitored on a continuous basis. An emergency external debt deferral operation with 
the commercial banks was arranged, and emergency measures, such as the plan to increase 
payments arrears by over US$ 100 million, were implemented. Finally, the Government sought 
extraordinary financing from bilateral sources. 
In the area of fiscal policy, expenditures were to be increased by an amount consistent with the 
maintenance of existing levels of employment and the targeted increase in nominal GDP. The 
current account deficit would thus be similar to that of the previous year, but the overall deficit 
would be reduced from 16% to 12% of GDP. Since only minor increases in taxes were contem-
plated, this entailed reducing capital expenditure to keep the rise in overall spending below the 
expected rate of inflation. It was hoped that about two-thirds of the finance needed to cover the 
fiscal deficit would be provided by external sources (see again table 22). 
Monetary policy was designed to dampen inflationary pressures, ease the strains on the 
balance of payments, and provide an expansion in credit sufficient to finance the planned level of 
economic activity. In January the bank rate, prime lending rate and savings deposit rates were all 
raised, although they remained appreciably below the rate of inflation. In February, a Deposit 
Scheme for Payments Arrears was established to mop up excess liquidity arising from the demand 
for foreign exchange that could not be met on a current basis, and to ensure an orderly liquidation 
of accumulated arrears as foreign exchange became available. Such a scheme had been used in 
connexion with the EFF programme in 1978, but this time interest would be paid on the deposits. 
In March, ceilings on consumer credit equal to the amounts outstanding on 31 December 1979, 
were established. Finally, the voluntary 40% liquid assets ratio for commercial banks that was 
introduced in 1979 on a temporary basis was extended through 1980. 
Fiscal and monetary measures were reinforced by an incomes policy and price controls. The 
10% lid on wage increases introduced at the start of the second year of the EFF programme was 
retained, while price controls were amplified and rigorously administered. 
The fiscal accounts for the April-December segment of the 1980/1981 fiscal year are shown 
in table 24. As may be seen, significant variations occurred in relation both to the comparable 
period of the previous year and to the budgeted amounts. Current revenue was about 2% below the 
1979 intake, and over 19% below the corresponding budget estimates. Current expenditures 
exceeded the 1979 ones (by 16%), but were virtually the same as planned. The resulting deficit on 
the current account was almost twice that of 1979 and two-thirds more than that envisioned for the 
entire fiscal year. Capital expenditure, on the other hand, was held below both the 1979 level and 
the planned level. In the latter case, the cutback amounted to one-fourth. Nevertheless, the overall 
deficit for the April-December period was already larger than projected for the entire fiscal year. 
This, together with the failure to mobilize foreign financing of the magnitude hoped for, led to 
much greater reliance on the domestic banking system, and especially on the Bank of Jamaica, than 
had been intended.-16 Net borrowing from the domestic banking system between April and 
December was equivalent to over 8% of the GDP for 1980 as a whole. Consequently, as the year 
progressed the monetary targets had to be modified. The decision taken was to accomadate both 
the public and private sector demand for credit and thus maintain the output and employment 
targets, while sacrificing the inflation one. In this manner the expansion of domestic credit 
reached over 34%, or much more than originally intended: that is to say, much more than would 
have been consistent with the projected levels of output and inflation.' As a result, the increase in 
the money supply approached 36%, notwithstanding a further appreciable deterioration in the net 
international reserves and a major increase in savings and time deposits (see table 25). The actual 
rate of growth of money was about four-fifths greater than planned, and this was probably a major 
factor in the acceleration of the rate of inflation over the course of the year. 
°While the foreign exchange gap in the balance of payments was closed only a small proportion of the offsetting 
inflow was available to the central government. 




JAMAICA: MONETARY BALANCE 
Balance at end of: 
(millions of Jamaica dollars) Growth rates 
1077 	 1978 	 1979 	 1980 1978 1979 1980 
1. Money 494 	 581 	 625 	 847 17.6 7.6 35.5 
Currency outside banks 182 	 173 	 220 	 260 -4.9 27.2 18.1 
Demand deposits 292 	 397 	 410 	 457 36.0 3.3 11.5 
2. Factors of expansion 1 	 122 	 1 	 106 	 1 	 251 	 1 	 831 -1.4 13.1 46.4 
Foreign assets (net) -246 	 -626 	 -845 	 -983 - - 
Domestic credit 1 	 368 	 1 	 732 	 2 096 	 2 814 26.6 21.0 34.3 
Government (net) 691 	 914 	 1 	 128 	 1 	 619 32.3 23.4 43.5 
Official entities 117 	 130 	 161 	 223 11.1 23.8 38.5 
Private sector 560 	 688 	 807 	 972 22.9 17.3 20.4 
3. Factors of absorption 628 	 525 	 626 	 984 -16.4 19.2 57.2 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 570 	 665 	 793 	 996 16.7 19.2 25.6 
Other items 	 (net) 58 	 -140 	 -167 	 -12 - - 
Source: 	 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. 34, 	 No. 9, 
September 	 1981. 
Measured against the initial targets, the performance of the economy was rather disappoint-
ing. Yet, given the yawning foreign exchange gap, the very adverse weather conditions, and the 
extremely turbulent social climate that developed in anticipation of the election results, the 
performance was creditable. In any event, it was about the same as was turned in under the IMF 
stabilization plan. 
In the October elections the governing party was defeated, and the new administration 






DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY 
- The challenge of the 1980s - 
Enrique V. Iglesias 
This article reproduces, with a few changes the Report which the 
author presented to the nineteenth session of CEPAL in his capacity as 
Executive Secretary of the Commission. 
In the first part, he describes some of the main features of the 
international situation and the regional scene at the beginning of the 1980s. 
With regard to the international situation, he stresses the dangers of the 
protectionism that is reappearing in the industrialized economies; with 
respect to the regional scene, he stresses the inconsistency between the 
expanding and increasingly diversified base of production and the conti-
nuation of unresolved distribution problems and social inadequacies. 
In the second part, he takes up two key concepts in the CEPAL theory 
of development--the centreperiphery system and industrialization--and uses 
them as guidelines for dealing with the problems of the present and the 
future. In so doing, he does not seek to make a retrospective eulogy of 
those concepts, but rather to use them to interpret some of the pressing 
economic problems of the region. 
In the third part, he outlines the strategic problems of the coming 
years which, in his view, are those pertaining to international trade, 
external financing, the energy transition and food security. 
In his final observations, he summarizes his vision: whilst it is 
very important to solve the external problems, it is on the domestic front 
that the groundwork for the region's development must be laid. On this 
front, he draws attention to three challenges: the reconciliation of 
economic and social efficiency, the modernization of private enterprise 
and of the State, and the bringing of all national policies into line with 
the criterion of integral development. 




PROBLEMS AND ORIENTATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
CEPAL, Economic Projections Centre 
At its nineteenth session, held in Montevideo in May 1981, the CEPAL 
Secretariat submitted a report entitled "Latin American Development in the 
1980s", for the main purpose of collaborating with the governments of the 
region in the preparation of a regional programme of action in relation to 
the new International Development Strategy. 
This article is a slightly modified version of the first two chapters 
of this report, aimed at the study of two major areas of Latin American 
development. Firstly, it deals with economic and social trends, focusing 
its attention on the problems of economic growth, income distribution, 
poverty, unemployment, energy problems and problems of the external sector, 
and concluding that it is essential to give a new orientation to development 
strategies and policies. Secondly, the article considers the main elements 
of this new orientation, indicating certain objectives which Latin America 
should set .tself in. the next decade, espec-ially in the economic field. 
These include in pa76cular the steppin 
	 economic growth, the 
equitable distribution of income and the el*mination of extreme poverty, 
the control of inflation, the trgns'SoTnation of the structure of external 
economic relations and the stimulation of the participation of the 
population in development. 
The article ,,cognizes t e diversity of national situations and 
stresses the need. to ma .e tl.em into cideration in concrete strategies, 
but it also points out that these generr,,.1 objectives are very useful for 
guiding the proe





CONSUMPTION 17 - :L! LATIN AMERICAN MODELS 
Carlos Filgueira 
The main objective or ti. 
consumption in the economic arc 
Years in the countries of the o 
places at the centre of this aes 
tide is to study the role played by 
itical strategies followed in recent 
'::ern Cone of Latin America. The author 
is an apparent paradox whose significance 
he seeks to discover: on the one :and, these societies display a consi-
derable increase in the consurnptoo of durable goods and other "sophisticated" 
articles, primarily acquired ttirocgh imports, and this is usually presented 
as a manifestation of the success cf such strategies, but on the other hand, 
the same societies also display ben growing inequality in the distribution 
of wealth and income and a deteriosation in the degree of coverage of the 
basic needs of the poorest strata. 
In order to elucidate this paradox, the author begins with a critical 
analysis of the significance which consumption usually has in economic 
theory and emphazises the need to Sake into account its sociological aspects 
which makes it an important interfsce between the two disciplines. He goes 
on to explore the statistical infolmation available in order to describe 
the patterns of concentration and dissemination of the consumption of 
durable goods, especially in the case of Chile, and finally gives a summary 
of his main conclusions. Among the latter he suggests that the new and 
sometimes paradoxical patterns of consumption adopted by the various social 
strata in these societies can only be understood within the context of 
global tendencies furthering the creation of forms of social organization 
in which the relative absence of other accepted manners of personal 
realization and social participation given 'modern' consumption a central 
role in both personal life and in he principles of social integration. 
CEPAL Consultant and Director of the Uruguayan Centre for 




SOME REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH-EAST ASIAN EXPORT INDUSTRIALIZATION 
Fernando Fajnzylber 
The succesful export strategies of some South-East Asian countries 
have been raised in certain Latin American circles to the level of veritable 
paradigms and it is held that our region should imitate these processes 
in order to achieve high rates of growth of production, employment, pro-
ductivity and even real remuneration. For this reason, it is of particular 
interest to analyse the policies, institutional machinery, and domestic 
and international social and political conditions within the framework 
of which these cases have taken place. 
The present article analyses some aspects of these processes which 
show the complexity, richness and heterogeneity that characterize them 
and which make it clear that the lessons that can be drawn from them while 
richer and more valuable than those deriving from the 'popular/ version 
generally disseminated in Latin America, do not permit their imitative 
application in this region. 
After the Introduction, section II of the article gives a brief 
description of the main economic parameters of the four countries in 
question--South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Section III 
examines the relationship between the export and industrialization policies, 
section IV raises some aspects of protectionist and import substitution 
policy, section V analyses the role which the State has played in these 
strategies, and the last section of the article sets these examples 
against the international context in which they have occurred. 




THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE 1980s 
Victor E. Tokman 21/ 
The productive absorption of the labour force has always been one 
of CEPAL's top priorities, not only because it indicates a rise in the 
level of productivity but also because it serves as a basis for a more 
equitable distribution of the benefits of development. 
The author analyses this subject in depth, stressing the persistence 
of a high level of underutilization of the labour force in the region as 
a whole--as expressed in high unemployment and underemployment indexes--
despite the considerable absorption capacity shown by high-productivity 
urban activities. If the region wants to reach a level of utilization equal 
to that of the industrialized economies within the next twenty years, the 
growth rate will have to be 8.3% annually and will also have to be supported 
by public policies directed towards productive absorption. 
Given these requirements, the article emphasizes the need to carry 
out action directly oriented towards achieving an increase in the productive 
absorption of the labour force, as historical experience shows, that this 
problem will not be solved spontaneously, nor is such absorption merely 
a subproduct of economic growth. 
In the final part, the author examines some of the repercussions 
which the new strategies applied in the region--oriented towards greater 
external openess--have had on employment, especially in industry. He 
admits that this sector of production must increase its efficiency and 
competitiveness, but he also stresses the important role it has played 
in the absorption of the labour force and consequently in the latter's 
living conditions. New strategies should always take into account their 
consequences for employment and the standard of living of the population. 
J Director of the Regional Employment Programme for Latin America 




THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION 
Isaac Cohen Grantee 
The concept of integration dates back a long time, although it has 
been used as an economic term only since the Second World War, when it 
was used to explain one of the objectives of the programmes for the 
reconstruction of Europe. Since its distant origins, its meaning has 
changed according to circumstances, which justifies an exploration of its 
various meanings in order to give them a sense appropriate to the present 
circumstances. 
This article does not have a merely semantic purpose, however, as it 
attempts to shed light on the term by adapting it to reality as far as 
possible, in order to derive from it more viable integrationist measures. 
In other words, it is an attempt to define integration so as to identify 
concrete measures capable of being adopted and carried out. This does not 
mean, of course, that a simple clarification of the concept of integration 
is enough to overcome the difficulties involved in the process. This 
approach does, however, recognize that overcoming these difficulties 
requires, inter alia, the development of a suitable definition. 
The study is divided into two parts. The first is a review of the 
definitions of integration most frequently used at present, in order to 
define their common features and some of their disadvantages; the second 
part offers an alternative definition and analyses its components some 
of its advantages 




DIAL 1CUE "" RIEDMAN AND HAYEK 
- From the _.tar.r,oin 	 the periphery 
Raal Prebisch */ 
In all his recent writings, the author has maintained that neocla-
ssical thinking is not only incapable of explaining tee structure and 
operation of capitalism in the T)erphery, but has a misguiding influence 
on economic policy decisions. In the present article he reverts to these 
ideas, formulating them as if Rro came up in the course of a dialogue 
carried out with followers of 
	 two leading contemporary mentors of 
the thinking in question; thus he is able to present his points of view 
with the fluid simplicity in which strictly academic essays are often 
lacking. 
In his opinion, the root cause of the incapacity of neoclassical 
thinking to interpret peripheral capitalism lies above all in its failure 
to take into consideration the economic surplus, which is the hub of this 
system's basic characteristics. It disregards the structural. heterogeneity 
which possibilitates the existence of the surplus; it bypasses the 
structure and dynamics of power which explain how the surplus is appro-
priated and shared out; it shuts its eyes to the monetary mechanism of 
production which allows the surplus, to be retained by the upper strata; 
and it underestimates the waste involved in the ways in which the surplus 
is currently used. 
This shortsighted interpretation of the economic process predisposes 
neoclassical thinking to propose policy measures which do not succeed in 
promoting the development of the periphery; which increase and consolidate 
social inequality and which necessitate the establishment of authoritarian 
regimes, diametrically at variance with the ideas of democratic liberalism. 
The necessary transformation of peripheral capitalism, which the author 
propounds, must preserve the value: :J and institutions of democracy and at 
the same time ensure vigorous economic development and equitable distri-
bution of its fruits. 
Director of the CEPAL Review. 
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